



Consolidated ISSSS Monitoring Report

Baseline Study

M&E Cell of the ISSSS Technical Secretariat

Goma, July 2017

REPORT NO. 1 – 2016/2017
ISSSS TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

List of Acronyms

CISPE	Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ETD	Local Entities/ 'Entités Territoriales Décentralisées'
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (DRC Armed Forces)
FARM	Food Security and Inclusive Access to Resources for Conflict Sensitive Market Development
SCF	Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation (Stabilization Coherence Fund, "trust fund")
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda)
HR	Human Right
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
JHRO	Joint Human Right Office
ISSSS	International Stabilization and Security Support Strategy
M&E Cell	Monitoring and Evaluation Cell
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC
NK	North Kivu
PNC	Police Nationale Congolaise (National Congolese Police)
PoC	Protection of civilians
SFCG	Search For Common Ground
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSU	Stabilization Support Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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1 Introduction

This report contains the first part of the official results baseline for the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS). The baseline data was collected over the period from July to December 2016.

The report is the first in a planned series of biannual reports, which are intended to support timely, evidence-based decision-making by both the Government of the DRC and its international partners. While it originally had been scheduled for March of 2017, its publication had to be delayed until July 2017, as data from the UNDP-MONUSCO joint project¹ and data from internal MONUSCO sources (2 out of the 3 main sources) had not yet been made available to the M&E Cell of the Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU). The first publication was also postponed so as to take into account the additional time implementing partners required to prepare their project log frames, which in turn required considerable SSU resources.

The next monitoring report will be published in September / October of 2017, covering the period from January 2017 until the end of June 2017. Subsequent reports will be released every six months.

1.1 About the ISSSS monitoring system

Preparations for the ISSSS monitoring system began in late 2015, with the support of a DFID-funded technical assistance project. This resulted in the establishment of the ISSSS M&E Cell in September of 2016.

The purpose of the ISSSS monitoring system is to track progress towards the objectives of the ISSSS. While the system **is not intended** to monitor individual stabilization projects, the M&E Cell does rely on data collection efforts by ISSSS project partners to provide data on several common, project level indicators.

Strategy level monitoring a new function for the ISSSS. Its set up has entailed three phases of work:

- i. Collaborative design of the M&E strategy with the Government, implementing partners, and ISSSS donors.
- ii. Harmonization of the logical framework of relevant programs with the ISSSS results framework, including common indicators and tools to measure them.
- iii. Reporting at six-month intervals against the indicators set out in the results framework, and ongoing support to alignment of new programs.

The design of the ISSSS M&E Strategy was completed in mid-2016, with the main products including the ISSSS logical framework and monitoring strategy. A short summary of the monitoring strategy can be obtained directly from the ISSSS M&E Cell, and will also shortly be available online.

The first tranche of “aligned” stabilization projects² have been harmonised with the ISSSS results framework, and a set common data collection tools for shared ISSSS indicators are in the late stages of development. These tools will allow all partners to collect ISSSS monitoring data in a consistent manner. Meanwhile programs funded under the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (SCF) have been designed from the outset to address ISSSS results, and to measure progress on the basis of shared indicators.

¹ Collecte des données sur la Consolidation de la Paix et la Reconstruction en RDC ; PNUD avec des partenaires d'exécution MONUSCO, HHI, Numéro de projet : 0090384.

² I.e. projects that are funded by third parties, i.e. bilateral donors, but that work in accordance with key principles of the ISSSS.

Monitoring of the ISSSS is drawing on data and information from three primary sources: i) the different thematic sections of MONUSCO and from the Technical Secretariat of the ISSSS; ii) project partners that are implementing interventions under the ISSSS umbrella; i.e., both “aligned” projects and those financed by the Stabilisation Coherence Fund; iii) the joint UNDP-MONUSCO project³ that, with the help of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI), is conducting perception polls on stabilization-related topics in the three Eastern provinces.

1.2 Scope of the report

The report provides baseline data for three of the six ISSSS Priority Zones: Sud-Irumu, Kitchanga, and Ruzizi.

Data from the priority zones of Mambasa and Kalehe could not be included in this report as the extension as funding constraints meant that in particular data from the UNDP-MONUSCO joint project (HHI surveys) could not be collected in these two priority zones in time for this report. Both priority zones will be covered by the 2nd ISSSS Monitoring report (planned for September / October 2017). The Beni priority zone is not yet active. A baseline report for Beni will be available in March of 2018.

1.3 Overview of the report

This monitoring report contains the following components:

- **Chapter 2** provides an overview of the ISSSS results are being addressed by corresponding stabilization projects. The mapping takes into account projects that either had already started in the summer of 2017, or that that were about to start implementation. The overview was put together on the basis of the logical frameworks and project documents that project partners had shared with the ISSSS Technical Secretariat. The “*project landscape*” is as much intended as an analytical device for use in this report as also as a common reference point for the M&E Cell and implementing partners to jointly refine the project mapping for subsequent reports⁴.
- **Chapter 3** presents the baseline data for those ISSSS indicators for which information was available in July of 2017. This includes perception data from the UNDP-MONUSCO joint project (collected on behalf of the project by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI)), specifically from the polls conducted in June and December of 2016. In addition, Chapter 3 also presents data from the ITEM database of MONUSCO, specifically the information on security incidents collected by the MONUSCO Force. **Not included in this report** are any indicators that rely on data collection by ISSSS project partners, and indicators that rely on data from the Joint Human Rights Office of the UN. Reporting on these indicators will start with the next monitoring report (to be published in September / October 2017).
- **Chapter 4** of this report offers several preliminary observations on the data and information presented in the previous chapters. These observations are intended as an invitation for further reflection on the data presented in this report. At the same time, all users of the ISSSS monitoring

³ Collecte des données sur la Consolidation de la Paix et la Reconstruction en RDC ; PNUD avec des partenaires d'exécution MONUSCO, HHI, Numéro de projet : 0090384.

⁴ Subsequent reports may well base the project mapping on the allocation of the project budget to the different components of the ISSSS log frame. This was not yet possible for this report.

data are encouraged to examine the evidence that is presented in this report, and to question and revise the observations in Chapter 4 on the basis of their own reflections.

This **baseline report** represents a **first step** in the role out of reporting and dissemination for the ISSSS monitoring system. A number of limitations of this first step should be noted at the outset:

- 1) Many of the aligned and SCF programs are in the early stages. This means that there is little data on program outcomes, as yet, which limits the possibilities to draw conclusions on programmatic aspects of the ISSSS.
- 2) Data sharing with sections within MONUSCO and with members of the UN family is still being piloted; with some of these arrangements yet having to be put in place. This means that the scope and detail of available data will grow for future reports.
- 3) This report also serves to test different options for presenting data and policy implications, with some components of the M&E system such as the online database yet to come online. In the future, regular reporting and continuous access to up-to-date electronic information will go hand-in-hand.

At this early stage in the monitoring process, the ISSSS evidence base is not yet complete enough to support any specific, concrete and targeted recommendations to ISSSS stakeholders on the way forward.

Therefore, the observations and reflections that this report offers (see Chapter 4) are preliminary and tentative in nature⁵. They are neither directed at any ISSSS partner in particular, nor are they intended to trigger any concrete and immediate actions.

The observations should merely be seen as “food for thought” for all ISSSS stakeholders. The M&E Cell will use them to kick-start discussions during dissemination events for this report. The M&E Cell will revisit the observations during the analysis for the next monitoring report, and, depending on the findings, will either refine or discard them in subsequent reports.

Subsequent reports will broaden and deepen the analysis, based on already-agreed sources of data “coming online”. This will include:

- Coverage of the additional three ISSSS Priority Zones (Mambasa, Kalehe and Beni).
- More data on trends and conditions, as well as program outcomes.
- Clearer definitions of political / policy milestones, e.g., in relation to the support of a coherent political, administrative, legal and financial framework for local governance.⁶
- A first set of more concrete and targeted recommendations for future action.

⁵ And the authors of the report phrased them tentatively on purpose.

⁶ See Overall Outcome 3.3 of the ISSSS logical framework.

1.4 Data sources

The analysis in this report is based on the following:

ISSSS Project mapping:

- Initial project documentation and log frames for ongoing programmes, including those that are funded by the SCF and those that are funded bi-laterally (i.e., aligned projects).

ISSSS Results monitoring

- Perception survey data collected through two perception surveys carried out in June and December of 2016 as part of a joint UNDP-MONUSCO project⁷ (data collection by HHI on behalf of the project)⁸.
- Data from MONUSCO on the occurrence of incidences of violence and other crimes perpetrated against the civilian population in the priority zones, also for the period from July to December 2016.

For this report, we have *not* accessed other data from the Joint Human Rights Office (JHRO)) and from in-depth documentation (reports, results data, evaluation reports) for ongoing programmes as most of them have become operational only in 2017 or have only aligned their operations to the ISSSS after the end of 2016⁹. This means that not all indicators of the ISSSS logical framework could be included in this report.

⁷ Collecte des données sur la Consolidation de la Paix et la Reconstruction en RDC ; PNUD avec des partenaires d'exécution MONUSCO, HHI, Numéro de projet : 0090384.


⁸ The survey carried out under the UNDP-MONUSCO joint project had a sample size of 1,742 (Sud Irumu: 433; Ruzizi: 841; Kitchanga: 468). The margin of error for the survey is +/- 5%.

⁹ The only project funded by the Stabilization Coherence Fund (SCF) that formally started operations already in 2016 is the project covering Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) of the ISSSS in the ISSSS Priority Zone of Kitchanga, implemented by a consortium led by International Alert. Monitoring data that reflects activities of this project carried out in the first half of 2017 has been submitted to the SSU M&E Cell, and will be presented in detail in the 2nd ISSSS monitoring report.

2 The ISSSS project landscape

The monitoring system of the International Stabilization Strategy is based on the logical framework of the ISSSS. The ISSSS 'log frame' summarises the **intervention logic** of the ISSSS, and distinguishes the five result levels of the strategy. The three lower results levels of the log frame summarise the **intervention logic** of the **five thematic pillars of the ISSSS**¹⁰: **Intermediate Outcomes**¹¹ at the lowest level, **Overall Outcomes**¹² right above, and **Specific Objectives**¹³ at the top (one for each thematic pillar). Cross-cutting **Strategic Objectives** (Security, Governance, Resilience), and the overarching **Goal** of the ISSSS (Stabilisation) sit at the top of the pyramid, as these results are dependent on progress across all of the pillars of the Strategy. Figure 1 below provides an overview of the architecture of the ISSSS logical framework.

Figure 1: The architecture of the ISSSS logical framework



The current log frame reflects the understanding of the ISSSS approach as of March 2016, which is when the logical framework was developed. Since then, the SSU has learned valuable lessons on the different aspects of the ISSSS. These lessons are being taken into account during the currently ongoing refinement of the ISSSS log frame.

¹⁰ I.e., the intended results of the ISSSS in its five thematic pillars: Democratic Dialogue, Security, Restoration of State Authority, Return, Reintegration and Socio-Economic Recovery, and the Fight against Sexual and Gender Based Violence – SGBV.

¹¹ The Intermediate Outcomes describe the incentives, knowledge and awareness of individual and organizational stakeholders that the ISSSS intends to positively affect in order to help influence the behaviour and performance of targeted stakeholders.

¹² Overall Outcomes describe the intended changes in stakeholder behaviour and performance that are sought to be necessary to help change the societal conditions and dynamics that have been driving instability and conflicts in Eastern DRC

¹³ The Specific Objectives of the ISSSS define the results that the stabilization strategy pursues under each pillar. Each of these specific objectives describes how the dynamics in the different sectors need to change to affect the cross-cutting societal conditions that are linked to the conflict drivers targeted by the stabilization strategy.

This chapter provides a first examination of the extent to which **the 56 results for the five thematic pillars of the ISSSS¹⁴** are currently being addressed by stabilization projects.

Note: The following **section of ISSSS project coverage** provides a **factual description** of the current situation. **Variations in project coverage** between different types of results **do not invariably constitute a gap** that needs to be filled, as the appropriateness of project coverage depends on the specific situation in each priority zone.

Also, stabilization projects are **only one way for affecting change** under the ISSSS. Other mechanisms include **broader political engagement** of the international community with its Congolese Partners, and the **“good offices” work of the SSU**, such as the efforts to work with provincial (and ultimately national) authorities to develop sector compacts.

While the following section only **describes patterns in project coverage**, Chapter 4 goes one step further and looks at **variations in coverage in the context of the ISSSS baseline data**. It is thus in Chapter 4 where the report offers some first, preliminary thoughts on the appropriateness of ISSSS project coverage at this point.

Table 1 provides an overview of the nine stabilization projects connected to the ISSSS that were either already ongoing in July 2017 or that were scheduled to start shortly after. The table distinguishes SCF-funded and bi-laterally funded (i.e., “aligned”) projects; and also provides information on the geographic coverage of each intervention.

Table 1: Overview of the ISSSS project portfolio for Kitchanga, Ruzizi and Sud Irumu Priority Zones (as of July 2017)

Type of Project	Project Name	Acronym used in report	Lead Organization	NK: Kitchanga	SK: Ruzizi	IT: Sud Irumu
SCF-funded	SCF Kitchanga (Pillar 1) - Les chemins vers les Accords	SCF Kitchanga (P1)	International Alert	X		
	SCF Kitchanga - Pamjoa Kwa Amani na Maende Leo	SCF Kitchanga	UNHABITAT	X		
	SCF Sud Irumu- Pamoja Kwa Amani (Ensemble pour la Paix)	SCF Sud Irumu	UNHABITAT			X
	SCF Ruzizi - Tujenge Pamoja kwa Ajili ya Amani (Construisons ensemble pour la Paix)	SCF Ruzizi	International Alert		X	
Bilaterally funded (aligned)	Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika (Security Sector Reform (SSR))	SSR	SFCG	X	X	
	Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC (CISPE)	CISPE	IOM	X		X
	Community Participatory Land Use Planning (CPLUP)	CPLUP	UNHABITAT			X
	Food Security and Inclusive Access to Resources for Conflict Sensitive Market Development (FARM)	FARM	Mercy Corps	X		
	Expanding Community Resilience to Violence in Ruzizi and Fizi	Peace Direct	Peace Direct		X	


¹⁴ I.e., Intermediate Outcomes, Overall Outcomes and Specific Objectives.

Figure 2 below **maps the 56 pillar-specific results the ISSSS logical framework** and shows how the thematic coverage of the nine stabilization projects in Table 1 is distributed across these results. The mapping took into account the results for which the SSU and project partners had identified common result indicators, but it also went beyond that and examined the scope of projects in the current portfolio independent of the existence of shared indicators. The mapping is thus not affected by any gaps in monitoring data.

In Figure 2 below,

- The five **Specific Objectives of the ISSSS (Orange)** are arranged at the **centre of the map**. For each pillar, the **Overall Outcomes (Blue)** and **Intermediate Outcomes (Green)** extend outwards from the centre.
- The **numbering of the results indicates which pillar each result belongs to (e.g. result 5.1.3 belongs to Pillar 5)**
- The **size of the circle** for each result element in the map indicates **the number of projects** that are addressing the respective ISSSS result across the three priority zones¹⁵, ranging from a **maximum of 7 projects (largest circle)** to a **minimum of 1 project per result (smallest circle)**.
- Results that are labelled in **red font** are currently **not covered by any projects**.

Figure 2: Map of ISSSS program landscape in Sud Irumu (Ituri), Kitchanga (North Kivu), Ruzizi (South Kivu), July 2017



Note: The size of the circle indicates the number of projects covering the respective result, ranging from 1 project (smallest circle) to 7 projects (largest circle). Results that are labelled in red font are currently not covered by any projects.

Note: The individual reports for each of the three ISSSS priority zones that were activated first (i.e., Kitchanga, Sud Irumu and Ruzizi) provide a more detailed picture of the project coverage of the ISSSS log frame in those zones. These reports can be found in **Annex X** of this summary report.

¹⁵ The largest circle stands for a total of 7 projects that are addressing the same result across the three priority zones; the smallest circles represents 1 project.

The coverage map in Figure 2 shows that:

- **Current project coverage varies substantially across the different results of the stabilisation strategy**, ranging from results that are addressed by seven different projects across the five priority zones¹⁶ (largest circles) to results that are at this time not addressed by any interventions under the ISSSS (no circles; red font).
- **Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) and Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience)** are the two ISSSS pillars with currently the **most complete project coverage**. As the cornerstone of the ISSSS approach, Democratic Dialogue is part of all projects that are funded by the SCF. Aligned projects are trying to emulate aspects of that approach for their sector specific interventions, by tying project governance and planning to the proceedings of participatory dialogue platforms and commonly agreed (sector-specific) action plans.
- For **Pillar 2**, **six** out of the **thirteen results** are covered by **two or more projects**. Four results are covered by one projects, three are not covered at all. Low coverage applies in particular to those results that aim at influencing FARDC operational PoC principles and procedures.
- In **Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)**, **seven out of the thirteen results** are only covered by **one or two** projects. **Two results** are **not covered at all**¹⁷. Coverage is particularly low for **Overall Outcome 3.3 (Coherent local governance framework)**.
- **Pillar 5 (SGBV Prevention)** is currently the pillar with the **lowest project coverage**. **Five out of the twelve results** under the pillar are **currently not covered** by projects, another **three** are **covered by one project**. Not covered are in particular those results that aim at **improving access to an (improved) judicial system** for SGBV survivors¹⁸. This also includes **strengthening of the military judicial system's capacity** to deal with SGBV cases (i.e., Intermediate Outcome 5.2.2)¹⁹.

Considering **project coverage across pillars**, the following pattern emerges:

- **Comparatively well covered by projects** at this point are results of the ISSSS intervention logic that **first and foremost require engagement at local level**, such as communities and their members, and local state agents or representatives of local authorities. This includes, for example, the training and awareness raising of individuals (e.g., community members w. regard to social / gender norms (IO 5.1) and social cohesion (IO 4.3); or training of state agents (IO 3.1.1 and 3.2.3).
- **Less well reflected in the intervention logic** of projects tend to be elements that are meant to link local stabilization efforts to proceedings and structures **at provincial or national level**. This includes results that foresee buy-in or action from national and provincial ministries or agencies on local priorities (e.g., IO 1.1.3 on sector compacts and IO 2.1.2 on the reinforcement of FARDC oversight and

¹⁶ Sud Irumu (Ituri), Kitchanga (North Kivu), Ruzizi (South Kivu)

¹⁷ '3.1.3: Availability of financial resources for service delivery' and '3.3.2: Division of responsibilities of formal and traditional authorities codified'.

¹⁸ Including Intermediate Outcomes 5.3.5: Speed, impartiality, confidentiality of SGBV trials; 5.3.4: Ease of filing of SGBV cases at local level; 5.3.1: Public awareness of laws, roles & responsibilities to combat SGBV.

¹⁹ It needs to be noted, however, that this assessment will need to be verified over the coming months: Assessing coverage of Pillar 5 is somewhat more difficult than it is for the other pillars, as many projects treat gender and SGBV as cross-cutting issues. Inclusion of these topics in a project's scope through 'mainstreaming' might therefore not be as immediately apparent.


disciplinary structures); or those that call for the dissemination of local lessons (IO 2.14) to higher administrative levels²⁰.

Note: It needs to be noted that each SCF consortium had to **develop a strategy on engagement of authorities at provincial and national level**. Also, the SSU is now working on a compact engagement strategy that is meant to lay down the commitments of the provincial authorities to contribute to the success of the program. These efforts will be **examined more closely** in subsequent ISSSS monitoring reports.

The **difference in project coverage** between results targeting mainly the community or local level and those meant to link the ISSSS to policies and actions of the Government of the DRC at provincial and national levels is illustrated below. As can be seen in Figure 3, most **results that are primarily 'local' in nature and approach are covered by two to four, and up to 7 projects**. Figure 4, by contrast, shows that a considerable share of the **"national" or "provincial"** results are either not covered at all at this point, or are **addressed by only one or two stabilization projects**, with three being the maximum number of projects that work on the same result. This pattern is **apparent in each of the three individual priority zones**. In all of them, projects were more likely to take on "local" ISSSS elements than they were to address the more challenging tasks of linking local action to the national and provincial policy and political contexts.


²⁰ As noted above, these are areas that may be covered by other engagement mechanisms, such as political dialogue and "good offices" work of the SSU.

Figure 3: Project coverage of ISSSS results focused on community & local level changes, July 2017.



Largest Circle: 7 projects; Smallest circle: 1 project; red font: no project

Figure 4: Coverage of ISSSS results aimed necessitating links to provincial & national levels, July 2017.



Largest Circle: 3 projects; Smallest circle: 1 project; red font: no project

Additionally, current project coverage as a whole also seems to **slightly favour ISSSS results that target individuals or inter-personal relations** between people (e.g., to raise awareness in communities of harmful gender norms, or to improve social ties between and within communities). By contrast, project coverage of ISSSS results **that target organizations; or that aim at establishing shared ‘institutions’**²¹ (such as joint, commonly agreed action plans to govern joint stabilization actions in the Priority Zones) tends to be **somewhat lower**, according to a preliminary analysis²². Table 2 illustrates the evolving coverage pattern in a cross table.

Table 2: Rough estimation of project coverage²³ by “level” and “sphere of influence” currently addressed in “PZ3” (Kitchanga, Ruzizi, Sud Irumu)

Level	Sphere of influence		
	Individual / Interpersonal	Organizational	Institutional
Local / Community	<p>Changes in individual skills / performance, e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2.1.1 (a, b): FARDC PoC awareness • 1.1.1: Inclusive, participatory Democratic Dialogue (DD) <p>Changes in awareness / knowledge / perceptions, e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5.1.2: Participation in SGBV dialogue 	<p>Capacity Development, e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.2.1: Oversight mechanisms of stabilization process functioning • 2.1: Operational FARDC PoC principles & procedures applied & enforced²⁴ • 3.3.1: Local authorities prepared for devolution and financial retrocession 	<p>Creation of common purpose (societal), e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.1.1: Joint action plans (Democratic Dialogue) developed and approved by communities
Provincial (& National)	<p>Changes in individual skills / performance; e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3.2.3: State agents aware of formal duties / responsibilities <p>Changes in awareness / knowledge / perceptions, e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.1.3: National authorities commit to & act upon 'Sector Compacts' • 2.1.4: Local PoC lessons & requirements communicated to nat. FARDC • 3.3.3: Lessons for local State presence acted on nationally 	<p>Capacity Development, e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2.1: Operational FARDC PoC principles & procedures applied & enforced²⁵ • 2.1.2: FARDC disciplinary, oversight structures reinforced • 2.1.3: Strengthened military judicial mechanisms f. HR violations • 5.2.2: Strengthened military judicial systems for SGBV cases 	<p>Creation of common purpose (societal), e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.1.3: National authorities commit to & act upon 'Sector Compacts' <p>Rule changing (legislative / regulatory, administrative); e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3.1.3: Availability of financial resources for service delivery • 3.3: Coherent local governance framework • 3.3.2: Division of responsibilities of formal and traditional authorities codified

Red: Low coverage²⁶; Yellow / Orange: Medium coverage²⁷; Green: High coverage²⁸

²¹ I.e., the rules, customs, shared standards and values by which a society of group of individuals lives and acts.

²² The analysis of patterns in the development of project coverage for the ISSSS will be refined over the coming months, and updates will be presented in each of the following monitoring reports. One important purpose of presenting these preliminary findings and observations here is to solicit feedback and to encourage a discussion among everyone involved in the implementation of the ISSSS that will help the M&E Cell to successively refine its analysis.

²³ In Kitchanga, Ruzizi and Sud Irumu.

²⁴ Also reaches up to national / provincial level.

²⁵ Also reaches down to community / local level.

²⁶ The majority of results without project coverage; or low (1 – 2) projects.

²⁷ The majority of results are covered by one to two projects; but selected key results (e.g., 1.2.1: Oversight mechanisms of stabilization process functioning) have good coverage.

²⁸ The majority of results are covered by more than two projects.

3 Conditions and trends in ISSSS results areas

This chapter presents the baseline data for the ISSSS (Phase 2) for those indicators that draw on MONUSCO data or the perception data from the joint UNDP-MONUSCO project²⁹. These tend to be the indicators for the higher levels of ISSSS results. The SSU M&E Cell will begin to report on indicators that are more directly linked to project operations and that are collected by project partners in the next report, as more stabilization projects have finalized their project set-up and are starting implementation and associated monitoring.

The chapter provides the available baseline values in three sets:

- Table 3 presents the baseline for those indicators whose values are largely the same between the priority zones of Kitchanga, Ruzizi and Sud Irumu³⁰, and are thus suggesting similarities between the zones.
- Table 4 shows the indicators whose values differ between the three priority zones³¹, and that thus are suggesting possible differences between the three areas.
- Table 5 and Table 6 provide a breakdown by gender for indicators with differing baseline values for men and women³².

This chapter does not provide any observations on patterns in the data. This is done in Chapter 4 of this report; and in the final chapter of the Annexes for each of the three priority zones.

²⁹ Collecte des données sur la Consolidation de la Paix et la Reconstruction en RDC ; PNUD avec des partenaires d'exécution MONUSCO, HHI, Numéro de projet : 0090384.

³⁰ This means that any differences in the survey results are within the margin of error of the perception survey; i.e., within +/- 5% of each other.

³¹ I.e., the difference of the values for the priority zones in that table for at least one pairing of zones is outside the +/- 5% margin of error for the polls conducted by the UNDP – MONUSCO joint project.

³² The difference of values for women and men in this table for at least one Priority Zone are outside the +/- 5% margin of error for the polls conducted under the UNDP – MONUSCO joint project.

Table 3: ISSSS monitoring data with similar values across 3 Priority Zones (combined (average) value from polls of 06/2016 and 12/2016)³³

Indicator		Location		
		Kitchanga	Ruzizi	Sud Irumu
Pillar 1	Indicator 1_iii: % Women and men stating that their villages / neighborhoods are 'very/ extremely peaceful	11%	12%	7%
	Indicator 1.1_iii: % of men and women who state that peace consolidation projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing the most important issues to in their area	6%	6%	6%
	Indicator 1.2: % of men and women who believe that government is managing the following areas "well" or "very well" (average)	9%	10%	8%
	Indicator 1.2 (Av. Security): % of men and women who believe that government is managing the following areas "well" or "verywell" (average for security and safety)	16%	18%	10%
	Indicator 1.2 (Av. Economy): % of men and women who believe that government is managing the following areas "well" or "verywell" (average for economic issues)	2%	2%	6%
	1.2 (a): Establish peace in Eastern Congo	7%	15%	8%
	1.2 (b): Reduce poverty	1%	1%	6%
	1.2 (c): Increase employment	2%	2%	6%
	1.2 (d): Combat corruption	5%	2%	5%
	1.2 (e): Unify the different ethnic groups	10%	17%	12%
1.2 (f): Improve the lives of Congolese	1%	2%	6%	
1.2 (g): Ensure security	14%	12%	8%	
Pillar 2	Indicator 2.1_ii: % population (women and men) who report that the presence of the military causes them to feel insecure (& triangulation)	22%	17%	20%
Pillar 3	Indicator 3.1_i (a): % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of the Congolese State	9%	14%	14%
	Indicator 3.1_i (b): % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to a police station or sub-station	12%	16%	16%
	Indicator 3.2_i (a): % of women and men indicating that national / provincial / local elected officials represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well'	2%	3%	6%
	Indicator 3.2_i (b): % of women and men indicating that provincial elected officials represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well'	4%	3%	7%
Indicator 3.2_i (c): % of women and men indicating that local officials represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well'	31%	26%	25%	
Pillar 4	Indicator 4.2.1_iv: % of women and men indicating they have "good" or "very good" access to markets	34%	37%	30%
	Indicator 4.2.5_i: % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months	5%	9%	10%
	Indicator 4.3_i (b): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups	92%	84%	90%
	Indicator 4.3_i (d): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups	84%	72%	83%
	Indicator 4.3.2_i: % of women and men who state that they have a "good" or "very good" relationship across different groups of people in their lives	88%	84%	89%
	Indicator 4.3.2_i (a) relationship with parents, children, spouse	88%	84%	89%
Pillar 5	Indicator 5_ii: % women and men reporting that they have experienced physical or sexual violence in the last 6mths	3%	1%	4%
	Indicator 5_iii (b)i: % of women and men who personally know a man who was survivor ("victim") of sexual violence	2%	2%	4%
	Indicator 5.1_i (a): % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage)	68%	60%	64%
	Indicator 5.1_ii (a-1): % of women and men reporting that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their community	95%	88%	87%
	Indicator 5.1_ii (a-2): % of women and men reporting that they would accept a survivor of sexual violence back into their household.	92%	87%	86%
	Indicator 5.1_ii (b): % of women and men reporting that they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence.	84%	83%	82%
	Indicator 5.1_ii (c): % of women and men who would accept back into their household a woman who is a survivor of sexual violence if this women had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as a result of this incidence.	80%	80%	80%
	Indicator 5.1.3_j (b): % of women and men who themselves have participated in meetings on issues related to gender-based violence over the last three months (discussion and debate)	15%	10%	7%
Indicator 5.1.3_j (c): % of women and men who themselves have participated in other actions to combat gender-based violence over the last three months (direct action)	10%	7%	6%	

Source: Perception polls carried out under UNDP- MONUSCO joint project in 06/2016 and 12/2016.

³³ The difference between the values for each priority zones are within the +/- 5% margin of error of polls conducted under the UNDP – MONUSCO joint project.

Table 4: ISSSS monitoring data with differing values across PZ3 Priority Zones (combined (average) value from polls of 06/2016 and 12/2016)³⁴

Indicator		Location		
		Kitchanga	Ruzizi	Sud Irumu
Pillar 1	Indicator 1_iv: % of women and men expecting that their village / neighborhood will be more peaceful in one year	23%	18%	12%
	1.2 (h): 'Indicator 1.2: % of men and women who believe that government is managing the following areas "well" or "very well": <u>Combat sexual violence</u>	34%	29%	13%
Pillar 2	Indicator 2_II (a): % of women and men who personally have been helped by the FARDC over the past year.	17%	5%	26%
	Indicator 2_III (a): % of women and men (in areas where FARDC are deployed) who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security	23%	12%	38%
	Indicator 2.2.2_i: % of women and men who agree that the victims of crimes by FARDC have the opportunity to complain (disaggregated by gender and sub-priority zone).	59%	53%	87%
	Indicator 2.2.2_ii: % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts to prevent crimes are ongoing	40%	37%	55%
	Indicator 2.2.2_iii: % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for their crimes)	34%	39%	19%
Pillar 3	Indicator 3.1_i (c): % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to the national civil judicial system	5%	14%	20%
	Indicator 3.2.2_ii: % of women and men who indicate that they find it "very" or "extremely" acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes').	17%	28%	16%
Pillar 4	Indicator 4_ii: % of HH depending on traditional activities as their main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, hunting, animal husbandry)	85%	58%	62%
	Indicator 4.2.3_i: % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required?	3%	7%	17%
	Indicator 4.3_i (a): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities or ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups	89%	73%	84%
	Indicator 4.3_i (c): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups	83%	57%	78%
	Indicator 4.3_ii (a): % of women and men who "agree" that groups or individuals in their neighborhood / village pursue shared objectives and work together to achieve them; in spite of occasional competition	71%	42%	57%
	Indicator 4.3_ii (b): % of women and men who "agree" that the population in their neighborhood / village work together but that there are important divisions that create competition	51%	33%	43%
	Indicator 4.3_ii (c): % of women and men who "agree" that the population in their village is very divided, that groups and individuals compete with each other and that everyone only seeks to achieve his / her own objective	38%	44%	60%
	Indicator 4.3.2_i: % of women and men who state that they have a "good" or "very good" relationship across different groups of people in their lives			
	Indicator 4.3.2_i (b) relationship with neighbors	88%	78%	89%
	Indicator 4.3.2_i (c) relationship with people in village or quarter	82%	75%	86%
	Indicator 4.3.2_i (d) relationship with people of own ethnic group	82%	72%	83%
Indicator 4.3.2_i (e) relationship with people, no matter their ethnic group	59%	70%	61%	
Pillar 5	Indicator 5_III (a): % of women and men who personally know a woman who was survivor ("victim") of sexual violence	21%	11%	30%
	Indicator 5.1_i (b). % of women and men who "agree" that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat his wife / spouse	31%	16%	29%
	Indicator 5.1_i (d). % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in the family', i.e., without involvement of the authorities	37%	30%	26%
	Indicator 5.1.3_i (a): % of women and men who have sought out information about issues related to gender-based violence over the last three months (seeking information)	18%	11%	7%
	Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence	51%	30%	35%
	Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who 'agree' that PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence	52%	30%	35%
	Indicator 5.2_iv (a): % of women and men who consider the efforts of the police / PNC to investigate cases of sexual violence to be 'good' or 'very good'	35%	24%	26%
	Indicator 5.2_iv (b): % of women and men who think that survivors of sexual violence are served by the police / PNC "as well" or "better" as survivors of other crimes	75%	69%	56%
	Indicator 5.2_iv (c): % of women and men who think that today's efforts of the police to investigate cases of sexual violence are 'better' than those of a year ago	35%	17%	13%
Indicator 5.3.3_v: % of women and men (where appropriate also girls and boys) ¹ reporting that they know how to access support services for SGBV survivors	48%	22%	24%	

Source: Perception polls carried out under UNDP- MONUSCO joint project in 06/2016 and 12/2016

³⁴ The difference of the values for the priority zones in this table for at least one pairing of zones are outside the +/- 5% margin of error for the polls conducted under the UNDP – MONUSCO joint project.

Table 5: ISSSS monitoring data with differing values for women and men (by Priority Zone) (Pillars 1 to 4) (combined (average) value from polls of 06/2016 and 12/2016)³⁵

Indicator		Location / Gender					
		Kitchanga		Ruzizi		Sud Irumu	
		Femme	Homme	Femme	Homme	Femme	Homme
Pillar 1	Indicator 1_iii: % Women and men stating that their villages / neighborhoods are 'very/ 'extremely' peaceful	7%	14%	7%	18%	6%	8%
	Indicator 1_iv: % of women and men expecting that their village / neighborhood will be more peaceful in one year	17%	29%	11%	25%	15%	9%
Pillar 2	Indicator 2_II (a): % of women and men who personally have been helped by the FARDC over the past year.	13%	21%	4%	6%	15%	37%
	Indicator 2_iii (a): % of women and men (in areas where FARDC are deployed) who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security	14%	31%	10%	14%	41%	35%
	Indicator 2.2.2_ii: % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts to prevent crimes are ongoing	37%	43%	38%	37%	40%	71%
Pillar 3	Indicator 3.1_i (b): % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to a police station or sub-station	8%	17%	15%	16%	10%	22%
	Indicator 3.1_i (c): % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to the national civil judicial system	5%	6%	6%	22%	16%	24%
	Indicator 3.2_i (c): % of women and men indicating that local officials represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well'	31%	32%	33%	19%	19%	32%
	Indicator 3.2.2_ii: % of women and men who indicate that they find it "very" or "extremely" acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes').	14%	21%	15%	41%	11%	21%
Pillar 4	Indicator 4_ii: % of HH depending on traditional activities as their main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, hunting, animal husbandry)	90%	80%	59%	58%	48%	75%
	Indicator 4.2.1_iv: % of women and men indicating they have "good" or "very good" access to markets	22%	47%	38%	36%	21%	39%
	Indicator 4.2.2_ii: % of women and men that declare they have "good" or "very good" access to land	35%	33%	31%	34%	20%	57%
	Indicator 4.2.3_i: % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required?	4%	2%	8%	5%	15%	20%
	Indicator 4.2.5_i: % of women and men declaring to have had a paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months	4%	7%	7%	11%	4%	17%
	Indicator 4.3_i (a): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities or ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups	87%	91%	58%	90%	91%	78%
	Indicator 4.3_i (b): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups	86%	98%	77%	92%	92%	89%
	Indicator 4.3_i (c): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups	75%	91%	44%	72%	74%	83%
	Indicator 4.3_i (d): % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups	75%	93%	66%	78%	89%	76%
	Indicator 4.3_ii (a): % of women and men who "agree" that groups or individuals in their neighborhood / village pursue shared objectives and work together to achieve them; in spite of occasional competition	63%	78%	30%	54%	55%	59%
	Indicator 4.3_ii (b): % of women and men who "agree" that the population in their neighborhood / village work together but that there are important divisions that create competition	35%	66%	22%	44%	37%	50%
	Indicator 4.3_ii (c): % of women and men who "agree" that the population in their village is very divided, that groups and individuals compete with each other and that everyone only seeks to achieve his / her own objective	30%	45%	44%	43%	67%	52%
	Indicator 4.3.2_i: % of women and men who state that they have a "good" or "very good" relationship across different groups of people in their lives						
	Indicator 4.3.2_i (a) relationship with parents, children, spouse	83%	93%	80%	88%	88%	89%
	Indicator 4.3.2_i (b) relationship with neighbors	84%	92%	68%	88%	91%	87%
	Indicator 4.3.2_i (c) relationship with people in village or quarter	79%	85%	63%	87%	90%	83%
Indicator 4.3.2_i (d) relationship with people of own ethnic group	79%	85%	60%	85%	86%	79%	
Indicator 4.3.2_i (e) relationship with people, no matter their ethnic group	50%	68%	58%	82%	66%	57%	

Source: Perception polls carried out under UNDP- MONUSCO joint project in 06/2016 and 12/2016

³⁵ The difference of values for women and men in this table for at least one Priority Zone are outside the +/- 5% margin of error for the polls conducted under the UNDP – MONUSCO joint project.

Table 6: ISSSS monitoring data with differing values for women and men (by Priority Zone) (Pillar5) (combined (average) value from polls of 06/2016 and 12/2016)³⁶

Indicator		Location / Gender					
		Kitchanga		Ruzizi		Sud Irumu	
		Femme	Homme	Femme	Homme	Femme	Homme
Pillar 5	Indicator 5_iii (a): % of women and men who personally know a woman who was survivor ("victim") of sexual violence	23%	19%	9%	12%	36%	24%
	Indicator 5.1_i (a). % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage)	74%	62%	53%	68%	57%	72%
	Indicator 5.1_i (b). % of women and men who "agree" that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat his wife / spouse	27%	35%	11%	23%	25%	34%
	Indicator 5.1_i (d). % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in the family', i.e., without involvement of the authorities	30%	44%	26%	35%	19%	33%
	Indicator 5.1_ii (c). % of women and men who would accept back into their household a woman who is a survivor of sexual violence if this women had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as a result of this incidence.	86%	74%	85%	75%	83%	77%
	Indicator 5.1.3_i (a): % of women and men who have sought out information about issues related to gender-based violence over the last three months (seeking information)	7%	30%	14%	7%	6%	9%
	Indicator 5.1.3_i (b): % of women and men who themselves have participated in meetings on issues related to gender-based violence over the last three months (discussion and debate)	7%	23%	12%	8%	5%	9%
	Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence	57%	45%	22%	38%	37%	34%
	Indicator 5.2_i. % of women and men who 'agree' that PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence	57%	47%	21%	39%	35%	35%
	Indicator 5.2_iv (a): % of women and men who consider the efforts of the police / PNC to investigate cases of sexual violence to be 'good' of 'very good'	21%	48%	16%	33%	20%	32%
	Indicator 5.2_iv (b): % of women and men who think that survivors of sexual violence are served by the police / PNC "as well" or "better" as survivors of other crimes	61%	89%	65%	74%	52%	60%
	Indicator 5.2_iv (c): % of women and men who think that today's efforts of the police to investigate cases of sexual violence are 'better' than those of a year ago	24%	46%	10%	24%	7%	18%
	Indicator 5.3.3_v: % of women and men (where appropriate also girls and boys) ¹ reporting that they know how to access support services for SGBV survivors	39%	57%	24%	20%	27%	20%

Source: Perception polls carried out under UNDP- MONUSCO joint project in 06/2016 and 12/2016

³⁶ The difference of values for women and men in this table for at least one Priority Zone are outside the +/- 5% margin of error for the polls conducted under the UNDP – MONUSCO joint project.

Considerations for establishing a baseline for ISSSS Overall Outcome 3.3 (Establishment of a coherent framework for local governance)

One of the lessons learned from the implementation of the first phase of the ISSSS was the importance of **linking local stabilization efforts to relevant policies and priorities at provincial and national levels** in the DRC. Against this background, it is useful to underline the **importance of Overall Outcome 3.3**, i.e. the existence of an enabling, coherent, regulatory, legal (and also administrative and financial) framework for local governance. A constraints mapping carried out by the ISSSS M&E Cell in June 2017 identified a range of “status quo” challenges where improvement will depend upon effective action at the provincial and national levels, due to the legal distribution of competencies. These include:

- (i) Operational budgets, addressing or working around a lack of fiscal support from higher levels of government.
- (ii) Human resources management, including a lack of regularised (salaried) staff, age and qualification issues, and inconsistent remuneration.
- (iii) Division of mandates and responsibilities between neighbouring customary authorities; and between customary authorities and other decentralised government entities.
- (iv) Points of tension between statutory governance regimes for natural resources, and customary practices.

For points (i) and (ii), projects operating under Pillar 3 will be used as an entry point to establish quantitative baselines for local government entities in each Priority Zone. For points (iii) and (iv) the conflict analyses that informed the development of the ISSSS describe a number of status quo challenges which comprise the policy baseline. This will be refined into a list of key challenges, to be measured in the next reporting period.

The table below provides an indicative summary of how points (iii) and (iv) play out in different PZs. In the second half of 2017, the ISSSS M&E cell will establish a **list of “key policy challenges”** that can be included in the next report, possibly linked to the discussion on sector compacts.

Dimensions	Priority Zone		
	Irumu	Kitchanga	Ruzizi
<i>Roles and mandates</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disputes over jurisdiction of Lendu Bindi chiefdom. • Exclusion of Batwa community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Role of Bashali chiefdom vs. Governor’s representative. • Grievances of “local minorities” about chiefdom governance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disputes over governance of Ruzizi Plain chiefdom • Disputes between Ruzizi Plain and Bafuliro chiefdoms
<i>Governance of natural resources</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal migration from North Kivu to Irumu. • Impact of oil concessions (Graben Albertine). • Historical “land grabs” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entrenched clashes of customary title and legal title. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of workable regime for pastoral vs agricultural use.

4 Cross-cutting observations and policy implications

In this chapter, the ISSSS M&E Cell is offering **several observations** and reflections on possible implications for decisions at project portfolio, strategy or policy level. At this early stage in the monitoring process, the ISSSS evidence base is **not yet complete enough to support any specific, concrete and targeted recommendations** to ISSSS stakeholders on the way forward.

All users of the ISSSS monitoring data are therefore encouraged to see these **observations as “food for thought”**, and to examine the evidence that is presented in this report from their own particular vantage points. As mentioned in Section 1.2 of this report, the M&E Cell will use the observations in this report to **kick-start discussions** during dissemination events. The M&E team will **revisit them** over the course of the analysis for the next monitoring report(s), and, depending on the findings, will either refine or discard them.

4.1 Pillar 1 – Establishing the ISSSS as a credible and legitimate stabilization effort

As implementation of ISSSS projects is beginning, the populations in the Priority Zones have generally low confidence that either the Government or the stabilization projects can make lasting improvements in the security and economic situation in their communities³⁷. The majority of people in the priority zones also has little trust in the ability of the elected representatives at provincial and national level to effectively represent their interests and priorities³⁸.

It is noteworthy, however, that across Priority Zones, the population tends to have higher confidence in the government’s ability to ensure security than in its capacity to manage economic issues; and ensure economic welfare³⁹. Indirectly, this may also suggest that communities consider better (and more equitable) access to socio-economic resource as a particularly prevalent need.

Low levels of trust in provincial and national government are contrasted by comparatively high levels of trust in local authorities. It is not clear from the data in this report, if and to what extent these positive perceptions are tied to ethnic affiliations and the existence of local patrimonial systems more so than to the balanced and effective representation of local the local population as a whole. If the former was the case, strong ethnically defined loyalties to local authorities might well stand against the efforts of a ‘beneficial’ central Congolese State; and of the international community to establish the ISSSS as a credible and legitimate effort of stabilizing the situation in Priority Zones.

Possible considerations for programming -Pillar 1

In light of the largely negative views on the past stabilization projects and on the role of the national and provincial Government, and the comparatively positive attitudes towards the role of local authorities, the **participatory approach and consultation and dialogue mechanism** of the ISSSS possibly **assumes particular importance**. They are important not just as efforts to develop locally sanctioned action plans

³⁷ See indicators 1.2 (a – g) (confidence in government); indicator 1.1_iii (confidence in ‘peace’ projects).

³⁸ Indicator 3.2_i (a, b) (trust in provincial, national government to represent own interests).

³⁹ Indicator 1.2.

and agendas for action, but also as a first and critical step to try to balance out ethnically defined loyalties with a broader representation of interests across ethnic groups. This is clearly already foreseen in the overall ISSSS approach. However, as local populations attach much importance to access to socio-economic resources, ISSSS projects might also face the risk of exacerbating competition for resources among ethnic groups. This makes it **particularly prudent and necessary to closely track and monitor the inclusiveness of dialogue processes during this phase.**

4.2 Pillar 2 – Variations across priority zones in FARDC performance in the Protection of Civilians

Baseline data suggest that the performance of the FARDC in the protection of civilians is not uniform across priority zones. Considerable variations exist, both with regard to the role that FARDC plays in providing security; and with regard to the Army's accountability for infractions and crimes that soldiers commit against civilians.

Differences in the security situation in the priority zones (e.g., caused by the greater presence of armed groups in one over the other priority zone) may well affect how the local population perceives the presence and actions of the FARDC. In both the Sud Irumu and Kitchanga priority zones, for example, the security situation is relatively volatile⁴⁰. In both zones, there are indications that at least part of the population sees the FARDC as responding effectively to threats (Indicator 2_iii (a)).

Acknowledgements that the FARDC is an important provider of security against the threat of armed groups does not automatically coincide with positive views of FARDC's efforts to hold its soldiers accountable for their treatment of civilians, as evidenced in Sud Irumu⁴¹.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 2

The **differences within and between priority zones** in the FARDC - civilian relations might be **worthwhile topic for a closer examination** of in subsequent monitoring reports⁴². Data in this report cannot support this examination. In principle, a host of circumstances could have led to the observed differences, among them the fact that **the SSR (SFCG) programme** has now been operating in Kitchanga and Ruzizi for several years. A closer examination of the project's operations (and of other possible factors) might help to gain more insight in into what has worked, and what has not.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 2

Currently, only few projects under the ISSSS (both 'aligned' and SCF funded) are set to work specifically with the FARDC on improving its performance in protecting civilians⁴³. Coverage is particularly low for

⁴⁰ For example, if compared to the situation in Ruzizi.

⁴¹ See Annex X on Sud Irumu.

⁴² E.g., in one of the stabilization spotlights.

⁴³ Projects that are targeting certain aspects of Pillar 2 are SSR (SFCG), SCF Ruzizi and SCF Sud Irumu.

results that aim at influencing FARDC operational PoC principles and procedures. This includes the ISSSS results that are intended to bring disciplinary and oversight structures better in line with PoC principles⁴⁴.

At the same time, doubts prevail among the large parts of the populations of the three priority zones that the FARDC is committed and able to hold perpetrators of crimes against civilians in its own ranks to account⁴⁵. This raises the question if current programming in Pillar 2 is already appropriately targeted to help improve PoC performance in line with the ISSSS strategic approach.

4.3 Pillar 3 - Restoring State Authority

Low levels of confidence in the performance of the Government in economic and security-related matters (see comments on Pillar 1 above) and difficulties to access state-provided services⁴⁶ provide a challenging starting point for Pillar 3 programming in all three priority zones. Access to **administrative services** and to **police (PNC)** is low in each of the three priority zones, albeit with considerable variations within each of the zones. **Access to justice** is also low, and in addition differs considerably between the three priority zones⁴⁷ and even more greatly within each of the PZs. Gender differences exist for access to justice⁴⁸ and for access to police⁴⁹. Only a small minority in each of the three priority zones think that national and provincial elected officials currently do a good job in representing their interests⁵⁰.

These negative views of the population on the role of the State in general; and that of the provincial and national level in particular confirm the importance of addressing state performance under Pillar 3; but also emphasize that this cannot be done exclusively at the local level, but that local support does need to be linked to provincial and national policies, processes and stakeholders. As presented in Box 1 on page 19, service delivery is constrained by several policy challenges that are rooted at provincial and national level, and that linkages from the local to the provincial and national levels under the ISSSS were meant to help address.

The mapping of the current coverage of ISSSS results by SCF-funded and aligned projects suggested that results that aim at linking local stabilization efforts to the national (and provincial) levels are proportionally less well covered than purely “local” results (see Chapter **Error! Reference source not found.** on the project landscape). In this context, it needs to be noted that weak linkages between local stabilization

⁴⁴ See Chapter 2 of this report.

⁴⁵ See, for example, the situation in Sud Irumu (Annex X on Sud Irumu), but also those in Ruzizi and Kitchanga.

⁴⁶ On average, approximately ten to twenty percent of the population in Ruzizi considers its access to administrative services, police stations and the judicial system to be ‘good’ or ‘very good’. Fifty to sixty percent on average find their access to be ‘bad’ or worse (**Indicator 3.1_i (a – c)**).

⁴⁷ In Sud Irumu, for example, twenty percent of the population find they have ‘good’ or ‘very good’ access to the national civil judicial system, while in Kitchanga this is only the case for approximately 5% of the population (Indicator 3.1_i (c)).

⁴⁸ I.e., in Ruzizi and possibly in Sud Irumu (the gender difference in Sud Irumu for Indicator 3.1_i (c) is within the margin of error of the HHI poll of +/- 5%).

⁴⁹ In Sud Irumu; and possibly in Kitchanga (the gender difference in Kitchanga for Indicator 3.1_i (b) is within the margin of error of the HHI poll of +/- 5%).

⁵⁰ See indicator 3.2_i (a) and (b) in all priority zone annexes.

efforts and national policies and frameworks contributed to the lack of progress during phase 1 of the ISSSS.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 3

- 1) ISSSS project mapping suggests that projects **do not always link their local work to relevant structures and stakeholders at national and provincial levels**. This raises the question what role projects can usefully play in this regard, and what actions by other actors might be required to make progress on this front.
- 2) If projects alone cannot establish and sustain local-national linkages, it **is important that other ISSSS mechanisms** (such as political dialogue, “Good Offices” work) **emphasize these aspects**, and do so in a cross-sectoral way, but also coordinate with projects **to engage** with the national and provincial actors **in the different sectors**.
- 3) The question of resource availability at local level to finance the sought-after greater role of the State and other components of Overall Outcome 3.3 (enabling framework for local governance) are either not addressed by ISSSS projects, or are covered in a relatively narrow manner. It may be beneficial to consider how the ISSSS can **address these issues more comprehensively**.
- 4) **Variations** in the baseline numbers **on access to services** suggest the importance of closely examining the particular circumstances in each PZ that act as barriers to service access; and to also consider the **barriers** (in particular those that block access to justice) that **may be gender specific** and unique to women.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 3

- 1) Monitoring data for Pillar 3 reinforce that it might be worthwhile examining the **factors** that are **contributing to comparatively positive views** of the State’s role in managing issues related to **safety and security**,
- 2) It is important to examine perception data such as the one on Indicator 3.2_i above (representation of interests by local authorities) also **through the lens of ethnic affiliation**, to assess the extent to which support cuts across ethnic lines. This data is available in principle from the joint UNDP-MONUSCO project, but had not yet been shared with the SSU in time or this report.

4.4 Pillar 4 – Socio-economic resilience to conflict

The establishment of more **equitable flows of socio-economic resources (Specific Objective 4)** starts from a low level in all priority zones. At the same time, socio-economic conditions vary considerably between and within the priority zones. The share of the population that depends on traditional economic activities to make a living (i.e., agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing, hunting) ranges from about 20 percent⁵¹ to close to 100 percent⁵², depending on the priority zone and subzone. Access to land is also subject to great differences among the different zones.

⁵¹ In Uvira Ville, Ruzizi (South Kivu).

⁵² Also in Ruzizi, i.e., in Secteur d’Itombwe.

Similar across priority zones is that wage labour plays a very small role in the local economies. On average, less than one in ten people in the priority zones had had access to paid labour in the three months prior to the being surveyed. Access to credit is also extremely low across all priority zones, but is subject to considerable geographic variations. On average, less than one in ten people across priority zones find they have access to credit when required. In Sud Irumu, the share of people with access to credit is approximately 17 percent on average; in the Chefferies / Secteurs ‘Bahema Mitego’, ‘Bahema Boga’, and ‘Banyali Tchabi’ (sub-zone Sud Irumu 1), about a quarter of the population can access credit when necessary⁵³.

Possible considerations for programming– Pillar 4

In all priority zones, baseline data suggest a possible need for exploring opportunities to **improve opportunities to earn cash-incomes** over the short-term (*Intermediate Outcomes 4.1.1*); and to help **improve conditions for local economic recovery in the priority zones** over the medium to long-term, for example to help improve low **access to credit** (*Intermediate Outcome 4.2.3*), training opportunities and, ultimately, **wage employment** (*Intermediate Outcome 4.2.5*).

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 4

Across the priority zones, stabilization projects seem to face **substantially differing conditions and dynamics** for their efforts to improve equitable access to land. It might be interesting for the SSU and the M&E Cell to engage with the relevant projects to understand any variations in the approach the corresponding projects might be employing to adequately respond to these differences.

4.5 Pillar 5 – Prevention of sexual violence

The incidence of sexual violence varies considerably between the priority zones. Several indicators suggest that among the three priority zones sexual violence is lowest in Ruzizi. Only 1 out of 10 people here report to know a woman is a survivor of sexual violence, while the corresponding percentages in Kitchanga and Sud Irumu are twice and three times as large, respectively⁵⁴.

Confidence in the ability of the Government to help prevent sexual violence was unexpectedly high, variation in this regard between the priority zones notwithstanding⁵⁵. Women and men by and large have a similar degree of confidence in the “overall capacity of government to counter sexual violence”. However, upon closer and more detailed examination differences between men and women become evident: In all priority zones, women tend to have less trust in the police to do a good job in investigating

⁵³ See data in the annexes for each of the priority zones.

⁵⁴ Ruzizi has also the smallest percentage of people who report to be survivors of sexual violence themselves. The difference between priority zones is within the margin of error of the HHI perception poll, however, and thus cannot give a good indication of the actual differences in the population (see Indicator 5_iii (a)).

⁵⁵ Confidence of the population in the ability of the Government to prevent SGBV was three times higher in Kitchanga and Ruzizi than in Sud Irumu.

cases of sexual violence and are also less likely to see improvements in the way the police conducts investigations into sexual violence cases (Indicator 5.2_iv (a-c)).

Attitudes towards women in general; and towards survivors of sexual violence vary significantly within and between the three priority zones. Violence and beatings as accepted part of a marriage are more common in Kitchanga and Sud Irumu than they are in Ruzizi. In the first two zones, up to a third of the population considers occasional beatings of wives by their husbands to be appropriate. In Ruzizi, this is only the case for approximately 15 percent of adults. Depending on the priority zone, pregnancies and injuries suffered as a result from sexual violence can make it more difficult for survivors to find acceptance and support in their families⁵⁶.

Possible considerations for programming – SGBV prevention (Pillar 5)

Across and within priority zones, the relationship between security forces and the population and also access of SGBV survivors to services remain volatile and variable. At the same time, coverage of Pillar 5 is weaker than most of the other components of the ISSSS. This suggests that it may be important to seek ways to expand project coverage of Pillar 5, either by soliciting support through project dedicated to this topic; or by working with implementing partners on the more comprehensive mainstreaming of gender and SGBV issues into projects in other sectors.

⁵⁶ This is most pronounced in Kitchanga (see Indicator 5.1_ii (c)).

5 Summary of the ISSSS logical frame and programs

5.1 Narrative summary of the ISSSS logical framework

Goal
<p>Improved mutual accountability and capacity of Congolese State and society to address and mitigate the main drivers of violent conflict in the eastern provinces and to reinforce the legitimacy of the social contract and foster long-term economic development.</p>
Pillar 1: Democratic Dialogue
<p><i>Specific Objective 1: Increased and inclusive (i.e. involving state, population (different groups)) engagement in the stabilization and security strategy at community level.</i></p> <p>Pillar 1 of the ISSSS aims to create a participatory and inclusive (democratic) dialogue around the implementation of the ISSSS in order to ensure the required support for the strategy among women, girls, boys and men and traditional and formal authorities (Specific Objective 1).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The dialogue should be based on inclusive and gender sensitive stabilization “action plans” that are jointly developed by community representatives, local authorities and traditional authorities and that then guide the stabilization effort in a particular geographic zone (Overall Outcome 1.1.). Intermediate outcomes 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 recognize that processes of change, in order to be viable, must also be actively supported from the ‘top down’. • In the medium/ longer term, support for stabilization efforts should be sustained throughout the implementation of the ISSSS through the participatory oversight of stabilization activities by the inclusive committees that were also responsible for the development of joint action plans (Overall Objective 1.2).
Pillar 2: Security
<p><i>Specific Objective 2: Improved FARDC performance in Protection of Civilians in armed conflict</i></p> <p>The main focus of Pillar 2 is on the <i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i> (FARDC), rather than on Security Sector Reform across a range of different actors.</p> <p>Overall Outcome 2.1: Ensuring that existing guidelines and actions plans of the FARDC for the Protection of Civilians (including the prevention and internal prosecution of incidents of sexual and gender based violence by the FARDC) are applied consistently by FARDC forces in the eastern provinces remains paramount here. The protection of civilians is one of the mandates of the FARDC and is crucial to contributing to efforts to stabilize eastern DRC.</p> <p>PoC and the prevention of SGBV remains a topic that eventually needs to be addressed as part of the wider Security Sector Reform (SSR). However, the ISSSS consciously focuses on facilitating the implementation of <u>existing</u> regulations and action plans as an element that (contingent on the overall approval of this kind of engagement between ISSSS implementing partners and local FARDC commanders) will benefit from progress</p>

on the national Security Sector Reform but that is potentially viable even in the absence of clear progress on that front.

Overall Outcome 2.2: While the first Overall Outcome focuses on the FARDC, the second speaks more from the perspective of the Congolese women, girls, boys and men that are being protected

Pillar 3: Restoration of State Authority

Specific Objective 3: Increased beneficial role and presence of "regular" Congolese State in local governance.

Pillar 3 on the *Restoration of State Authority* aims at increasing the (beneficial) role and presence of the regular Congolese state (and here in particular the local authorities) in the eastern provinces of the DRC (**Specific Objective 3**). A greater presence of the Congolese state is expected put in place the prerequisites for a transfer of security-related functions from the FARDC to the PNC, is expected to help increase the security of women, girls, boys and men, including security to prevent SGBV. It is also expected to help increase the socio-economic resilience to conflict of women, girls, boys and men.

The **three Overall Outcomes** capture the main dimensions of this increased beneficial presence of the Congolese State.

- **Overall Outcome 3.1** deals with the foreseen increased role of the state to ensure access to essential services, such as land management, natural resource management (in particular mining), justice, local administration and police / law enforcement. This Overall Outcome aims to capture the key prerequisites that need to be in place for any service to be accessible and beneficial to local women, girls, boys and men: Well-performing state agents (Intermediate Outcome 3.1.1), a sufficient availability of the assets required for service delivery, such as building, transportation or supplies (Intermediate Outcome 3.1.2), and sufficient financial resources to sustain the delivery of services by the local State (Intermediate Outcome 3.1.3).
- **Overall Outcome 3.2** captures the changes in the relationship between the State and its constituents that are required for making the increase presence of state institutions beneficial for stabilization. Improved accountability linked to functioning sector-specific planning and oversight structures (Intermediate Outcome 3.2.1), a greater awareness of the local population of the responsibilities and roles of the local authorities and their own responsibilities in that relationship (included, but not limited to, the payment of taxes) (Intermediate Outcome 3.2.2) and greater awareness of state agents of their own responsibilities (Intermediate Outcome 3.2.3).
- Finally, **Overall Outcome 3.3** deals with the establishment conditions that would eventually will allow long-term institutional strengthening of the State in Eastern DRC; i.e., the development of an enabling, coherent regulatory and legal framework. This third overall outcome also emphasizes the need to maintain the link between the national support of governance structures through the ISSSS with national reform processes in decentralization, justice sector reform, police reform and general public administration / civil service reform. It thus implies a strong link between the ISSSS, the overall MONUSCO mission and the wider political and policy dialogue between the ISSSS and the international community (e.g., in the context of the PSCF).

Pillar 4: Return, Reintegration and Socio-Economic Recovery

Specific Objective 4: Equitable resource flow from income earning opportunities, economic activities and socio-economic support (services) increased across population (including men, women, boys, girls among at-risk groups, IDPs & returnees).

The intervention logic of Pillar 4 in the ISSSS log frame needs to reflect that the stabilization strategy is not intended to promote “socio-economic development for developments sake”. Instead, the focus lies on using support for socio-economic improvements to address and influence conflict dynamics in the interest of stabilization. In other words, socio-economic factors should become less likely to fuel conflict dynamics in the ISSSS Priority Zones as a result of activities implemented under Pillar 4. The overall objective of Pillar 4 is therefore to help increase the equitable resource flow to the population in the eastern provinces, including in particular women and men, girls and boys among at-risk groups, IDPs and returnees.

- **Overall Outcomes 4.1 and 4.2** capture Tracks A and B of the *United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration (UN, 2009)*⁵⁷, namely the stabilization of income generation and emergency employment (Track A; Overall Outcome 4.2), and local economic recovery for employment opportunities and reintegration (Track B; Overall Outcome 4.3).
- **Overall Outcome 4.3**, finally, deals with the strengthening of social linkages between and within communities that the ISSSS has identified as one of the preconditions for increase economic activity and access to socio-economic support in program areas.

Pillar 5 – Fight against Sexual Violence

Specific Objective 5: Reduced levels of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) in programme areas.

The intervention logic of Pillar 5 of the ISSSS is structured to be complementary to activities and results of Pillars 2 and 3. In other words, Pillar 5 is meant to ensure that security sector reforms (covered by both Pillars 2 and 3) and state capacity building at local level (Pillar 3) sufficiently emphasize the requirements needed for combating sexual and gender based violence as a symptom and driver of the conflict in the Priority Zones. This will be achieved by increasing the awareness of the social and legal norms against SGBV among women, girls, boys and men, but also among officers, soldiers and higher-level officials in the Congolese State (see Overall Outcome 5.1). Moreover, programming under Pillar 5 would need to help ensure that state capacity building regarding the PNC and the justice sector would be done in a way to also:

- Facilitate greater voluntary use of law enforcement avenues for investigation of SGBV cases by SGBV survivors (Overall Outcome 5.2);
- Improve access to justice for SGBV survivors (Overall Outcome 5.3).

⁵⁷ The ISSSS Strategic Framework is based on the concepts and approach in this strategy.

5.2 Programs supporting the ISSS

This table lists all programs formally aligned with the ISSS Strategic Framework for Kitchanga, Ruzizi and Sud Irumu. Programs are separated into those supported by the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (SCF01-07); and “aligned” programs supported by other donors but still harmonised with the ISSS monitoring approach.

Type	Title	Lead Organisation	Funding partner	Status	Priority Zone(s)
SCF	Les chemins vers les Accords « Njia za Makubaliano »	International Alert	SCF	Ongoing (Oct 2016 to Sept 2018)	Kitchanga
	Pamjoa Kwa Amani na Maende Leo	UN Habitat,	SCF	Ongoing (??)	Kitchanga
	Tujenge Pamoja kwa Ajili ya Amani Construisons ensemble pour la Paix!	International Alert	SCF	Ongoing (Mar 2017 to Feb 2019)	Ruzizi
	Pamoja Kwa Amani - Ensemble pour la Paix	UN Habitat	SCF	Ongoing (May 2017 to May 2019)	Sud-Irumu
	Amani ni njiya ya maendeleo phase II	UN Habitat	SCF	Ongoing (Apr 2017 to Apr 2018)	Mambasa
	Projet de consolidation du projet intégré du Nord Kalehe	UNDP	SCF	Ongoing (May 2017 to Apr 2018)	Kalehe
Aligned	Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika (Security Sector Reform (SSR))	Search for Common Ground (SFCG)	DFID	Ongoing (June 2014 to May 2018 – extension included)	Kitchanga, Ruzizi, Beni
	Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC (CISPE)	IOM	Dutch Cooperation	Ongoing (November 2015 to April 2019)	Kitchanga, Sud-Irumu
	Community Participatory Land Use Planning (CPLUP)	UN Habitat	DFID	Ongoing (June 2016 to December 2018)	Sud-Irumu, Kalehe
	Food Security and Inclusive Access to Resources for Conflict Sensitive Market Development (FARM)	Mercy Corps, SFCG	Dutch Cooperation	In development	Kitchanga, Sud-Irumu