

Annex I - Sud-Irumu Priority Zone, Ituri Province

List of Acronyms

| CISPE | Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC |
|----------|--|
| CPLUP | Community-Based Participatory Land Use Planning |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| ETD | <i>Entités Territoriales Décentralisées</i> (Local Entities) |
| FARDC | <i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i> (DRC Armed Forces) |
| FCS | <i>Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation</i> (Stabilisation Coherence Fund) |
| HR | Human Right(s) |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| I.O. | Intermediate Outcome |
| ISSSS | International Stabilization and Security Support Strategy |
| JHRO | Joint Human Right Office |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| M&E Cell | Monitoring and Evaluation Cell (of the SSU) |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC |
| O.O. | Overall Outcome |
| PNC | <i>Police Nationale Congolaise</i> (Congolese National Police) |
| PoC | Protection of civilians |
| PZ | Priority Zone |
| SFCG | Search For Common Ground |
| SGBV | Sexual and Gender Based Violence |
| S.O. | Specific Objective |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform (<i>Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika</i>) |
| SSU | Stabilisation Support Unit |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

1 Introduction to Annex I – Sud-Irumu (Ituri Province)

This annex to the second consolidated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) follows the baseline study that was published in July 2017, as part of the biannual production of consolidated ISSSS progress reports by the M&E Cell of the Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU).

This annex presents a projection of the ISSSS programming in the Sud-Irumu priority zone (PZ) for the period that extends from the second half of 2017 to the first quarter of 2018. This forward looking perspective is meant to ensure that our mapping takes into account those projects that are currently still “in the pipeline” (for example, in their preliminary phase, or in the final stages of their design phase), but are slated for implementation in the foreseeable future. The projects considered in this mapping are those that are funded by the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (*Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation*, FCS) and those that are funded by bilateral contributions and have undergone the process of alignment to and harmonisation with the ISSSS and its logical framework (logframe).

This annex provides an update to the ISSSS baseline data for the first half of 2017, by presenting a set of preliminary and provisional observations regarding progress in the ISSSS programming in the Sud-Irumu PZ. It is however important to underline that these observations are meant to help and inform stakeholders to pursue the debate about trends and programming options in the PZ. They are therefore by no means intended to be definitive, final or accepted at face value. Questioning, revising and refining this report’s observations in the course of this debate is very much an intended part of the monitoring and learning process within the SSU M&E Cell.

2 Status of ISSSS programming – Sud-Irumu (Ituri Province)

This section of the report provides an overview of the status of ISSSS programming in the Sud-Irumu PZ. Specifically, this section provides:

- a **brief description of the different programmes and interventions** that are currently being implemented in Sud-Irumu in association with the ISSSS, i.e. those that are either financed through the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (SCF) or through bi-lateral funding arrangements (*aligned programmes*);
- an overview of how these **interventions cover the result elements of the ISSSS across its five thematic pillars**, and some tentative observations on the degree to which all necessary elements are being addressed;
- a slightly more in-depth **view of the pillar-specific status of ISSSS programming**, based on the status of ISSSS projects in June/July 2017, as well as some additional thoughts on implications for the implementation of the strategy in the months to come.

Overview of ISSSS interventions in Sud-Irumu

Table 1 below lists the projects that are currently being implemented or are set to start implementation in the coming months under the umbrella of the ISSSS in the Sud-Irumu priority zone. For each one, the table provides information on the respective lead organisations, the expected implementation period and the thematic focus.

Table 1: Overview of interventions associated with the ISSSS (aligned and SCF) in Sud-Irumu

| Type | Title (Lead Organisation) | Implementation Period | Thematic Focuses |
|---------|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| FCS | <i>Pamoja Kwa Amani na Maendeleo</i> (Together for peace) (UNHABITAT) | Ongoing (May 2017 to May 2019) | Increased and inclusive support for the stabilisation and security strategy at Community level; Improved land governance and accountability; Enhanced transparency in the exploitation and management of mineral resources in the priority area; Functionality, performance and quality of chieftdom and sector services (ETD) are strengthened; Strengthened security governance; Social cohesion and resilience; Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) |
| Aligned | CISPE (OIM) | Ongoing (November 2015 to April 2019) | Contribute to the improved mutual accountability and capacity of Congolese state institutions and civil society to address and mitigate the main drivers of conflict in selected intervention zones in Ituri and North Kivu, and to reinforce the legitimacy of these institutions and its agents, who are perceived as enabling security actors by men, women, boys and girls. |
| | <i>Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika</i> (Security Sector Reform) Phase 4 - Extension (SSR-SFCG) | Ongoing (expected to end in May 2018) | Increased knowledge and awareness, by the Congolese security forces and civilians, regarding their mutual rights, roles and responsibilities, in order to improve their relations and build trust. |
| | CPLUP (UNHABITAT) | Ongoing (June 2016 to December 2018) | Focused on community based participatory land use planning to improve the security of land rights, the project is centred on the following core components: a) A platform for promoting dialogue around land governance both at the community and provincial level; b) Ownership by the political/administrative authorities; c) Research for consensus on land planning and usages; d) Development of appropriate tools for an integrated and participatory management of economic space and land. |

The overall project landscape in Sud-Irumu

Taken together, the above-mentioned projects address the results from all five thematic pillars of the ISSSS, with varying degrees of coverage:

- Over this period, the coverage by programming under Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in Protection of Civilians) is still “developing” in the Sud-Irumu PZ, i.e. less than half of the results under this pillar are currently covered by at least one project.
- The coverage of all four other pillars, i.e. pillars 1 (Democratic Dialogue), 3 (Restoration of State Authority), 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict) and 5 (Fight against SGBV) is **relatively advanced**, in as much as more than half of the results are covered by at least one project.

Table 2 below provides an overview of the programming status of the five thematic ISSSS pillars in the Sud-Irumu PZ.

Table 2: Overview of programming status across all ISSSS Pillars, Sud-Irumu PZ (Ituri Province), July 2017

| Pillar | Intended Contribution to implementation of ISSSS | Status of programming ¹ |
|----------|--|------------------------------------|
| Pillar 1 | <i>Create a participatory and inclusive (democratic) dialogue around the implementation of the ISSSS in order to ensure required support for the ISSSS among the population (women, girls, boys and men) and among traditional and formal authorities.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 2 | <i>Improve the performance of the FARDC in civilian protection, and community – FARDC relations</i> | Developing |
| Pillar 3 | <i>Increase the (beneficial) role and presence of the Congolese state (in particular the local authorities) in the Priority Zones.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 4 | <i>Increase the equitable resource flow to and coherence among at-risk populations (women and men, girls and boys), including in particular, IDPs and returnees.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 5 | <i>Ensure that security sector reforms (covered by both Pillars 2 and 3) and local state capacity building (Pillar 3) sufficiently emphasize combating sexual and gender-based violence as a symptom and driver of conflict in the Priority Zones.</i> | Advanced |

Most projects in the Sud-Irumu PS are based on **action plans** that are developed in consultation with and with the participation of the population (Intermediate Outcome 1.1.1). This means that the two aligned, bilateral projects (CISPE and SSR) follow the same global Democratic Dialogue approach (Pillar 1) in their sector-specific interventions as the SCF project. Similarly, these projects also rely on **participatory dialogue platforms** as a space which to carry out their global (SCF) or sector-specific (CISPE and SSR) action plans and provide oversight of their implementation, in keeping with the respective approach of the ISSSS.

The sections below provide a more detailed look at the project coverage for each of the five pillars in the Sud-Irumu PZ.

Programming for Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

Table 3 below presents the ISSSS programming under Pillar 1 in the Sud-Irumu PZ, and shows that most outcomes are currently covered. Gaps remain regarding the sector compacts at provincial and national

¹ **Complete:** all result elements of the given pillar of the ISSSS are addressed by projects; **Advanced:** most result elements are addressed by projects; **Developing:** a minority of result elements are addressed by projects; **None:** no results elements are addressed by projects.

levels. In order to mitigate these gaps, discussions are on-going between the SSU and authorities at both administrative levels in order to establish provincial and national sector compacts. It remains to be seen how this will materialise in a context of political and security instability in the PZ². This context may seriously affect the current stabilisation efforts and in particular the participatory process started by implementation partners.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 1 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 3: The ISSSS program landscape in Sud-Irumu, Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated projects / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---|
| S.O. 1 | Support for the ISSSS at community level | |
| O.O. 1.1 | Local stabilisation processes aligned with community priorities | (SCF) UN HABITAT (A) CISPE, (A) CPLUP ³ |
| I.O. 1.1.1 | Joint action plans developed and approved by communities | (SCF) UN HABITAT (A) CISPE |
| I.O. 1.1.2 | Joint action plans compiled into Sector Compacts | Not covered |
| I.O. 1.1.3 | National authorities commit to & act upon 'Sector Compacts' | Not covered |
| O.O. 1.2 | Local groups support stabilisation process | (SCF) UN HABITAT (A) CISPE |
| I.O. 1.2.1 | Oversight mechanisms of stabilisation process set-up and functioning; | (SCF) UN HABITAT (A) CISPE, (A) CPLUP |

Programming for Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

As the table below illustrates, current programming in Sud-Irumu is focussed on improving FARDC behaviour in terms of Protection of Civilians (PoC) in armed conflicts, through support activities to the FARDC (and PNC) “Comités de Base” and to the “Conseils Locaux de Proximité”. The SCF-funded project in the PZ aims to improve the role played by security forces in terms of PoC, by strengthening the awareness of roles and responsibilities, as well as the cooperation and the accountability between security forces and civilians, through the set up of provincial committees. However, as for the baseline study, the result elements linked to internal dynamics and incentive mechanisms that influence FARDC behaviour are at this stage still not covered (e.g. Intermediate Outcomes 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). The same is true regarding efforts aimed at communicating experiences and lessons learnt from the project’s local engagement with members of the FARDC to national leaders, or aiming to link local-level work to the national Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The rotation/reassignment mechanism of FARDC members makes it difficult to consolidate project results relating to the FARDC performance in terms of PoC. Another obstacle is the insufficient progress made in the national programme of security sector reform, in particular when it comes to the care and the politicisation of the Army.

² Among stabilisation efforts in the PZ, it is worth underlining the existence of the joint strategy (MONUSCO Force-SSU-other civilian elements) to neutralise the “Force de résistance patriotique d’Ituri” (FRPI, or the “Ituri patriotic resistance force”), which also aims to link the process of democratic dialogue to the political commitment at the national level.

³ CPLUP is aligned to the ISSSS, but has not made its data available to this day.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 2 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 4: The ISSSS program landscape in Sud-Irumu, Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of PoC)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programme |
|---------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| S.O. 2 | FARDC Performance in PoC | |
| O.O. 2.1 | Operational FARDC PoC principles & procedures applied and enforced | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 2.1.1 | Increased awareness and skills among FARDC commanders & their units regarding PoC and SGBV prevention principles | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 2.1.2 | FARDC disciplinary, oversight, incentive structures reinforced and aligned with PoC principles | Not covered |
| I.O. 2.1.3 | Strengthened military judicial mechanisms f. HR violations | Not covered |
| I.O.2.1.4 | Lessons learnt from PoC experiences and resource requirements communicated to national FARDC leaders | Not covered |
| O.O. 2.2 | Strengthened cohesion and trust between civilians and FARDC | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 2.2.1 | Social & economical integration of soldiers into host communities | |
| I.O. 2.2.2 | Improved redress mechanisms for local authorities and communities | Not covered |
| I.O. 2.2.3 | Improved behaviour by FARDC soldiers (less predatory & profiteering) | (SCF) UN HABITAT |

Programming for Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

Table 5 below shows that ISSSS programming under Pillar 3 in the Sud-Irumu PZ covers most results. It is focussed on improving the access to services, the performance of state agents and the availability of infrastructures, on establishing participatory, local oversight and planning structures, and on improving state actors' awareness, to increase the beneficial role of the Congolese State in local governance.

However, some Intermediary Outcomes (I.O.) are still not covered in the PZ, such as the need for larger financial allocations from the national level to the *entités territoriales décentralisées* (ETD) in order to fund the expansion of provided public services (**I.O. 3.1.3**), or the presence of a coherent regulatory or legal framework for local governance in the PZ (**O.O. 3.3**).

Multiple risk factors from the ISSSS risk matrix have the potential to affect the work carried out under Pillar 3 of the ISSSS. In particular the current national political context (centralisation of power, associated with obstructionism and lack of reforms, including in financial areas such as the issue of the pay) could hinder and counteract project work.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 3 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 5: The ISSSS program landscape in Sud-Irumu, Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| O.S. 3 | Increased beneficial role and presence of "regular" Congolese State in local governance | |
| O.O. 3.1 | Improved access to relevant state-provided services | (SCF) UN HABITAT |

| | | |
|-----------------|--|------------------------------------|
| | | (A) CPLUP ⁴ , (A) CISPE |
| I.O. 3.1.1 | Improved performance of state agents in service delivery | (SCF) UN HABITAT (A) CISPE |
| I.O. 3.1.2 | Improved availability/access to physical infrastructure and other assets for service delivery | (SCF) UN HABITAT (A) CISPE |
| O.O. 3.1.3 | Improved availability of financial resources for service delivery | Not covered |
| O.O. 3.2 | Improved accountability and responsiveness of state institutions | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.2.1 | Local, participatory oversight and planning structures established; functioning | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 3.2.2 | Local population & civil society acting on responsibilities and rights vis-a-vis local authorities | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 3.2.3 | Awareness of state agents of their formal duties and responsibilities (including no corruption) | (SCF) UN HABITAT (A) CISPE |
| O.O. 3.3 | Enabling, coherent regulatory/legal framework for local governance in place | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.3.1 | Local authorities/ETD prepared for devolution and financial retrocession | (SCF) UN HABITAT (A) CPLUP |
| I.O. 3.3.2 | Division of responsibilities between formal and traditional authorities codified | (SCF) UN HABITAT (A) CPLUP |
| I.O. 3.3.3 | Lessons for increased local State presence acted on by national authorities | (A) CPLUP (A) CISPE |

Programming for Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

As presented by Table 6 below, ISSSS outcomes under Pillar 4 are better covered by programming in the Sud-Irumu PZ. Coverage includes all results linked to the improvement of an equitable resource flow. However, apart from CPLUP that addresses land issues, all other results are only addressed by the SCF-funded project that is lead by the UN HABITAT consortium.

The challenge is now for the project's activities to cover the whole PZ.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 4 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 6: The ISSSS program landscape in Sud-Irumu, Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| O.S. 4 | Equitable resource flow (income earning & economic opportunities; socio-economic support) | |
| O.O. 4.1 | Increased participation in employment schemes and short-term income stabilisation | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.1.1 | Improved availability of livelihood and start-up grants and cash-for-work | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.1.2 | Improved access to services | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| O.O. 4.2 | Improved (enabling) conditions for local economic recovery | |
| I.O. 4.2.1 | Increased sustained access to markets | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.2 | Improved and secure access to land, natural resources | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.3 | Improved access to credit (all groups) | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.4 | Improved access to training opportunities | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.5 | Improved access to wage employment | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| O.O. 4.3. | Social linkages within and between communities strengthened | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.3.1 | Psycho-social needs of vulnerable or marginalized groups in community addressed | (SCF) UN HABITAT |

⁴ The CLUP programme is aligned to the ISSSS, but does not currently share its data for internal reasons.

| | | |
|------------|--|------------------|
| I.O. 4.3.2 | Inter- and intra-community trust increased | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
|------------|--|------------------|

Programming for Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

Table 7 below shows that almost all of the results are covered by the SCF-funded project implemented by the UN HABITAT consortium. This project intervenes at the same time in terms of prevention and of response. In the first case, it focusses on changing harmful social norms related to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and on engaging the communities in this transformation. In the second case, it focusses amongst other things on the “holistic” services provided to SGBV victims (medical, legal and psychosocial). The project, however, does not address internal dynamics that are thought to influence FARDC behaviour towards the communities, and in particular towards women.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 5 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 7: The ISSSS program landscape in Sud-Irumu, Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| S.O. 5 | Reduced levels of Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) | |
| O.O. 5.1 | Harmful social / gender norms (SGBV) decreased | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.1.2 | Active and meaningful participation in dialogue around SGBV | |
| I.O. 5.1.3 | Increased involvement in changing harmful social/gender norms | |
| O.O. 5.2 | Increased levels of trust in security forces to prosecute SGBV incidents committed by staff | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.2.1 | Reduced involvement of security sector actors (FARDC and PNC) in SGBV | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.2.2 | Strengthened military judicial systems for prosecution of SGBV cases | Not covered |
| O.O. 5.3 | Improved access to justice and support services for SGBV survivors | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.3.1 | Increased public awareness of laws & standards; roles and responsibilities to combat SGBV | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.3.3 | Improved support services for SGBV survivors | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.3.4 | Improved ease of filing of SGBV cases at local level | (SCF) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.3.5 | Improved speed, impartiality and confidentiality of SGBV trials improved | (SCF) UN HABITAT |

3 ISSSS Results Data – Sud-Irumu PZ

This section of the report contains a summary data sheet for those indicators of the ISSSS logframe for which data were available at the time of writing the present report.

The population samples for the perception data were established at the PZ level, which means the data are statistically representative of the zone's population (and not limited to the beneficiaries or the respondents). In this process, the PZ was divided into 2 sub-zones: the first one, called "Sud-Irumu South", includes the *chefferies* of Bahema Mitego, Bahema Boga and Banyali Tchabi ; the second sub-zone, called "Sud-Irumu North", includes the chefferies of Bahema Sud and Walendu Bindi.⁵

The data sheet contains data from the Joint Human Rights Office (JHRO) refer to the *territoire du Sud-Irumu*, where the two Sud-Irumu sub-zones are located. Please note that the underage victims' gender is not recorded in JHRO data. Minors are therefore only included in the overall, total number of victims.

The following section contains a presentation and global analysis of selected data, which underline the global trends and main changes observed in the data between the two reporting periods. The M&E Cell intends to publish a quarterly report called "Stabilisation Spotlights", which will provide more detailed analyses of certain questions raised in the present report (ISSSS stakeholders are invited to contact the M&E Cell and submit their requests).

⁵ The *chefferies* of Walese-Vonkutu and Andisoma are not included in the sample, although they are covered by the ISSSS programmes' implementation.

Table 8 : ISSSS Results Data, Sud-Irumu, Pillars 1 and 2, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | | January - June 2016 | | | July - December 2016 | | | January - June 2017 | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|--|---|-------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | | | Sud Irumu S | Sud Irumu N | Grand Total | Sud Irumu S | Sud Irumu N | Grand Total | Sud Irumu S | Sud Irumu N | Grand Total | |
| Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) | 1_iii | % women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | 5% | 8% | 7% | 2% | 13% | 7% | 5% | 12% | 8% | |
| | 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | 8% | 12% | 10% | 2% | 27% | 14% | 8% | 16% | 12% | |
| | 1.1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | 6% | 18% | 12% | 7% | 24% | 15% | 5% | 10% | 7% | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_1 (a) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men. | | | | 3 incident(s) | 96 incident(s) | 99 incident(s) | 7 incident(s) | 162 incident(s) | 169 incident(s) | |
| | 2_1 (b) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men. | | | | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 2 incident(s) | 2 incident(s) | 4 incident(s) | |
| | 2_1 (c) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by unknown perpetrators against women, girls, boys and men. | | | | 1 incident(s) | 13 incident(s) | 14 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 9 incident(s) | 9 incident(s) | |
| | 2_1 (a) (JHRO) | # of reported incidents perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**) | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | | | 10 incident(s) | |
| | | | | Others | | | | | | | 5 incident(s) | |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | | | | 30 incident(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | | 40 incident(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | | | | 36 incident(s) |
| | | | Property | | | | | | | | | 117 incident(s) |
| | 2_1 (b) (JHRO) | # of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**) | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | | | 0 incident(s) | |
| | | | | Others | | | | | | | 0 incident(s) | |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | | | | 0 incident(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | | 3 incident(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | | | | 5 incident(s) |
| | | | Property | | | | | | | | | 3 incident(s) |
| | 2_1 (c) (JHRO) | # of reported incidents perpetrated by other state agents against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**) | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | | | 1 incident(s) | |
| | | | | Others | | | | | | | 0 incident(s) | |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | | | | 0 incident(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | | 1 incident(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | | | | 3 incident(s) |
| Property | | | | | | | | | | | 2 incident(s) | |
| 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over past year | | | | | | | 18% | 10% | 14% | | |
| 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | 24% | 28% | 26% | 29% | 22% | 26% | 26% | 14% | 20% | | |
| 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | | | | | | | 64% | 56% | 60% | | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | 30% | 47% | 38% | 33% | 44% | 38% | 19% | 26% | 22% | | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'ala salam a' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6mths | | | | | | | 29% | 16% | 23% | | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men feeling "very secure" or "secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol | | | | | | | 19% | 59% | 39% | | |
| 2.2_1 | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | 92% | 87% | 89% | 88% | 82% | 85% | 60% | 67% | 63% | | |
| 2.2_2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by soldiers are ongoing | 71% | 53% | 62% | 50% | 47% | 48% | 34% | 25% | 30% | | |
| 2.2_2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for crimes) | 34% | 19% | 26% | 6% | 17% | 12% | 20% | 8% | 14% | | |

Table 9 : : ISSSS Results Data, Sud-Irumu, Pillar 3, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | | July - December 2016 | | | January - June 2017 | | | |
|--|---|--|-------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-----|
| | | Sud Irumu S | Sud Irumu N | Grand Total | Sud Irumu S | Sud Irumu N | Grand Total | Sud Irumu S | Sud Irumu N | Grand Total | |
| Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority) | 3_1 [central gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of central government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Combat corruption | 3% | 8% | 6% | 3% | 7% | 5% | 16% | 15% | 16% |
| | | Combat sexual violence | 6% | 27% | 17% | 6% | 13% | 9% | 17% | 26% | 22% |
| | | Create employment | 3% | 7% | 5% | 3% | 9% | 6% | 19% | 18% | 18% |
| | | Ensure security | 3% | 16% | 10% | 5% | 9% | 7% | 19% | 17% | 18% |
| | | Establishing peace in Eastern DRC | 4% | 16% | 10% | 1% | 9% | 5% | 19% | 20% | 19% |
| | | Improve the lives of Congolese | 3% | 12% | 7% | 3% | 6% | 4% | 17% | 15% | 16% |
| | | Reduce poverty | 4% | 8% | 6% | 2% | 8% | 5% | 14% | 18% | 16% |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 7% | 17% | 12% | 7% | 15% | 11% | 19% | 22% | 20% | |
| | 3_1 [provincial gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of provincial government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Ensure security | | | | | | | 20% | 21% | 21% |
| | | Improve the lives of Congolaise | | | | | | | 17% | 21% | 19% |
| | | Prepare democratic elections | | | | | | | 21% | 21% | 21% |
| | 3_1 [territorial gov.] | % of women and men assessing the performance of the territorial government / La Mairie as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Ensure security | | | | | | | 21% | 21% | 21% |
| | | Improve the lives of Congolaise | | | | | | | 19% | 19% | 19% |
| | | Prepare democratic elections | | | | | | | 18% | 18% | 18% |
| | 3.1_1 | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of Congolese State (état civil) | 5% | 26% | 16% | 6% | 19% | 12% | 10% | 30% | 20% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to land administration services of the Congolese State | | | | | | | 11% | 29% | 20% |
| | 3.1.1_1 [overall] | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to national civil judicial system | 5% | 35% | 20% | 17% | 23% | 20% | 21% | 23% | 22% |
| | | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance on state agents: | | | | | | | | | |
| | | State agents have the right skills to provide good services | | | | | | | 36% | 59% | 47% |
| | | State agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way | | | | | | | 27% | 38% | 33% |
| | | State agents work on case without payment of incentive | | | | | | | 26% | 35% | 30% |
| | 3.1.1_1 [justice] | State agents work on cases quickly / swiftly | | | | | | | 28% | 43% | 35% |
| | | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance of judicial officials: | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Actors of the justice (system) are corrupt | | | | | | | 29% | 45% | 37% |
| | | Court decisions are well executed | | | | | | | 18% | 17% | 17% |
| Decisions of courts are taken in a fair manner | | | | | | | | 19% | 19% | 19% | |
| Justice is fast | | | | | | | | 19% | 15% | 17% | |
| 3.1.1_1 [police] | The courts treat people in a fair and equal manner | | | | | | | 21% | 23% | 22% | |
| | Trials are fair | | | | | | | 18% | 15% | 16% | |
| | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on police / PNC performance: | | | | | | | | | | |
| | It is possible to avoid arrest if one pays the police | | | | | | | 39% | 37% | 38% | |
| 3.2_1 | Police go unpunished (for crimes they commit) | | | | | | | 21% | 10% | 16% | |
| | Police only work on case after payment of an incentive | | | | | | | 48% | 54% | 51% | |
| | The police treats all ethnic groups in the same way | | | | | | | 23% | 28% | 26% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that national government represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 2% | 13% | 8% | 4% | 10% | 7% | 11% | 15% | 13% | |
| 3.2.2_ii | % of women and men indicating that provincial government represents the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | | | 9% | 14% | 11% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that territorial administration & 'la mairie' represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 0% | 0% | 0% | 28% | 23% | 25% | 26% | 49% | 38% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that local authorities represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well' | 2% | 11% | 7% | 4% | 8% | 6% | 15% | 38% | 27% | |
| | % of women and men who indicate that they find it 'very' or 'extremely' acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes') | 12% | 27% | 20% | 3% | 22% | 12% | 11% | 43% | 27% | |

Table 10 : ISSSS Results Data, Sud-Irumu, Pillars 4 and 5, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | | July - December 2016 | | | January - June 2017 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|-------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-----|
| | | Sud Irumu S | Sud Irumu N | Grand Total | Sud Irumu S | Sud Irumu N | Grand Total | Sud Irumu S | Sud Irumu N | Grand Total | |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience) | 4_1_i | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4_1_ii | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2.1_iv | 0% | 0% | 0% | 70% | 53% | 62% | 78% | 64% | 71% | |
| | 4.2.2_ii | 46% | 31% | 38% | 44% | 33% | 39% | 24% | 46% | 35% | |
| | 4.2.3_i | 9% | 16% | 13% | 37% | 8% | 22% | 26% | 18% | 22% | |
| | 4.2.5_i | 5% | 15% | 10% | 7% | 13% | 10% | 16% | 16% | 16% | |
| | 4.3_i | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | 0% | 0% | 0% | 84% | 85% | 84% | 89% | 89% | 89% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | 0% | 0% | 0% | 91% | 89% | 90% | 92% | 90% | 91% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups | 0% | 0% | 0% | 78% | 78% | 78% | 88% | 86% | 87% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups | 0% | 0% | 0% | 84% | 81% | 83% | 85% | 83% | 84% |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 5_ii | 2% | 7% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 4% | 9% | 4% | 7% | |
| | 5_iii | | | | | | | 12% | 13% | 12% | |
| | | 53% | 68% | 60% | 67% | 70% | 69% | 61% | 69% | 65% | |
| | 5.1_i | 0% | 0% | 0% | 27% | 25% | 26% | 30% | 23% | 26% | |
| | | 0% | 0% | 0% | 31% | 28% | 29% | 29% | 34% | 31% | |
| | 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into community | 86% | 94% | 90% | 84% | 85% | 84% | 71% | 84% | 77% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into household | 78% | 93% | 86% | 83% | 90% | 86% | 66% | 89% | 78% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence | 72% | 92% | 82% | 79% | 83% | 81% | 68% | 91% | 79% |
| | | % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as result. | 70% | 91% | 81% | 77% | 82% | 79% | 68% | 87% | 78% |
| | 5.2_i | | | | | | | 29% | 43% | 36% | |
| 5.3.3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to health care services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | | 17% | 26% | 22% | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to psychological support services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | | 11% | 17% | 14% | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to reintegration services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | | 14% | 24% | 19% | |

Table 11: ISSSS Results Data, Sud-Irumu - by gender, Pillars 1 and 2, June 2016 – June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January-June 2016 | | July-december 2016 | | January-June 2017 | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|--|---|-----|-------------------|-----|-----------|------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Children | Grand Total 2017 | | | |
| Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) | 1_iii | % women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1_1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_i (a) [JHRO] | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls*, boys* and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 12 vict(s) | 1 vict(s) | 13 vict(s) |
| | | | | Other | | | | | 2 vict(s) | 5 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 7 vict(s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | 31 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 7 vict(s) | 38 vict(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | 6 vict(s) | 52 vict(s) | 3 vict(s) | 61 vict(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | 19 vict(s) | 43 vict(s) | 7 vict(s) | 69 vict(s) |
| | | Forced Labour | | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 18 vict(s) | 4 vict(s) | 22 vict(s) | |
| | 2_i (b) [JHRO] | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls*, boys* and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) |
| | | | | Other | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 3 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 3 vict(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | 1 vict(s) | 20 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 21 vict(s) |
| | | Forced Labour | | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 10 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 10 vict(s) | |
| | 2_i (c) [JHRO] | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls*, boys* and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 1 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 1 vict(s) |
| | | | | Other | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 1 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 1 vict(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | 2 vict(s) | 9 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 11 vict(s) |
| | | Forced Labour | | | | | | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | 0 vict(s) | |
| 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over past year | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'lala salama' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6mths | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men feeling "very secure" or "secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.2.2_1 | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.2.2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by soldiers are ongoing | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.2.2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for crimes) | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 13: ISSSS Results Data, Sud-Irumu - by gender, Pillars 4 and 5, June 2016 – June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January-June 2016 | | July-december 2016 | | January-June 2017 | | | | |
|--|---|--|-----|--------------------|-----|-------------------|-----|----------|------------------|-----|
| | | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Children | Grand Total 2017 | |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience) | 4_i | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4_ii | | | | | 61% | 81% | | 71% | |
| | 4.2.1_iv | | | | | 22% | 23% | | 23% | |
| | 4.2.2_ii | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2.3_i | 16% | 61% | 23% | 54% | 26% | 44% | | 35% | |
| | 4.2.3_ii | 6% | 19% | 23% | 22% | 17% | 27% | | 22% | |
| | 4.2.5_i | 4% | 16% | 3% | 17% | 8% | 24% | | 16% | |
| | 4.3_j | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups | | | | | 91% | 77% | | 84% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | | | | | 94% | 85% | | 89% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups | | | | | 89% | 86% | | 87% |
| % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | | | | | | 96% | 86% | | 91% | |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 5_ii | | | | | | 5% | 8% | 7% | |
| | 5_iii | | | | | 11% | 13% | | 12% | |
| | 5.1_i | % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage) | 52% | 69% | 63% | 75% | 60% | 69% | | 65% |
| | | % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in family', i.e., without involvement of authorities | | | | | 20% | 32% | | 26% |
| | | % of women and men who 'agree' that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat wife / spouse | | | | | 17% | 45% | | 31% |
| | 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence | 91% | 74% | 82% | 80% | 81% | 77% | | 79% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into community | | | | | 73% | 82% | | 77% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into household | 93% | 78% | 84% | 89% | 77% | 78% | | 78% |
| | | % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as result | 87% | 75% | 79% | 80% | 81% | 74% | | 78% |
| | 5.2_j | % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC / PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence | | | | | 20% | 52% | | 36% |
| 5.3.3_y | % of women and men who consider the access to health care services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | 22% | 21% | | 22% | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to psychological support services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | 14% | 14% | | 14% | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to reintegration services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | 19% | 19% | | 19% | |

4 Conclusion - Observations and possible considerations

The analysis, the conclusions, the observations and the recommendations presented in this section of the report were developed by the M&E Cell, based on the available data provided by the various sources.

Observations – Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

Citizens of Sud-Irumu do not present an optimistic mind-set regarding the current and future state of peace and security, and on the ability of the international community and the Government to affect positive change. This creates challenging circumstances for the launch of democratic dialogue in Sud-Irumu (**Specific Objective 1**). This negative perception of peacefulness in the priority zone as a whole has remained consistent since January 2016 through this reporting period. Pessimism is stronger among the populations of Bahema Sud and Walendu Bindi (Sud-Irumu North) where approximately half of the people characterise their village as only “a little” to “not at all” peaceful (**Indicator 1_iii**). Recorded incidences perpetrated by Armed Groups in these two areas of Sud-Irumu North have increased, up from 96 incidences recorded between July and December 2016 to 162 recorded during this reporting period. The opinions of citizens remained unchanged from the initial ISSSS Baseline Report with 9 out of 10 adults in PZ expecting an unchanged situation or even less peaceful conditions in the future (**Indicator 1_iv**). Approximately 6 out of 10 people in Sud-Irumu indicated that ‘peace projects’ (stabilisation projects) made little to no contribution to overall improvements in their villages or communities (**Indicator 1.1_iii**).

As opposed to emerging trends in other priority zones, men in Sud-Irumu are more positive and optimistic both about the current and future security situation than women. This is interesting given that men report being victims to violence and wrongdoing more often than women.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 1

As in other priority zones, the largely negative views on the past stabilisation projects increase the significance of the **participatory approach** of the ISSSS, i.e. to use the **consultation and dialogue mechanism** not only during the start-up phase of projects, but also during implementation (such as participatory monitoring) to establish the legitimacy of the stabilisation process as a whole. This may also increase the pressure for projects to follow-up dialogue with concrete actions and gains in order to convince a largely sceptical population of the **overall value of the stabilisation process**.

A strong participatory approach throughout the life of the project could also provide an opportunity to ensure engaged, active participation from women.

Observations – Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

As ISSSS programming efforts are getting underway in Sud-Irumu, things have not changed much regarding the **performance of the FARDC in the protection of civilians (PoC) and an improvement in community-FARDC relations (Specific Objective 2)**. While relationships between the population and the FARDC are neither significantly good nor bad, the FARDC do not appear to be interacting much with the population in order to foster stronger relationships.

The majority of citizens in Sud-Irumu have neither been victims of FARDC misconduct nor have they been helped by them (**Indicator 2_ii and 2_ii(a)**). The share of the population that reports having been helped by the FARDC has declined from about 2 out of 10 in December 2016 to 1 in 10 during this reporting period. The population's perceptions of the FARDC's contribution towards maintaining peace and security is not strong, with 6 out of 10 people perceiving the FARDC to make a medium to weak contribution to peace in Sud-Irumu (**Indicator 2_iii (a)**). Approximately a quarter of the population in Sud-Irumu reports having made payments of *lala salama*⁶ within this reporting period (**Indicator 2.1_iii**).

Attitudes of Sud-Irumu citizens towards the FARDC remain equal between men and women. However, trust in the willingness of the FARDC to make themselves accountable for possible infractions has declined. In June 2016, 9 out of 10 people believed there were opportunities for FARDC victims to complain, while in this reporting period this is only the case for 6 out of 10 people. At the same time, the knowledge among the population of FARDC accountability structures is relatively limited, as 4 out of 10 adults responded "don't know" when asked if they agree with the internal measures and structures used by the FARDC to hold FARDC perpetrators accountable (**Indicator 2.2.2_i**).

Women's perceptions of security vary in Sud-Irumu. The majority of women (approximately 9 out of 10) have indicated not having been a victim of FARDC misconduct. Close to two thirds of women have confidence in the ability of the FARDC to ensure the safety of their villages and about half of the female respondents agreed that the FARDC soldier are being held accountable for their crimes. However, only about a quarter of women feel comfortable when personally encountering FARDC on patrol.

There are clear differences emerging in terms of security trends between Sud-Irumu South and Sud-Irumu North. In the first sub-zone, 3 out of 10 adults have reported to have been helped by the FARDC as opposed to only 1 out of 10 in the second one. In terms of buying security, 3 out of 10 people in Sud-Irumu South pay *lala salama*, against only 1 in 10 in Sud-Irumu North (**Indicator 2.1_iii**). The population of Sud-Irumu South reports feeling significantly less secure (2 out of 10) when encountering the FARDC on patrol as opposed to Sud-Irumu North, where 6 out of 10 citizens report feeling comfortable when encountering FARDC on patrol (**Indicator 2.2.**).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 2

Consistent doubts among the population, variances in the perception of women and the considerable differences emerging between Sud-Irumu South and Sud-Irumu North may point to the need to target specific aspects of the ISSSS intervention in specific sub priority zones. Given that a significant number of Pillar 2 results are not covered in Sud-Irumu, there remains a risk that advancement towards results will remain low unless synergies with other interventions are identified or ISSSS programming can respond to these gaps. It might be useful to continue to monitor the development in trends between Sud-Irumu South and North regarding the emerging security situation.

⁶ *Lala Salama* is a monetary contribution paid to the FARDC by civilians to ensure security.

Observations – Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

Sud-Irumu will **benefit from an increased local presence of the regular Congolese State (Specific Objective 3)**. Attitudes towards the central government's ability to establish peace in Eastern DRC have improved the most, from almost zero in December 2016 to approximately 2 out of 10 people in June 2017 who believe the central government has done a "good" or "very good" job at establishing peace in Eastern DRC (**Indicator 3_i central government**). This trend is the same for Sud-Irumu South and Sud-Irumu North, with 2 out of 10 people expressing positive opinions about the work of government at all levels (**Indicator 3_i central, provincial and territorial**). However, more work can be done to address equal treatment and access to services by all ethnic groups. Almost half of men and women indicate the government does not treat all ethnic groups equally (**Indicator 3.1.1_i overall**).

Opinions differ between men and women on the government's work towards combating sexual violence. Approximately 6 out of 10 women rate the central government as being "bad" or "very bad" in this regard. This contrasts with about a quarter of men who rate the government as "good" in combating sexual violence. However, overall opinions have been consistently improving in Sud-Irumu overall since 2016 until this reporting period (**Indicator 3_i central government**).

Only 2 out of 10 citizens of Sud-Irumu have a positive opinion regarding access to the judicial system and also access to general and land administrative services. The opinion of access to these services is better in Sud-Irumu North than in Sud-Irumu South where only 1 out of 10 people rate access to the judicial, general and administrative services as "good" or "very good" (**Indicator 3.1_i**).

Public knowledge of judicial services and activities appears to be low. On average approximately 3 out of 10 people either refused to respond or answered "I don't know" when asked about the work of the judicial system. Opinions differed between Sud-Irumu South and North on corruption within the judicial system. Approximately one third of Sud-Irumu South believes the actors within the judicial system are corrupt. In Sud-Irumu North this is the case for almost 50 percent of citizens (**Indicator 3.1.1_i justice**).

Opinions differ greatly in Sud-Irumu with regards to the willingness to pay taxes to support state services. In Sud-Irumu South only 1 in 10 people indicate they find it "very" or "extremely" acceptable to pay 'official taxes'⁷. Approximately half of the people in Sud-Irumu North find it "very" or "extremely" acceptable to pay "official taxes" (**Indicator 3.2.2_ii**).

It is interesting to note that in all questions related to the government about 3 out of 10 women were either unable to respond or responded "I don't know" for only about 1 out of 10 male respondents.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 3

Sud-Irumu presents the ideal situation for ISSSS programming to make a positive difference in the lives of citizens by working with partners to hold the government accountable in **addressing the role and presence of the Congolese State in the zone at all levels – central, provincial and territorial**. In close cooperation with partners and other actors in the zone, this improvement will promote increased access to services and also support accountability of the government to provide quality services. While current ISSSS interventions are covering a considerable portion of Pillar 3, it would be interesting to investigate

⁷ "Official taxes" refer to real taxes, meaning monies entering into the public purse, and not invented taxes intended to provide personal finances to an individual or a specific group of people.

potential synergies between components in order to strengthen results. As noted throughout this analysis, an examination of gender-specific barriers that reduce access to services more significantly for women than for men could greatly inform and direct efforts.

Observations – Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

Overall, Sud-Irumu continues to struggle to ensure the **equitable flow of socio-economic resources (Specific Objective 4)**. Advances in this regard assisted through ISSSS programming will likely be challenging. While men appear to have improved access to land, credit and paid employment, women continue to report lower access rates.

The share of the population that relies primarily on traditional income generating activities has increased from December 2016 to June 2017, by approximately 10 percent. For approximately 4 out of 5 men, agriculture, fishery or animal husbandry are the main sources of income. The same is true for only 3 out of 5 women (**Indicator 4_iii**). The number of individuals reporting to have received payment for one week of work in the past three months has increased between June 2016 and June 2017. However, there remains a significant difference between men and women with about a quarter of men reporting to have been paid, in comparison to only one tenth of women. Average household income is low, with 1 out of 5 people reporting to earn less than 15\$ or between 16-30\$ per month. A quarter of women in Sud-Irumu reports earning less than 15\$ per month and approximately 1 out of 5 women reports no earnings at all. Sud-Irumu South recorded the lowest level of household income where approximately 3 out of 10 people report to earning 0\$ per month (**Indicator 4_i**).

Access to credit remains similar between Sud-Irumu South and North with about a quarter of people indicating they had access to credit between December 2016 and June 2017. Again, more men - approximately 3 out of 10 - report to having access to credit in comparison to only 2 out of 10 women (**Indicator 4.2.3_i**). Similar access is reported between men and women regarding access to markets in Sud-Irumu with a quarter of people indicating they are able to access markets. However, access to markets is slightly better in Sud-Irumu North with 3 out of 10 people reporting access as opposed to 1 out of 10 in Sud-Irumu South (**Indicator 4.2.3_ii**).

Citizens of Sud-Irumu appear to be taking the lead with regards to interaction with different ethnic groups, as opposed to waiting for initiation from the government (see Pillar 3 above). Interaction with members of other ethnic groups is quite high with an average of 9 out of 10 citizens indicating they interact and participate in events or activities with members of other ethnic groups. Women report more interactions with other ethnic groups than men (**Indicator 4.3_i**).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 4

There are major challenges that need to be addressed through ISSSS programming in order to achieve equitable access. As an initial step, it might be interesting for programming to identify the root causes or blockages preventing equality and equitable access to socio-economic resources in Sud-Irumu.

By addressing these root causes, it is likely there will be other positive effects on programming. For example, positive opinions may begin to improve in relation to aspects of Pillar 1 as women's perception improves regarding peace projects and how they positively contribute to addressing their priorities.

Observations – Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)⁸

Reported and self-reported incidence of sexual violence was relatively low in Sud-Irumu with more men than women reporting having experienced sexual violence. Sud-Irumu South, with about 1 in 10 people, has a slightly higher rate of people who reported experiencing sexual violence than Sud-Irumu North, with less than 1 in 10. However, the overall number of incidents has increased slightly since June 2016.

Attitudes of men are more in agreement than women with regards to various aspects of sexual violence. Approximately half of the men agree that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat his wife/spouse in contrast to only a quarter of women. Moving in more of a positive direction, attitudes regarding sexual consent have remained consistent with 6 out of 10 people in Sud-Irumu agreeing that sexual encounters should be consensual. It is interesting to note that citizens of Sud-Irumu North report a higher agreement, with 8 out of 10 people who think that sexual activity should be consensual (**Indicator 5.1_i**). Over half of the men agree that members of the FARDC/PNC are appropriately punished if they commit sexual violence infractions, as opposed to only 1 in 5 women (**Indicator 5.2_i**).

Opinions regarding the reintegration of survivors of sexual violence into the community or household, and of those who have children as a result are similar between men and women with approximately 7 out of 10 people favouring reintegration (**Indicator 5.1_ii**). Sud-Irumu South has not been consistent in trends regarding their opinion of favourable reintegration between June 2016 and June 2018. For example, in June 2016 acceptance of survivors of sexual violence back into the household began at 8 out of 10 people in agreement, this increased slightly again in December 2016 but fell to 6 out of 10 people who were favourable in June 2017.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 5

Considering the increased number of incidents of sexual violence and the varying and inconsistent attitudes between men and women and within sub-priority zones, it may be necessary to consider if and how the **currently low coverage of Pillar 5 by ISSSS projects can be expanded**. It needs to be emphasized that many of the related results of Pillar 2 (i.e. those aimed at strengthening the FARDC's internal disciplinary and oversight structures (**Overall Outcome 2.1**)) are currently also not covered by stabilisation projects.

⁸ It is not possible to estimate the total number of incidents of sexual violence in the priority zones, as it is unlikely that any of the available data sets offer a comprehensive tally. Assuming however that any flaws in the data affect all data collection across all geographic zones, however, the data sets can offer some insight into relative magnitude of the problem across geographic areas.

Annex II - Mambasa Priority Zone, Ituri Province

List of Acronyms

| | |
|----------|---|
| CISPE | Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| ETD | <i>Entités Territoriales Décentralisées</i> (Local Entities) |
| FARDC | <i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i> (DRC Armed Forces) |
| FARM | Food Security and Inclusive Access to Resources for Conflict Sensitive Market Development |
| FCS | <i>Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation</i> (Stabilisation Coherence Fund) |
| HR | Human Right(s) |
| HRV | Human Rights Violation(s) |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| I.O. | Intermediate Outcome |
| IOM | International Migration Organisation |
| ISSSS | International Stabilization and Security Support Strategy |
| JHRO | Joint Human Right Office |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| M&E Cell | Monitoring and Evaluation Cell (of the SSU) |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC |
| MNE | (sub-zone of) Mambasa North-East |
| MSW | (sub-zone of) Mambasa South-West |
| O.O. | Overall Outcome |
| PNC | <i>Police Nationale Congolaise</i> (Congolese National Police) |
| PoC | Protection of civilians |
| PZ | Priority Zone |
| SFCG | Search For Common Ground |
| SGBV | Sexual and Gender Based Violence |
| S.O. | Specific Objective |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform (<i>Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika</i>) |
| SSU | Stabilisation Support Unit |
| SV | Sexual Violence |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

1 Presentation of Annex II – Mambasa (Ituri Province)

This annex presents a projection of the ISSSS programming in the Mambasa priority zone (PZ) for the first half of 2017. It provides the mapping of harmonised projects that are either currently implemented or still “in the pipeline” (for example, in their preliminary phase, or in the final stages of their design phase), but slated for implementation in the foreseeable future.

Since the first semester of 2017 is the first period for which complete sets of monitoring data were available, this annex effectively constitutes a brief baseline report of the ISSSS in the Mambasa PZ, which means that the data presented here will serve as reference to which data collected in the future will be compared.

This annex provides a set of preliminary and provisional observations regarding progress in the ISSSS programming in the Mambasa PZ. It is however important to underline that these observations are meant to help and inform stakeholders to pursue the debate about trends and programming options in the PZ. They are therefore by no means intended to be definitive, final or accepted at face value. Questioning, revising and refining this report’s observations in the course of this debate is very much an intended part of the monitoring and learning process within the SSU M&E Cell.

2 Status of ISSSS programming – Mambasa PZ (Ituri Province)

This section of the report provides an overview of the status of ISSSS programming in the Mambasa PZ. Specifically, this section provides:

- a **brief description of the different programmes and interventions** that are currently being implemented in the Mambasa PZ in association with the ISSSS, i.e. those that are either financed through the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (FCS) or through bi-lateral funding arrangements (*aligned programmes*);
- an overview of how these **interventions cover the result elements of the ISSSS across its five thematic pillars**, and some tentative observations on the degree to which all necessary elements are being addressed;
- a slightly more in-depth view of the **pillar-specific status of ISSSS programming**, based on the status of ISSSS projects from January to June 2017, as well as some additional thoughts on implications for the implementation of the strategy in the months to come.

Overview of ISSSS interventions in Mambasa

Table 1 below lists the projects that are currently being implemented or are set to start implementation in the coming months under the umbrella of the ISSSS in the Mambasa PZ. For each one, the table provides information on the respective lead organisations, the expected implementation period and the thematic focus.

Table 1: Overview of interventions associated with the ISSSS (aligned and FCS) in Mambasa

| Type | Title (Lead Organisation) | Implementation Period | Thematic Focuses |
|---------|---|--------------------------------|--|
| FCS | <i>Amani ni njiya ya maendeleo</i> , phase II (UNHABITAT) | April 2017 - April 2018 | Democratic dialogue, land use governance for the restoration of state authority, social cohesion and community resilience for socio-economic reintegration and revival, promotion of gender equality, fight against discriminations, SGBV prevention |
| | <i>Pamoja Kwa Amani na Maendeleo</i> (UN HABITAT) | Ongoing (ending in April 2019) | Land governance, social cohesion, socio-economic reintegration, prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) |
| Aligned | <i>Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika</i> (Security Sector Reform (SSR)) (Phase 4; Extension) (SFCG) | Ongoing (ending in May 2018) | Increasing knowledge and awareness among Congolese security forces and civilians about their rights, roles and mutual responsibilities to improve relationships and build trust |

The overall project landscape in Mambasa

Taken together, the projects mentioned in Table 2 below are set to address all five thematic pillars of the ISSSS in the Mambasa PZ, albeit at differing degrees of intensity:

- Presently, project coverage of Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in Protection of Civilians) **is still developing**. Less than half of the results components of this pillar are currently targeted by at least one intervention in the PZ.

- Project coverage of all other pillars, i.e. 1 (Democratic Dialogue), 3 (Restoration of State Authority), 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict) and 5 (Fight against SGBV) is **relatively advanced**, in that more than half of each of these pillars' results components are covered by at least one project.

Table 2 below provides an overview of the programming status the five thematic pillars of the ISSSS in the Mambasa PZ.

Table 2: Overview of programming status across all ISSSS Pillars, Mambasa PZ (Ituri Province), July 2017

| Pillar | Intended Contribution to implementation of ISSSS | Coverage of ISSSS results framework ¹ |
|----------|--|--|
| Pillar 1 | <i>Create a participatory and inclusive (democratic) dialogue to ensure a political and community-based transformation process of the targeted conflicts.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 2 | <i>Improve the performance of the FARDC in civilian protection, and community – FARDC relations</i> | Developing |
| Pillar 3 | <i>Increase the (beneficial) role and presence of the Congolese state (in particular the local authorities) in the Priority Zones.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 4 | <i>Increase the equitable resource flow to and coherence among at risk populations (women and men, girls and boys), including in particular, IDPs and returnees.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 5 | <i>Ensure that security sector reforms (covered by both Pillars 2 and 3) and local state capacity building (Pillar 3) sufficiently emphasize combating sexual and gender based violence as a symptom and driver of conflict in the Priority Zones.</i> | Advanced |

Programming for Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

With regard to Table 3 below, programming for Pillar 1 is currently addressed by a single project in the Mambasa PZ: the FCS intervention of the UN HABITAT consortium. This project intervenes on the issue of conflicts around the RFO (*Réserve de la Faune à Okapis*, Wildlife Reserve for Okapis), mainly in the dialogue between stakeholders through the establishment of platforms and the development of joint action plans. This follows Phase I of the project and the achievements of the Mambasa Inclusive Conference (August 2016).

Although the project advocates the endorsement of community action plans by the authorities at the local, provincial and national levels, it nevertheless remains devoid of action on sector compacts at the national level, while progress has been achieved in terms of engaging the authorities (and their partners) at the provincial and national levels.

The current socio-political situation, particularly with regard to elections and insecurity (emergence and recrudescence of armed groups in this area), could negatively affect the possibility of setting up a participatory dialogue process in Mambasa and the efforts made with that aim.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 1 of the ISSSS logframe.

¹ **Complete:** All result elements of the ISSSS are addressed by projects; **Advanced:** Most result elements are addressed by projects; **Developing:** A minority of result elements are addressed by projects; **None:** No results elements of the Pillar are addressed by projects.

Table 3: The ISSSS programme landscape in the Mambasa PZ, Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| S.O. 1 | Support for the ISSSS at community level | |
| O.O. 1.1 | Local stabilisation processes aligned with community priorities | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 1.1.1 | Joint action plans developed and approved by communities | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 1.1.2 | Joint action plans compiled into Sector Compacts | Not covered |
| I.O. 1.1.3 | National authorities commit to & act upon Sector Compacts | Not covered |
| O.O. 1.2 | Local groups support stabilisation process | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 1.2.1 | Oversight mechanisms of stabilisation process set-up and functioning; | (FCS) UNHABITAT |

Programming for Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

As Table 4 below illustrates, ISSSS programming under Pillar 2 in the Mambasa PZ is characterized by SSR actions aimed at changing the FARDC behaviour in terms of protection of civilians, or PoC and sexual and gender-based violence, or SGBV. It also focusses on improving trust and cohesion between local communities and FARDC members deployed in the PZ. However, the results components related to internal dynamics and incentive mechanisms that influence FARDC behaviour are currently not substantially covered (e.g. Intermediate Outcome **IO 2.2.2**). In the same way, the SSR intervention logic on improving FARDC performance does not yet clearly include efforts to communicate the experiences and lessons learnt from the local engagement of the project with FARDC members to national leaders, or to link the work carried out at the local level to the National Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The system of rotation/transfer of FARDC members makes it difficult to consolidate the achievements of the project in terms of performance in PoC. Added to this is the lack of progress in the national security sector reform program, particularly in relation to the care and politicisation of the army corps.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 2 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 4: The ISSSS program landscape in Mambasa, Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of PoC)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| S.O. 2 | FARDC Performance in terms of PoC | |
| O.O. 2.1 | Operational FARDC PoC principles & procedures applied and enforced | (A): SSR |
| I.O. 2.1.1 | Increased awareness and skills among FARDC commanders & their units regarding PoC and SGBV prevention principles | (A) : SSR |
| I.O. 2.1.2 | FARDC disciplinary, oversight, incentive structures reinforced and aligned with PoC principles | Not covered |
| I.O. 2.1.3 | Strengthened military judicial mechanisms f. HR violations | (A): SSR |
| I.O.2.1.4 | Lessons learnt from PoC experiences and resource requirements communicated to national FARDC leaders | Not covered |
| O.O. 2.2 | Strengthened cohesion and trust between civilians and FARDC | (A): SSR |
| I.O. 2.2.1 | Social & economical integration of soldiers into host communities | (A): SSR |
| I.O. 2.2.2 | Improved redress mechanisms for local authorities and communities | Not covered |

| | | |
|------------|--|-------------|
| I.O. 2.2.3 | Improved behaviour by FARDC soldiers (less predatory & profiteering) | Not covered |
|------------|--|-------------|

Programming for Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

Table 5 below shows that programming for Pillar 3 focusses on improving the state agents' performance in the police and land management sectors.

The gaps identified for Pillar 3 programming are related to the coverage of results related to the availability of necessary resources for the proper functioning of the ETDs (for example the Overall Outcomes **O.O. 3.1.3** **O.O. 3.2**) on the one hand, and to the existence of a regulatory/legal framework that can foster local governance.

In this context, several factors may affect the effects expected under Pillar 3. Among these factors, we can cite the current national political context (centralisation of power, obstructionism and lack of reforms, including financial ones, such as the question of the pay).

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 3 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 5: The ISSSS program landscape in Mambasa, Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| O.S. 3 | Increased beneficial role and presence of "regular" Congolese State in local governance | |
| O.O. 3.1 | Improved access to relevant state-provided services | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 3.1.1 | Improved performance of state agents in service delivery | (FCS) UN HABITAT (A) SSR |
| I.O. 3.1.2 | Improved availability/access to physical infrastructure and other assets for service delivery | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| O.O. 3.1.3 | Improved availability of financial resources for service delivery | Not covered |
| O.O. 3.2 | Improved accountability and responsiveness of state institutions | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.2.1 | Local, participatory oversight and planning structures established; functioning | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 3.2.2 | Local population & civil society acting on responsibilities and rights vis-a-vis local authorities | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 3.2.3 | Awareness of state agents of their formal duties and responsibilities (including no corruption) | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| O.O. 3.3 | Enabling, coherent regulatory/legal framework for local governance in place | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.3.1 | Local authorities/ETD prepared for devolution and financial retrocession | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.3.2 | Division of responsibilities between formal and traditional authorities codified | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 3.3.3 | Lessons for increased local state presence acted on by national authorities | Not covered |

Programming for Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

With regard to Table 6 below, ISSSS programming for Pillar 4 in the Mambasa PZ covers most of the components of the associated results: improved economic conditions for long-term economic development and stabilisation (Overall Outcome **O.O. 4.2**), and specific assistance to improve access to

land (reduced land conflicts, better access to land governance, land use planning). ISSSS programming also provides support for strengthening social links and social cohesion within communities (**O.O. 4.3**). Among what is not covered, we can mention the creation of paid jobs related to the long-term stabilisation of local economies (Intermediate Outcome **I.O. 4.2.5**), and the support for the stabilisation of income in the short term (**O.O. 4.1**) and for market access (**IR 4.2.1**).

Political instability and the resurgence of armed groups around the RFO reserve constitute a major risk for the success of interventions under Pillar 4 in the Mambasa PZ.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 4 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 6: The ISSSS program landscape in Kitshanga, Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated projects / programmes |
|---------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| O.S. 4 | Equitable resource flow (income earning & economic opportunities; socio-economic support) | |
| O.O. 4.1 | Increased participation in employment schemes and short-term income stabilisation | Not covered |
| I.O. 4.1.1 | Improved availability of livelihood and start-up grants and cash-for-work | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.1.2 | Improved access to services | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| O.O. 4.2 | Improved (enabling) conditions for local economic recovery | |
| I.O. 4.2.1 | Increased sustained access to markets | Not covered |
| I.O. 4.2.2 | Improved and secure access to land, natural resources | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.3 | Improved access to credit (all groups) | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.4 | Improved access to training opportunities | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.5 | Improved access to wage employment | Not covered |
| O.O. 4.3. | Social linkages within and between communities strengthened | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.3.1 | Psycho-social needs of vulnerable or marginalized groups in community addressed | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 4.3.2 | Increased trust within and among communities | (FCS) UN HABITAT |

Programming for Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

As can be noted in Table 7 below, ISSSS programming under Pillar 5 in the Mambasa PZ covers the majority of the corresponding results. Interventions under this pillar aim to at the same time foster the changing of negative social norms related to SGBV, prevention, and the legal and psychosocial care. It also covers actions related with the trust of SGBV victims/survivors towards security forces.

The remaining gaps in the programming for Pillar 5 are related to the military justice system and to the respect of the principles of impartiality and confidentiality during the trials.

The table below provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 5 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 7: The ISSSS program landscape in Mambasa, Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated projects / programmes |
|---------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| S.O. 5 | Reduced levels of Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) | |
| O.O. 5.1 | Harmful social / gender norms (SGBV) decreased | |
| I.O. 5.1.2 | Active and meaningful participation in dialogue around SGBV | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.1.3 | Increased involvement in changing harmful social/gender norms | |
| O.O. 5.2 | Increased levels of trust in security forces to prosecute SGBV incidents committed by staff | (A) SSR |
| I.O. 5.2.1 | Reduced involvement of security sector actors (FARDC and PNC) in SGBV | (A) SSR (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.2.2 | Strengthened military judicial systems for prosecution of SGBV cases | Not covered |
| O.O. 5.3 | Improved access to justice and support services for SGBV survivors | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.3.1 | Increased public awareness of laws & standards; roles and responsibilities to combat SGBV | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.3.3 | Improved support services for SGBV survivors | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.3.4 | Improved ease of filing of SGBV cases at local level | (FCS) UN HABITAT |
| I.O. 5.3.5 | Improved speed, impartiality and confidentiality of SGBV trials improved | Not covered |

3 ISSSS Results Data – Mambasa PZ

This section of the report contains a summary data sheet for those indicators of the ISSSS logframe for which data were available during this first monitoring phase for the Mambasa PZ.

The population samples for the perception data were established at the PZ level, which means the data are statistically representative of the zone's population (not limited to the beneficiaries or the respondents). In this process, the PZ was divided into 2 sub-zones. The first one, called "Mambasa North-East" includes the chefferies of Babila Bakwanza, Mambasa, Walese Karo and Walese Dese. The second one is called "Mambasa South-West" and includes the chefferies of Babila Babombi, Bombo and Bandaka.

The data sheet contains data from the Joint Human Rights Office (JHRO) refer to the territory of Mambasa, where the two sub-zones are located. Please note that the underage victims' gender is not recorded in JHRO data. Minors are therefore only included in the overall, total number of victims.

The following section contains a presentation and global analysis of selected data, which underline the global trends and main changes observed in the data between the two reporting periods. The M&E Cell intends to publish a quarterly report called "Stabilisation Spotlights", which will provide more detailed analyses of certain questions raised in the present report (interested ISSSS stakeholders are invited to contact the M&E Cell and submit their requests).

Table 8 : ISSSS Results Data, Mambasa, Pillars 1 and 2, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2017 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | Mambasa NE | Mambasa SW | Mambasa (Total) | | | |
| Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) | 1_iii | % women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | | | 50% | 16% | 32% |
| | 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | | | 16% | 9% | 12% |
| | 1.1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | | | 5% | 21% | 13% |
| | | | | | | | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_i (a) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men. | | | 1 incident | 7 incidents | 8 incidents |
| | 2_i (b) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men. | | | 0 incidents | 0 incidents | 0 incidents |
| | 2_i (c) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by unknown perpetrators against women, girls, boys and men. | | | 0 incidents | 0 incidents | 0 incidents |
| | 2_i (a) (JHRO) | # of reported incidents perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 1 | | |
| | | | | Other | 0 | | |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 0 | | |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 1 | | |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | 3 | | | |
| | | | Property | 1 | | | |
| | Forced Labour | 0 | | | | | |
| | 2_i (b) (JHRO) | # of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 2 | | |
| | | | | Other | 3 | | |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 1 | | |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 4 | | |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | 11 | | | |
| | | | Property | 5 | | | |
| | Forced Labour | 2 | | | | | |
| | 2_i (c) (JHRO) | # of reported incidents perpetrated by other state agents against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 0 | | |
| | | | | Other | 0 | | |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 0 | | |
| Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | 3 | | | |
| Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | 4 | | | | |
| Property | | | 7 | | | | |
| Forced Labour | 0 | | | | | | |
| 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over past year | | | 2% | 5% | 3% | |
| 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | | | 2% | 11% | 7% | |
| 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | | | 53% | 52% | 53% | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | | | 19% | 16% | 18% | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'lala salama' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6mths | | | 6% | 6% | 6% | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men feeling "very secure" or "secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol | | | 39% | 26% | 32% | |
| 2.2.2_i | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | | | 42% | 72% | 58% | |
| 2.2.2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by soldiers are ongoing | | | 21% | 37% | 29% | |
| 2.2.2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for crimes) | | | 23% | 38% | 31% | |

Table 9 : ISSSS Results Data, Mambasa, Pillar 3, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2017 | | |
|------------------------|--|---------------------|------------|-----------------|
| | | Mambasa NE | Mambasa SW | Mambasa (Total) |
| 3_i [central gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of central government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | 46% | 28% | 37% |
| | Combat corruption | 47% | 23% | 35% |
| | Combat sexual violence | 52% | 34% | 43% |
| | Create employment | 38% | 26% | 32% |
| | Ensure security | 56% | 28% | 42% |
| | Establishing peace in Eastern DRC | 50% | 31% | 40% |
| | Improve the lives of Congolese | 35% | 26% | 30% |
| | Reduce poverty | 41% | 26% | 34% |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 48% | 28% | 38% |
| 3_i [provincial gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of provincial government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | |
| | Ensure security | 59% | 34% | 46% |
| | Improve the lives of Congolaise | 35% | 30% | 32% |
| | Prepare democratic elections | 68% | 42% | 42% |
| 3_i [territorial gov.] | Unify the different ethnic groups | 58% | 37% | 47% |
| | % of women and men assessing the performance of the territorial government / La Mairie as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | |
| | Ensure security | 60% | 37% | 48% |
| | Improve the lives of Congolaise | 38% | 33% | 36% |
| 3.1_i | Prepare democratic elections | 54% | 32% | 43% |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 61% | 39% | 50% |
| | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of Congolese State (état civil) | 70% | 47% | 20% |
| 3.1.1_i [overall] | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to land administration services of the Congolese State | 34% | 16% | 25% |
| | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to national civil judicial system | 38% | 26% | 32% |
| | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance on state agents: | | | |
| 3.1.1_i [justice] | State agents have the right skills to provide good services | 63% | 58% | 60% |
| | State agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way | 34% | 30% | 32% |
| | State agents work on case without payment of incentive | 34% | 26% | 30% |
| | State agents work on cases quickly / swiftly | 32% | 29% | 30% |
| 3.1.1_i [police] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance of judicial officials: | | | |
| | Actors of the justice (system) are corrupt | 57% | 51% | 54% |
| | Court decisions are well executed | 36% | 21% | 28% |
| | Decisions of courts are taken in a fair manner | 30% | 24% | 27% |
| | Justice is fast | 22% | 20% | 21% |
| | The courts treat people in a fair and equal manner | 30% | 25% | 27% |
| 3.1.1_i [police] | Trials are fair | 31% | 24% | 27% |
| | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on police / PNC performance: | | | |
| | It is possible to avoid arrest if one pays the police | 44% | 56% | 50% |
| | Police go unpunished (for crimes they commit) | 27% | 41% | 34% |
| 3.2_j | Police only work on case after payment of an incentive | 60% | 62% | 61% |
| | The police treats all ethnic groups in the same way | 28% | 36% | 32% |
| | % of women and men indicating that national government represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 13% | 23% | 19% |
| | % of women and men indicating that provincial government represents the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 17% | 22% | 20% |
| 3.2.2_ii | % of women and men indicating that territorial administration & 'la mairie' represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 30% | 31% | 30% |
| | % of women and men indicating that local authorities represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well' | 52% | 46% | 49% |
| 3.2.2_ii | % of women and men who indicate that they find it "very" or "extremely" acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes'). | 29% | 15% | 22% |

Table 10 : ISSSS Results Data, Mambasa, Pillars 4 and 5, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2017 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|------------|-----------------|
| | | Mambasa NE | Mambasa SW | Mambasa (Total) |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience) | 4_i | Average monthly HH Income | | |
| | 4_ii | % of HH depending on traditional activities as main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, animal husbandry) | | |
| | 4.2.1_iv | % of women and men indicating they have "good" or "very good" access to markets | | |
| | 4.2.2_ii: | % of women and men declaring they have "good" or "very good" access to land | | |
| | 4.2.3_i | % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required | | |
| | 4.2.5_j: | % of women and men declaring to have had paid job for at least a week over #past 3 months | | |
| | 4.3_i | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups | | |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 5_ii | % women and men reporting to have experienced physical or sexual violence in last 6 months | | |
| | 5_iii | % of women and men who personally know a woman / man who was survivor ("victim") of sexual violence | | |
| | 5.1_i | % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage) | | |
| | | % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in family', i.e., without involvement of authorities | | |
| | | % of women and men who "agree" that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat wife / spouse | | |
| | 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into community | | |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into household | | |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence | | |
| | | % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as result. | | |
| | 5.2_i | % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC / PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence | | |
| 5.3.3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to health care services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to psychological support services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to reintegration services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | |

Table 11 : ISSSS Results Data, Mambasa - by gender, Pillars 1 and 2, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2017 | | | Total | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|------------------|---|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | Women | Men | Children | | | | |
| Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) | 1_iii | % women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | 25% | 40% | | 32% | | |
| | 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | 8% | 16% | | 12% | | |
| | 1.1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | 13% | 13% | | 13% | | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_i (a) [JHRO] | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls*, boys* and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) |
| | | | | Other | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) |
| | | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | 1 victim (s) | 4 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 5 victim (s) |
| | | Forced Labour | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | | |
| | 2_i (b) [JHRO] | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls*, boys* and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 0 victim (s) | 2 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 2 victim (s) |
| | | | | Other | 0 victim (s) | 3 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 3 victim (s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 1 victim (s) | 5 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 6 victim (s) |
| | | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | 0 victim (s) | 54 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) | 55 victim (s) |
| | | Forced Labour | 0 victim (s) | 41 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 41 victim (s) | | |
| | 2_i (c) [JHRO] | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls*, boys* and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) |
| | | | | Other | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 0 victim (s) | 7 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 7 victim (s) |
| | | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | 0 victim (s) | 4 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 4 victim (s) |
| | | Forced Labour | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | | |
| | 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over past year | 1% | 6% | | 3% | | |
| | 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | 5% | 9% | | 7% | | |
| 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | 66% | 40% | | 53% | | | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | 22% | 13% | | 18% | | | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'lala salam a' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6mths | 3% | 9% | | 6% | | | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men feeling "very secure" or "secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol | 50% | 15% | | 32% | | | |
| 2.2.2_i | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | 65% | 51% | | 58% | | | |
| 2.2.2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by soldiers are ongoing | 38% | 20% | | 29% | | | |
| 2.2.2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for crimes) | 22% | 40% | | 31% | | | |

Table 12 : ISSSS Results Data, Mambasa - by gender, Pillar 3, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2017 | | | Total | |
|---|--|--|-----|----------|-------|-----|
| | | Women | Men | Children | | |
| Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority) | 3_i [central gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of central government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | |
| | Combat corruption | 47% | 23% | | 35% | |
| | Combat sexual violence | 57% | 28% | | 43% | |
| | Create employment | 41% | 24% | | 32% | |
| | Ensure security | 51% | 32% | | 42% | |
| | Establishing peace in Eastern DRC | 48% | 32% | | 40% | |
| | Improve the lives of Congolese | 36% | 25% | | 30% | |
| | Reduce poverty | 41% | 27% | | 34% | |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 46% | 29% | | 38% | |
| | 3_j [provincial gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of provincial government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | |
| | Ensure security | 57% | 35% | | 46% | |
| | Improve the lives of Congolaise | 39% | 26% | | 32% | |
| | Prepare democratic elections | 54% | 31% | | 42% | |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 54% | 40% | | 47% | |
| | 3_i [territorial gov.] | % of women and men assessing the performance of the territorial government / La Mairie as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | |
| | Ensure security | 61% | 35% | | 48% | |
| | Improve the lives of Congolaise | 44% | 27% | | 36% | |
| | Prepare democratic elections | 57% | 29% | | 43% | |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 55% | 44% | | 50% | |
| | 3.1_i | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of Congolese State (état civil) | | | | |
| | | | 25% | 15% | | 20% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to land administration services of the Congolese State | | | | |
| | | | 33% | 17% | | 25% |
| | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to national civil judicial system | | | | | |
| | | 37% | 27% | | 32% | |
| 3.1.1_i [overall] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance on state agents: | | | | | |
| | State agents have the right skills to provide good services | 78% | 42% | | 60% | |
| | State agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way | 42% | 21% | | 32% | |
| | State agents work on case without payment of incentive | 40% | 21% | | 30% | |
| | State agents work on cases quickly / swiftly | 36% | 25% | | 30% | |
| 3.1.1_i [justice] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance of judicial officials: | | | | | |
| | Actors of the justice (system) are corrupt | 51% | 56% | | 54% | |
| | Court decisions are well executed | 44% | 12% | | 28% | |
| | Decisions of courts are taken in a fair manner | 40% | 14% | | 27% | |
| | Justice is fast | 33% | 9% | | 21% | |
| | The courts treat people in a fair and equal manner | 41% | 14% | | 27% | |
| | Trials are fair | 43% | 12% | | 27% | |
| 3.1.1_i [police] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on police / PNC performance: | | | | | |
| | It is possible to avoid arrest if one pays the police | 48% | 53% | | 50% | |
| | Police go unpunished (for crimes they commit) | 20% | 48% | | 34% | |
| | Police only work on case after payment of an incentive | 58% | 64% | | 61% | |
| | The police treats all ethnic groups in the same way | 38% | 27% | | 32% | |
| 3.2_i | % of women and men indicating that local authorities represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | |
| | | 26% | 11% | | 19% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that national government represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | |
| | | 29% | 11% | | 20% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that provincial government represents the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | |
| | | 31% | 30% | | 30% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that territorial administration & 'la mairie' represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | |
| | | 43% | 55% | | 49% | |
| 3.2.2_ii | % of women and men who indicate that they find it 'very' or 'extremely' acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes'). | | | | | |
| | | 8% | 35% | | 22% | |

Table 13 : ISSSS Results Data, Mambasa - by gender, Pillars 4 and 5, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2017 | | | Total |
|---|----------------------------|---|-----|----------|-------|
| | | Women | Men | Children | |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience) | 4_i | Average monthly HH Income | 49% | 72% | 61% |
| | 4_ii | % of HH depending on traditional activities as main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, animal husbandry) | 18% | 12% | 15% |
| | 4.2.1_iv | % of women and men indicating they have "good" or "very good" access to markets | 45% | 58% | 52% |
| | 4.2.2_ii: | % of women and men declaring they have "good" or "very good" access to land | 19% | 2% | 11% |
| | 4.2.3_i | % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required | 8% | 4% | 6% |
| | 4.2.5_i: | % of women and men declaring to have had paid job for at least a week over #past 3 months | 73% | 86% | 79% |
| | 4.3_i | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups | 74% | 90% | 82% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | 68% | 83% | 75% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups | 76% | 89% | 82% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | 2% | 1% | 2% |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 5_ii | % women and men reporting to have experienced physical or sexual violence in last 6 months | 2% | 6% | 4% |
| | 5_iii | % of women and men who personally know a woman / man who was survivor ("victim") of sexual violence | 70% | 61% | 66% |
| | 5.1_i | % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage) | 17% | 19% | 18% |
| | | % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in family, i.e., without involvement of authorities | 7% | 20% | 14% |
| | | % of women and men who "agree" that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat wife / spouse | 90% | 80% | 85% |
| | 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence | 83% | 80% | 81% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into community | 81% | 58% | 69% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into household | 80% | 57% | 68% |
| | | % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as result. | 66% | 28% | 47% |
| | 5.2_i | % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC / PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence | 56% | 27% | 41% |
| | 5.3.3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to health care services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | 24% | 18% | 21% |
| | | % of women and men who consider the access to psychological support services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | 19% | 26% | 23% |
| % of women and men who consider the access to reintegration services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their | | | | | |

4 Conclusion - Observations and possible considerations

The analysis, the conclusions, the observations and the recommendations presented in this section of the report were developed by the M&E Cell, based on the available data provided by the various sources.

Observations – Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

The population of the Mambasa PZ holds relatively positive views on the “state of peacefulness” of their own villages and neighbourhoods, especially if compared with most of the other priority zones. This is true in particular for Mambasa North-East (MNE), where about half of the population consider their own villages to be “very” or “extremely peaceful”. Men were almost twice as likely as women to believe in the existence of peace in their neighbourhoods (approximately 2 out of 10 women against 4 out of 10 men) (**Indicator 1_iii**).

At the same time, the majority of women and men in the PZ look into the future with muted optimism at best: out of 10 people, between 1 and 2 expect the situation in their villages and neighbourhood to worsen in the next year, and another 4 do not expect to see any changes in the coming year, neither negative nor positive (**Indicator 1_iv**).

The comparatively positive assessment of the security situation in Mambasa goes along with a level of support for “peace” projects (i.e. stabilisation projects) that is higher than in many of the other ISSS priority zones. This is in particular true in Mambasa South-West (MSW), where 2 out of 10 people think that peace projects have been “very” or “extremely” good at addressing the most important issues in their area (compared to 1 out of 10 people in the PZ as a whole) (**Indicator 1.1_iii**).

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 1

Once dialogue platforms in the priority zone are established and operating, it will be interesting to see if the population maintains its relatively positive attitudes towards the process, and if and how the dialogue process is able to further improve attitudes towards the capacity and authority of the State to govern public life in the priority zone.

In addition, it will be helpful to examine further what societal or political factors are linked to the more positive attitudes of the population in Mambasa towards government.

Observations – Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

With ISSS programming in the Mambasa PZ currently does not (yet) comprehensively cover the full breadth of the stabilisation strategy, the state of FARDC-community relations and the performance of the FARDC in the protection of civilians (PoC) in Mambasa remains ambivalent. In the zone as whole, approximately one third of the population feels “secure” or “very secure” when encountering FARDC patrols, while another third feels “insecure” or even “very insecure” in the same situation (**Indicator 2.2**). 3 out of 10 women and men in the zone think efforts of the FARDC to counter impunity are ongoing, while a quarter of the population find this not to be the case, and between 4 and 5 out of 10 people find they do not know enough to assess these efforts (**Indicator 2.2.2_ii**). Between 4 and 5 out of 10 women and men in Mambasa think that perpetrators within the ranks of the FARDC are punished for any crimes

they commit, whereas approximately one third of women and men do not agree that this is the case (and more than a quarter of the population found it did not know how assess the likelihood that FARDC perpetrators are in fact punished) (**Indicator 2.2.2_ii**). 6 out of 10 people find it is possible for victims of crimes committed by FARDC soldiers to complain (**Indicator 2.2.2_i**), which is similar to the result obtained in Sud-Irumu and places these two PZ above all other currently active priority zones.

Relations between FARDC and the community in Mambasa are characterized by geographic differences between the two sub-priority zones. The population of MSW is more likely to view the FARDC with greater suspicion compared to women and men in MNE. Fewer people in MSW feel secure when encountering FARDC patrols (**Indicator 2.2**). Men and women in MSW also more frequently think that FARDC soldiers who committed a crime go unpunished (**Indicator 2.2.2_iii**). However, people in MSW are more likely to agree than the population of MNE that they have the opportunity to complain should the FARDC commit crimes (**Indicator 2.2.2_i**). Similarly, a larger share of the population of MSW thinks that FARDC accountability efforts are ongoing (**Indicator 2.2.2_ii**)

Men in Mambasa appear to be over-proportionally affected by security incidents perpetrated by the FARDC (and by armed groups), and consistently see their overall relations to the **FARDC in a more negative light than women**. Between January 2017 and the end of June 2017, JHRO recorded the violation of the right to life and the right to bodily integrity of seven men by the FARDC, compared to the **single reported case of a woman**. 95 men were reported as victims of the FARDC of an infringement of their right to liberty and security (including 54 victims of arbitrary detention and 41 victims of forced labour) (**Indicator 2_i (b)** [JHRO]).

Men more frequently report to be affected by a feeling of insecurity when encountering FARDC patrols: more than 3 out of 10 men indicate they feel “unsafe” or “very unsafe” in this situation, for 2 out of 10 women. About half of the women in Mambasa feel “safe” or “very safe” when meeting FARDC patrols; as opposed to 1 man out of 6 (**Indicator 2.2**). Only 4 out of 10 men have confidence in the FARDC to ensure safety in their neighbourhood, as opposed to close to 7 out of 10 women (**Indicator 2_iii**). Men also seem less likely to find the FARDC making a contribution to their security: nearly 6 out of 10 find that the FARDC make only a “small” or “no” contribution to their security, as opposed to only 3 out of 10 women (**Indicator 2_iii (a)**). Men are also less likely to recognise ongoing crime accountability efforts within FARDC (**Indicator 2.2.2_ii**); and to find they are able to complain about any FARDC crimes (**Indicator 2.2.2_i**). They are also more likely to view FARDC soldiers as going unpunished for their crimes.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 2

In light of the apparent prevalence of **FARDC violence and harassment against men** in the priority zone, Search for Common Ground (SFCG; SSR) and other project partners considering to develop the programming for Pillar 2 in Mambasa may want to assess if and **how their activities address this particular aspect of FARDC – community relations**. This is not to say that programming directed at the situation of women ought to be de-emphasized, but implementing partners might want to add emphasis on activities aimed at men. Data for Mambasa do suggest that the FARDC’s role in protecting civilians is at this point in time particularly challenged when it comes to their relationship to male members of the communities².

² At this point, the differences among women and men in their relationships towards the FARDC would need to be further investigated to also account for the possibility that men are more likely to report infractions by the FARDC against themselves

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 2

Future efforts in monitoring and evaluation may need to be directed at better understand the particular causes for the FARDC violence and harassment directed at men in Mambasa. This should also include examining any biases that may be skewing the data towards one over the other gender.

Observations – Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

Attitudes towards the Congolese State/Government (at all levels, i.e. national, provincial, territorial, local) tend to be more positive than in most of the other active ISSSS PZ. This applies in particular to the performance of the national, provincial and territorial government to address issues related to socio-economic welfare and security. 3 to 4 out of 10 people assess the performance of the central government as “good” or “very good” across these two broad thematic areas, with seemingly broader support for the performance of the government in security-related matters³ (**Indicator 3_i**).

A relatively large share of people considers their access to services to be “good” or “very good”, ranging from about one quarter (land administration, an area supported by the FCS-funded consortium led by UN HABITAT) to one half of the population (overall administrative services of the “*état civil*”) (**Indicator 3.1_i**). Performance ratings for justice and police are also higher than in other priority zones (**Indicators 3.1.1_i [justice]** and **3.1.1_i [police]**).

Predominantly, perception data suggests that attitudes towards government are more positive in MNE compared to MSW (across most indicators). One notable exception to this pattern is the representation of local interests by the national government. Here, the population in MNE is less likely to attest that the national government represents its interests “well” or “very well” (**Indicator 3.2_i**)⁴. Still women and men in MNE are more likely than their compatriots in MSW to find it “very” or “extremely” acceptable to pay official taxes, by a margin of 2 to 1 (**Indicator 3.2.2_ii**).

Attitudes in Mambasa towards government **very clearly break along gender lines**. While still more positive than men in other PZ, the male population is much less convinced than women of the performance of the Government, and of the representation they receive through officials at the different levels. With a margin of between 15 to 20 points, more women than men attest the central, provincial and territorial government “very good” or “good performance in matters related to security and to economic welfare (**Indicator 3_i**). Women are also more positive than men about their ability to

than women are. While the current data should by all means not be discounted, it is important to better understand the underlying dynamics that might have brought about the current picture.

³ In MNE, 5 out of 10 people attest the government good or very good performance in security and safety, and 4 out of 10 do the same for areas related to socio-economic welfare. In MSW, the margin of approval for security-related performance is within the margin of error of the poll (+/- 5%).

⁴ The phrasing of those indicators that measure the level of trust among populations towards the different administrative levels has changed slightly since the baseline study (June-December 2016 data) and the present reporting period (January-June 2017). The original phrasing was: “In your opinion, how do representatives at the national level represent the population’s interests and opinions?” Now, the indicator asks: “In your opinion, how does the central government represent the population’s interests and opinions?” The M&E Cell continues to compare these indicators, but a certain error margin inevitably appears.

access state-provided services (**Indicator 3.1_i**); the performance of “state agents” in Mambasa in general (by a 2 to 1 margin) (**Indicator 3.1.1_i [overall]**); and the performance of the justice system (by close to a 4 to 1 margin – e.g. more than 4 out of 10 women think that “court decisions are well executed”; while this is only the case for 1 out of 10 men) (**Indicator 3.1.1_i [justice]**).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 3

Similarly to the situation under Pillar 2, the ISSSS Technical Secretariat, project partners and donors might find it useful to assess if and how current activities address the particular situation of men in Mambasa. Again, this is not to say that efforts directed at improving the situation of women vis-à-vis the State should be abandoned or de-emphasized. However, project partners may examine how their interventions under this pillar are likely to specifically affect women or men.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 3

In light of the different perceptions of men and women on the role and performance of the State, and the fact that findings in Mambasa contrasts with that in other active priority zones, it seems worthwhile to further examine the situation in Mambasa to better understand the reasons for this difference, and to explore the drivers for the different attitudes of women and men toward state performance.

This examination could and should also be covered by efforts to better understand what makes the sub-zone of Mambasa North-East higher performing in terms of restoration of state authority than Mambasa South-West, and also better performing than most of the other ISSSS priority zones. The goal would be to better understand the contributing factors to the relatively broad support for the performance of the State, and to the positive perceptions on service access in the sub-zone.

Observations – Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

Just as data suggests that the population in Mambasa North-East (MNE) is better positioned than Mambasa South-West (MSW) when it comes to access to services (see Pillar 3), MNE is also in a comparatively better position in relation to at least some economic conditions.

While people in MNE are more reliant on traditional economic activities (agriculture, fishery, animal husbandry) than men and women in MSW (**Indicator 4_ii**), they do have comparatively better access to land (by a margin of two to one (**Indicator 4.2.2_ii**), as well as significantly better access to credit (**Indicator 4.2.3_i**). These advantages are however **not evenly shared between men and women**: while men are slightly more likely to have “good” or “very good” access to land than women (approximately 6 out of 10 men, for 5 out of 10 women), women are nearly ten times as likely as men to have access to credit if required (**Indicator 4.2.3_i**).

Income opportunities are **quite unevenly distributed** in the Mambasa Priority Zone, geographically as well based on gender. In spite of the comparatively better access to and credit in MNE, the median income in the sub-zone is below US\$15 per month, as opposed to US\$61 to US\$150 per month in MSW⁵.

⁵ Approximately 2 out of 10 people in both zones are not able to provide income figures.

The median income of women (< US\$15) is lower than that of men (between US\$61 and US\$150) (**Indicator 4_i**). Across Mambasa, around 6% of the population has held a paid job for at least a week over the 3 month period preceding the HHI poll (**Indicator 4.2.5_i**).

The population in MNE is slightly more open to maintaining social contacts with people from ethnic groups other than their own compared to women and men in MSW. A greater share of people there indicates that they “often” seek closer social relations with members of an ethnic group other than their own; in particular with regard to marriage and worship. Men are more likely than women to see and maintain relations with people who belong to a different ethnic group (**Indicator 4.3_i**).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 4

Differences in the findings on economic resources and assets and on socio-economic conditions between Mambasa North-East and Mambasa South-West suggest that ISSS projects (i.e. the FCS-financed project and any future interventions) might need to adapt their approaches to ensure socio-economic resilience to conflict based on the circumstances in each of the sub-zones. The population in MNE seems to be comparatively more reliant on subsistence agriculture and other traditional activities than communities in MSW, giving issues such as maintaining secure access to land a potentially more significant role.

Observations – Pillar 5 (SGBV Prevention)⁶

Compared to other priority zones⁷, reported rates of sexual violence in Mambasa are relatively low⁸. That notwithstanding, attitudes towards women that may facilitate acts of sexual violence remain prevalent in the zone, in particular in Mambasa South West (MSW) with only approximately half of the population considering consent a necessary condition for sexual activity⁹. In Mambasa North-East (MNE), by contrast, this is true for a significantly larger group of 8 out of 10 people (**Indicator 5.1_i**).

However, **attitudes towards victims/survivors** of sexual violence are slightly more accepting in MSW than in MNE. In both sub-zones, the clear majority of the people (approximately 8 out of 10) indicate they would accept victims/survivors of sexual violence back into their communities and households. Nevertheless, in MNE, acceptance among the population is comparatively lower for those who have children as a result of the assault, or who contracted a disease or suffered an injury during the attack. Only approximately 6 out of 10 people in MNE would accept SV victims/survivors back into their households under these circumstances, as opposed to three quarters of the population in MSW. Overall, men are less likely than women to accept SV victims/survivors back into communities or households, especially if the attack resulted in pregnancies or injuries (**Indicator 5.1_ii**).

⁶ It is not possible to estimate the total number of incidents of sexual violence in the priority zones, as it is unlikely that any of the available data sets offer a comprehensive tally. Assuming however that any flaws in the data affect all data collection across all geographic zones, however, the data sets can offer some insight into relative magnitude of the problem across geographic areas.

⁷ E.g., in particular Sud-Irumu and Kitshanga.

⁸ According to JHRO data, the rape of one child was reported during the period from January to June 2017 (**Indicator 5_i [JHRO]**). Less than 1 in 10 people personally know a SV survivor (**Indicator 5_iii**).

⁹ The data do suggest that women are more likely to consider consent a requirement than men, however, the difference between men and women (9%) is within the margin of error of the opinion poll (+/- 5%).

The population in MSW is relatively more optimistic that FARDC and PNC are punished appropriately if they commit acts of sexual violence. Somewhat unexpectedly, a greater share of women (approximately 2 thirds) than men (less than 1 third) believe that the members of the security services are held accountable for such infractions (**Indicator 5.2_i**).

A greater share of the population in MSW considers access to health care, psychological support and reintegration services for SV victims/survivors to be “good” or “very good” (between 3 and 5 out of 10 people; as opposed to 1 to 3 out of 10 in MNE). Men tend to have more negative opinions than women on this question. In the PZ, only a quarter of men consider access to health care services for SV victims/survivors to be “good” or “very good”, as opposed to over half of the women (**Indicator 5.3.3_v**).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 5

In spite of comparatively low **reported** rates of sexual violence in Mambasa, the data on attitudes towards women are relevant for programming of the FCS-funded and UN HABITAT-led consortium, in particular those in the MNE sub-zone. The consortium may consider whether project activities are targeted appropriately in light of the findings from the Mambasa ISSSS baseline. This includes in particular the comparatively more negative societal values towards women in MSW (e.g. with regard to consent as a prerequisite for sex), but also the attitudes towards victims/survivors of sexual violence (here in particular in MNE) and the varying access to psychosocial and medical services among the two sub-zones.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 5

In MSW, attitudes towards women that may facilitate sexual violence (such as not regarding consent as prerequisite for sex) co-exist with comparatively more positive attitudes towards the reintegration of SV survivors, especially if assaults resulted in pregnancy or injury. In order to better be able to target the underlying attitudes and values that determine actions in this area, it might be helpful to conduct further inquiries among the population in the priority zone.

Finally, as was the case for Pillars 2 and 3, data for Pillar 5 again suggests that fewer men than women have a positive perception of access to services and of the performance of security services (in this case to investigate cases of sexual violence), adding to the consistency of this pattern across several thematic areas in Mambasa. In the interest of appropriate targeting of current and future programming, it would be helpful to know more of the underlying dynamics that contribute to this situation.

Annex III - Kitshanga Priority Zone, North-Kivu Province

List of Acronyms

| | |
|----------|---|
| CISPE | Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| ETD | <i>Entités Territoriales Décentralisées</i> (Local Entities) |
| FARDC | <i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i> (DRC Armed Forces) |
| FARM | Food Security and Inclusive Access to Resources for Conflict Sensitive Market Development |
| FCS | <i>Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation</i> (Stabilisation Coherence Fund) |
| HR | Human Right(s) |
| HRV | Human Rights Violation(s) |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| I.O. | Intermediate Outcome |
| IOM | International Migration Organisation |
| ISSSS | International Stabilization and Security Support Strategy |
| JHRO | Joint Human Right Office |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| M&E Cell | Monitoring and Evaluation Cell (of the SSU) |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC |
| NK | North-Kivu |
| O.O. | Overall Outcome |
| PNC | <i>Police Nationale Congolaise</i> (Congolese National Police) |
| PoC | Protection of civilians |
| PZ | Priority Zone |
| SFCG | Search For Common Ground |
| SGBV | Sexual and Gender Based Violence |
| S.O. | Specific Objective |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform (<i>Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika</i>) |
| SSU | Stabilisation Support Unit |
| SV | Sexual Violence |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

1 Presentation of Annex III – Zone around Kitshanga (North-Kivu)

This annex to the second consolidated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) follows the baseline study that was published in July 2017, as part of the biannual production of consolidated ISSSS progress reports by the M&E Cell of the Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU).

This annex presents a projection of the ISSSS programming in the Kitshanga priority zone (PZ) for the period that extends from the second half of 2017 to the first quarter of 2018. This forward looking perspective is meant to ensure that our mapping takes into account those projects that are currently still “in the pipeline” (for example, in their preliminary phase, or in the final stages of their design phase), but are slated for implementation in the foreseeable future. The projects considered in this mapping are those that are funded by the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (*Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation*, FCS) and those that are funded by bilateral contributions and have undergone the process of alignment to and harmonisation with the ISSSS and its logical framework (logframe).

This annex provides an update to the ISSSS baseline data for the first half of 2017, by presenting a set of preliminary and provisional observations regarding progress in the ISSSS programming in the Kitshanga PZ. It is however important to underline that these observations are meant to help and inform stakeholders to pursue the debate about trends and programming options in the PZ. They are therefore by no means intended to be definitive, final or accepted at face value. Questioning, revising and refining this report’s observations in the course of this debate is very much an intended part of the monitoring and learning process within the SSU M&E Cell.

2 Status of ISSSS programming – Zone around Kitshanga (North-Kivu)

This section of the report provides an overview of the status of ISSSS programming in the Kitshanga PZ. Specifically, this section provides:

- a **brief description of the different programmes and interventions** that are currently being implemented in Kitshanga in association with the ISSSS, i.e. those that are either financed through the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (FCS) or through bi-lateral funding arrangements (*aligned programmes*);
- an overview of how these **interventions cover the result elements of the ISSSS across its five thematic pillars**, and some tentative observations on the degree to which all necessary elements are being addressed;
- a slightly more in-depth view of the **pillar-specific status of ISSSS programming**, based on the status of ISSSS projects in June/July 2017, as well as some additional thoughts on implications for the implementation of the strategy in the months to come.

Overview of ISSSS interventions in Kitshanga

Table 1 below lists the projects that are currently being implemented or are set to start implementation in the coming months under the umbrella of the ISSSS in the Kitshanga PZ. For each one, the table provides information on the respective lead organisations, the expected implementation period and the thematic focus.

Table 1: Overview of interventions associated with the ISSSS (aligned and FCS) in Kitshanga

| Type | Title (Lead Organisation) | Implementation Period | Thematic Focuses |
|---------|---|--|---|
| FCS | <i>Njia za Makubaliano (International Alert)</i> | Started in October 2016 (24-month programme, until September 2018) | Implementation of Democratic Dialogue (DD) in Kitshanga (Pillar 1) |
| | <i>Pamoja Kwa Amani na Maendeleo (UN HABITAT)</i> | Ongoing (ending in April 2019) | Land governance, social cohesion, socio-economic reintegration, prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) |
| Aligned | <i>Lobi Moko Ya Sika (Security Sector Reform (SSR)) (Phase 4; Extension) (SFCG)</i> | Ongoing (ending in May 2018) | Increasing knowledge and awareness among Congolese security forces and civilians about their rights, roles and mutual responsibilities to improve relationships and build confidence. |
| | Consortium for the Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC (CISPE) (<i>IOM</i>) | Ongoing (ending in April 2019) | I) Promotion of inclusive, dialogue-based conflict resolution mechanisms; and II) Enhance state-community relations through improved security services performance and raised perception of services within communities. III) Contribute to the improved mutual accountability and capacity of Congolese state institutions and civil society; Reinforce the legitimacy of these institutions and its agents. |
| | Food Security and Inclusive Access to Resources for Conflict Sensitive Market Development (FARM) (<i>Mercy Corps</i>) | Preliminary phase (to start in 2018) | Improving the food security of target populations by addressing grievances among marginalized groups, promote inclusive democratic dialogue and conflict management systems, stronger inter-communal relationships, and sustainable agricultural practices, thus improving land access and agricultural markets, leading to increased stability and greater access and availability of food. |

The overall project landscape in Kitshanga

Taken together, the projects mentioned in Table 2 below are set to address all five substantive pillars of the ISSSS in the Kitshanga PZ, albeit at differing degrees of intensity:

- Presently, project coverage of Pillars 1 (Democratic Dialogue), 3 (Restoration of State Authority), and 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict) **is relatively advanced**, in that more than half of each of these pillars’ results components are covered by at least one project.
- Project coverage for Pillars 2 (FARDC performance in Protection of Civilians), and 5 (Fight against SGBV) **is still developing**. Less than half of the results components of each of these pillars are currently targeted by at least one project.

Table 2 below provides an overview of the programming status of the five thematic ISSSS pillars in Kitshanga.

Table 2: Overview of programming status across all ISSSS Pillars, Kitshanga PZ (North-Kivu Province), July 2017

| Pillar | Intended Contribution to implementation of ISSSS | Coverage of ISSSS results framework ¹ |
|----------|--|--|
| Pillar 1 | <i>Create a participatory and inclusive (democratic) dialogue to ensure a political and community-based transformation process of the targeted conflicts.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 2 | <i>Improve the performance of the FARDC in civilian protection, and community – FARDC relations</i> | Developing |
| Pillar 3 | <i>Increase the (beneficial) role and presence of the Congolese state (in particular the local authorities) in the Priority Zones.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 4 | <i>Increase the equitable resource flow to and coherence among at risk populations (women and men, girls and boys), including in particular, IDPs and returnees.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 5 | <i>Ensure that security sector reforms (covered by both Pillars 2 and 3) and local state capacity building (Pillar 3) sufficiently emphasize combating sexual and gender based violence as a symptom and driver of conflict in the Priority Zones.</i> | Developing |

Most of the projects in the Kitshanga PZ work on the basis of **action plans** that are to be developed in consultation and with the participation of the population (Intermediate Outcome 1.1.1). This means that the two aligned, bi-laterally funded projects (CISPE, SSR) are emulating for their sector-specific interventions the overarching Democratic Dialogue approach (Pillar 1 of the ISSSS) of the FCS-funded project in Kitshanga. Similarly, projects also make use of **participatory dialogue platforms** as a space to create their overarching (FCS) or sector-specific (CISPE, SSR) action plans and to provide oversight over their implementation, in keeping with the approach of the ISSSS.

The sections below provide a more detailed look at the project coverage in each of the five Pillars in Kitshanga.

¹ **Complete:** All result elements of the ISSSS are addressed by projects; **Advanced:** Most result elements are addressed by projects; **Developing:** A minority of result elements are addressed by projects; **None:** No results elements of the Pillar are addressed by projects.

Programming for Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

As Table 3 below shows, programming under Pillar 1 is characterized by the development and implementation of participatory and inclusive oversight mechanisms at the community level for the development of joint and gender-sensitive action plans.

The gaps identified during the baseline study regarding the creation of sector compacts to be produced at the provincial level and regarding the sustained engagement of national authorities in their implementation have been partially filled by the adjustment made by International Alert in June of 2016 during the review of their project’s intervention strategy in Kitshanga. This adjustment also took into account the support to and the strengthening of the key stakeholders’ trust in the ISSSS at community level.

The lack of coordination of dialogue platforms/structures could lead to duplication and confusion regarding the actions undertaken by different programmes, which would in turn increase the population’s disinterest and exacerbate existing tensions with the authorities at the PZ level.

Actors intervening under Pillar 1 in Kitshanga will have to favour coordination and look for synergies between their actions in order to capitalize on the effects of the dialogue, to dissipate misunderstandings and the political tensions with Congolese authorities, and succeed in creating a conducive atmosphere within the PZ for interventions under the stabilisation strategy’s other pillars. These synergies should focus, among other things, on the complementarity between dialogue activities around land issues, as promoted by the UN HABITAT consortium and FARM, and those around conflicts within and between communities, as fostered by the International Alert-led consortium.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 1 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 3: The ISSSS program landscape in the Kitshanga PZ, Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---|
| S.O. 1 | Support for the ISSSS at community level | |
| O.O. 1.1 | Local stabilisation processes aligned with community priorities | (FCS) International Alert and UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 1.1.1 | Joint action plans developed and approved by communities | (FCS) International Alert and UNHABITAT (A) CISPE, (A) FARM |
| I.O. 1.1.2 | Joint action plans compiled into Sector Compacts | Not covered |
| I.O. 1.1.3 | National authorities commit to & act upon Sector Compacts | Not covered |
| O.O. 1.2 | Local groups support stabilisation process | (FCS) International Alert (A) CISPE |
| I.O. 1.2.1 | Oversight mechanisms of stabilisation process set-up and functioning; | (FCS) International Alert and UNHABITAT (FCS) UNHABITAT (A) CISPE, (A) FARM |

Programming for Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

As Table 4 below illustrates, ISSSS programming under Pillar 2 in the Kitshanga PZ is limited to a single intervention, which covers part of the results elements: the SSR project carried out by Searching for Common Ground (SFCG). This intervention aims to improve the protection of civilians (PoC) by strengthening the awareness of roles and responsibilities, as well as the cooperation and the accountability between security forces and the civilian population.

The gaps identified by the baseline study in the programming coverage of Pillar 2 remain present, regarding internal incentive mechanisms among the FARDC (or the PNC - see Pillar 3 below) that aim to influence the behaviour of FARDC soldiers and commanders towards the civilian population ; the mainstreaming of lessons learnt at the local level into a wider national policy agenda (e.g. SSR) ; and the disciplinary and judicial mechanisms in case of crimes committed by FARDC members against civilians.

The complete lack of management of and care for FARDC soldiers by the central government and the worsening of their living conditions risk minimising positive effects of the programme. It is indeed inevitable that some members of the FARDC will continue harassing civilians for their own survival, and that in turn will severely hamper trust and cooperation between the FARDC and the civilian population.

The table below provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 2 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 4: The ISSSS program landscape in the Kitshanga PZ, Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of PoC)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| S.O. 2 | FARDC Performance in PoC | |
| O.O.2.1 | Operational FARDC PoC principles & procedures applied and enforced | (A) SSR |
| I.O. 2.1.1 | Increased awareness and skills among FARDC commanders & their units regarding PoC and SGBV prevention principles | (A) SSR |
| I.O. 2.1.2 | FARDC disciplinary, oversight, incentive structures reinforced and aligned with PoC principles | Not covered |
| I.O. 2.1.3 | Strengthened military judicial mechanisms f. HR violations | (A) SSR |
| I.O.2.1.4 | Lessons learnt from PoC experiences and resource requirements communicated to national FARDC leaders | Not covered |
| O.O. 2.2 | Strengthened cohesion and trust between civilians and FARDC | (A) SSR |
| I.O. 2.2.1 | Social & economical integration of soldiers into host communities | |
| I.O. 2.2.2 | Improved redress mechanisms for local authorities and communities | Not covered |
| I.O. 2.2.3 | Improved behaviour by FARDC soldiers (less predatory & profiteering) | Not covered |

Programming for Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

Table 5 below shows that programming for Pillar 3 focusses on improving the state agents' performance in the police, justice, administration and land management sectors. In order to gradually change state agents' structures and behaviours, the CISPE programme focusses on improving their payment conditions, whereas the FCS-funded UN HABITAT consortium and the FARM project aim to facilitate, establish and technically train the ETDs in their role as service providers (in the sectors mentioned above)

in the intervention zones. The SSR, FARM and FCS programmes all aim to increase state agents' awareness of their formal rights and responsibilities and of the devastating effects of corruption.

The gaps identified for Pillar 3 programming are related to the establishment of a consistent regulatory/legal framework for local governance, to which we must add the lack of national plans for power devolution and the retrocession of public finances.

Clientelism, tribalism and the lack of transparency in the selection of state agents, together with impunity, the lack of accountability mechanisms and the deferred payment of salaries constitute a major risk for the achievement of the planned effects of programming for Pillar 3 and of an equitable access to state services around Kitshanga.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 3 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 5: The ISSSS program landscape in Kitshanga, Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---|
| O.S. 3 | Increased beneficial role and presence of "regular" Congolese State in local governance | |
| O.O. 3.1 | Improved access to relevant state-provided services | (FCS) UNHABITAT (A) CISPE, FARM |
| I.O. 3.1.1 | Improved performance of state agents in service delivery | (FCS) UNHABITAT (A) CISPE, SSR, FARM |
| I.O. 3.1.2 | Improved availability/access to physical infrastructure and other assets for service delivery | (A) CISPE |
| O.O. 3.1.3 | Improved availability of financial resources for service delivery | Not covered |
| O.O. 3.2 | Improved accountability and responsiveness of state institutions | (A) CISPE |
| I.O. 3.2.1 | Local, participatory oversight and planning structures established; functioning | (FCS) UNHABITAT (A) CISPE, SSR, FARM |
| I.O. 3.2.2 | Local population & civil society acting on responsibilities and rights vis-a-vis local authorities | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.2.3 | Awareness of state agents of their formal duties and responsibilities (including no corruption) | (FCS) UNHABITAT (A) CISPE, SSR |
| O.O. 3.3 | Enabling, coherent regulatory/legal framework for local governance in place | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.3.1 | Local authorities/ETD prepared for devolution and financial retrocession | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.3.2 | Division of responsibilities between formal and traditional authorities codified | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 3.3.3 | Lessons for increased local state presence acted on by national authorities | Not covered |

Programming for Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

As can be seen in Table 6 below, the FCS-funded project lead by the UN HABITAT consortium covers programming of most results under Pillar 4. The FARM project contributes in a complementary way to the result concerning access to land and credit.

The gap in terms of programmatic coverage for this pillar lies in the management of and care for psychosocial needs among vulnerable groups.

The lack of psychosocial support to vulnerable groups can constitute an obstacle to their integration and encouragement within communities, which in turn can negatively affect the outcomes of some of the results concerning social links within and between communities, actions regarding received funds, and obtained jobs. Moreover, the conflict analysis carried out by the ISSSS in the Kitshanga PZ highlighted mobilisation around land and identity issues as one of the key risk factors affecting stabilisation. Historical tensions in this area between rwandophones and presumed “indigenous” populations constitute a potential barrier to progress in terms of improving access to land and the natural resources.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 4 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 6: The ISSSS program landscape in Kitshanga, Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated projects / programmes |
|---------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| O.S. 4 | Equitable resource flow (income earning & economic opportunities; socio-economic support) | |
| O.O. 4.1 | Increased participation in employment schemes and short-term income stabilisation | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 4.1.1 | Improved availability of livelihood and start-up grants and cash-for-work | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 4.1.2 | Improved access to services | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| O.O. 4.2 | Improved (enabling) conditions for local economic recovery | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.1 | Increased sustained access to markets | (A) FARM |
| I.O. 4.2.2 | Improved and secure access to land, natural resources | (FCS) UNHABITAT (A) FARM |
| I.O. 4.2.3 | Improved access to credit (all groups) | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.4 | Improved access to training opportunities | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 4.2.5 | Improved access to wage employment | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| O.O. 4.3. | Social linkages within and between communities strengthened | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 4.3.1 | Psycho-social needs of vulnerable or marginalized groups in community addressed | Not covered |
| I.O. 4.3.2 | Increased trust within and among communities | (FCS) UNHABITAT |

Programming for Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

As can be noted in Table 7 below, ISSSS programming under Pillar 5 in the Kitshanga PZ is focussed on SGBV (sexual and gender-based violence) prevention. The FCS-funded programme lead by the UN HABITAT consortium addresses sensitization to the harmful effect of negative gender norms and the strengthening the capacities of the youth and of community leaders. SFCG’s SSR project deals with reducing FARDC and PNC involvement in cases of SGBV and with strengthening trust between SGBV victims/survivors and security forces.

Gaps remain in the programming for Pillar 5, for example concerning the fight against impunity for SGBV crimes within the judicial system or the improvement of services for victims/survivors of SGBV.

The absence of programming regarding the response to cases of SGBV, notably concerning the support to victims (medical, psychosocial and for social reintegration), significantly increases the likelihood of associated risks materialising. Sensitizing about gender norms may be important, but the lack of handling and management of victims together with the lack of efforts made to address the impunity

that surrounds SGBV cases within the judicial and military systems renders any maintained progress under Pillar 5 unlikely.

This in turn can further increase the disappointment and disillusionment, especially among women and girls, regarding the contribution of stabilisation to reducing SGBV.

The table below provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 5 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 7: The ISSSS program landscape in Kitshanga, Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

| Objective / Result | | Harmonised Projects |
|--------------------|--|---------------------|
| S.O. 5 | Reduced levels of Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) | |
| O.O. 5.1 | Harmful social / gender norms (SGBV) decreased | (FCS) UNHABITAT |
| I.O. 5.1.2 | Active and meaningful participation in dialogue around SGBV | |
| I.O. 5.1.3 | Increased involvement in changing harmful social/gender norms | |
| O.O. 5.2 | Increased levels of trust in security forces to prosecute SGBV incidents committed by staff | (A) : SSR |
| I.O. 5.2.1 | Reduced involvement of security sector actors (FARDC and PNC) in SGBV | (A) : SSR |
| I.O. 5.2.2 | Strengthened military judicial systems for prosecution of SGBV cases | Not covered |
| O.O. 5.3 | Improved access to justice and support services for SGBV survivors | Not covered |
| I.O. 5.3.1 | Increased public awareness of laws & standards; roles and responsibilities to combat SGBV | Not covered |
| I.O. 5.3.3 | Improved support services for SGBV survivors | Not covered |
| I.O. 5.3.4 | Improved ease of filing of SGBV cases at local level | Not covered |
| I.O. 5.3.5 | Improved speed, impartiality and confidentiality of SGBV trials improved | Not covered |

3 ISSSS Results Data – Kitshanga PZ

This section of the report contains a summary data sheet for those indicators of the ISSSS logframe for which data were available at the time of writing the second monitoring report.

The population samples for the perception data were established at the PZ level, which means the data are statistically representative of the zone’s population (and not limited to the beneficiaries or the respondents). In this process, the PZ was divided into 2 sub-zones: the first one, called “Bwito”, includes the Bwito chefferie (in Rutshuru territory); the second sub-zone, called “Bashali”, includes the chefferie of Bashali and a portion of Kisimba (also known as Wanianga) around Pinga (both in Masisi territory).

The data sheet contains data from the Joint Human Rights Office (JHRO) refer to the territories of the two sub-zones: Rutshuru, Masisi and Walikale. Please note that the underage victims’ gender is not recorded in JHRO data. Minors are therefore only included in the overall, total number of victims.

The following section contains a presentation and global analysis of selected data, which underline the global trends and main changes observed in the data between the two reporting periods. The M&E Cell intends to publish a quarterly report called “Stabilisation Spotlights”, which will provide more detailed analyses of certain questions raised in the present report (interested ISSSS stakeholders are invited to contact the M&E Cell and submit their requests).

Table 8: ISSSS Results Data, Kitshanga, Pillar 1, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January June 2016 | | | July - December 2016 | | | January - June 2017 | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---------------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|-----|
| | | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | | | | |
| International Alert data (Interviews with key informers) | | | | | | | | # | % | # | % | # | % | |
| 1_ii | Key stabilisation actors state their support and their trust towards the stabilisation and security strategy in their area | | | | | | | Qualitative data (cf. text) | | | | | | |
| 1_iii | % of women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | 2% | 13% | 8% | 5% | 21% | 14% | 14% | 15% | 14% | | | | |
| 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | 13% | 31% | 23% | 18% | 26% | 23% | 5% | 22% | 13% | | | | |
| 1.1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | 6% | 2% | 4% | 12% | 5% | 8% | 29% | 5% | 18% | | | | |
| CISPE data (Beneficiaries survey) (n(Bwito)=20; n(Bashali)=21) | | | | | | | | # | % | # | % | # | % | |
| 1.2.1_i (a) | Inclusivity: fair representation in the platform's composition | The dialogue platform represents the interests of the women (well, very well) | | | | | | 11 | 55% | 12 | 57% | 23 | 56% | |
| | | The dialogue platform represents the interests of the youth (well, very well) | | | | | | 11 | 55% | 13 | 62% | 24 | 59% | |
| | | The dialogue platform represents the interests of different ethnic groups (well, very well) | | | | | | | 9 | 45% | 11 | 52% | 20 | 49% |
| 1.2.1_i (b) | Neutral space: extent to which participants to the platform feel free to express their views and opinions without fear of repercussions | During the platform's meetings, do you feel comfortable when you speak up to express your point of view (comfortable, very comfortable) | | | | | | 9 | 45% | 12 | 57% | 21 | 51% | |
| | | During the meetings, have you already feared reprisal or threats for expressing your opinion about a problem (often, occasionally) | | | | | | | 10 | 50% | 9 | 43% | 19 | 46% |
| 1.2.1_i (c) | Learning: extent to which participants to the platform exchange their opinions and learn from each other | How often do meetings help you better understand other participants' opinions? (often, very often) | | | | | | 11 | 55% | 11 | 52% | 22 | 54% | |
| | | During the meetings, do you feel participants really express their views? (all participants, most) | | | | | | | 14 | 70% | 8 | 38% | 22 | 54% |
| 1.2.1_i (d) | Good faith: extent to which the participants feel the process is conducted in a correct and transparent way | Is it possible that the platform members take part in the meetings with a sincere intention to find solutions to the community's problems? (possible, likely) | | | | | | 9 | 45% | 9 | 43% | 18 | 44% | |
| | | Is it possible that certain members of the platform try to perturb its work? (possible, likely) | | | | | | | 11 | 55% | 11 | 52% | 22 | 54% |
| 1.2.1_i (e) | Empowerment: extent to which participants feel they have an important role within the stabilisation process | Est-il possible que la plateforme souleve une question avec les autorités que vous aimez particulièrement? (possible, likely) | | | | | | 11 | 55% | 11 | 52% | 22 | 54% | |
| | | Est-il possible que les autorités de l'Etat prennent l'initiative sur la base de la recommandation du groupe? (possible, likely) | | | | | | | 10 | 50% | 9 | 43% | 19 | 46% |
| | | How often do you personally reach out to state authorities to discuss your troubles? (often, very often) | | | | | | | 6 | 30% | 8 | 38% | 14 | 34% |
| | | To what extent does the action plan reflect your priorities? (well, very well) | | | | | | | 11 | 55% | 5 | 24% | 16 | 39% |
| | | In your opinion, how does the implementation of the action plan reflect your priorities? (well, very well) | | | | | | | 10 | 50% | 7 | 33% | 17 | 42% |
| | | During the platform meetings, how often have you raised the issue of GBV? (often, very often) | | | | | | | 11 | 55% | 8 | 38% | 19 | 46% |

Table 9: ISSSS Results Data, Kitshanga, Pillar 2, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | | January June 2016 | | | July - December 2016 | | | January - June 2017 | | | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|--|---|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------|-----|----|----|
| | | | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | | | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_i (a) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men. | | | | | 22 | 6 | 28 | 53 | 30 | 83 | | |
| | 2_i (b) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men. | | | | | 7 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 12 | 18 | | |
| | 2_i (c) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by unkown perpetrators against women, girls, boys and men. | | | | | 37 | 4 | 41 | 71 | 11 | 82 | | |
| | 2_i (a) (JHRO) | # of reported incidents perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | | | 53 | 31 | 84 | |
| | | | | Others | | | | | | | 9 | 5 | 14 | |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | | | | 5 | 14 | 19 |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | | 34 | 43 | 77 |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | | | | 54 | 41 | 95 |
| | | | Property | | | | | | | | | 33 | 57 | 90 |
| | Forced Labour | | | | | | | | | 1 | 5 | 6 | | |
| | 2_i (b) (JHRO) | # of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | | | 12 | 4 | 16 | |
| | | | | Others | | | | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | | | | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | | 8 | 8 | 16 |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | | | | 6 | 8 | 14 |
| | | | Property | | | | | | | | | 10 | 6 | 16 |
| | Forced Labour | | | | | | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | | |
| | 2_i (c) (JHRO) | # of reported incidents perpetrated by other state agents against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | | | 2 | 3 | 5 | |
| | | | | Others | | | | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | | | | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | | 7 | 2 | 9 |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | | | | 7 | 2 | 9 |
| | | | Property | | | | | | | | | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| | Forced Labour | | | | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| | 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over | | | | | | | | | 5% | 2% | 4% | |
| | 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | | 11% | 30% | 21% | 12% | 14% | 13% | 22% | 12% | 17% | | |
| 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | | | | | | | | | 67% | 42% | 55% | | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | | 17% | 24% | 20% | 17% | 33% | 26% | 9% | 4% | 7% | | | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'lala salama' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6mths | | | | | | | | | 4% | 8% | 6% | | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men feeling "very secure" or "secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol | | | | | | | | | 30% | 41% | 35% | | |
| 2.2.2_i | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | | 76% | 60% | 67% | 37% | 58% | 48% | 43% | 50% | 46% | | | |
| 2.2.2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by | | 36% | 49% | 43% | 30% | 44% | 38% | 38% | 42% | 40% | | | |
| 2.2.2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for crimes) | | 36% | 35% | 36% | 42% | 22% | 31% | 36% | 28% | 32% | | | |

Table 10: ISSSS Results Data, Kitshanga, Pillar 3, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January June 2016 | | | July - December 2016 | | | January - June 2017 | | | |
|---|--|--|---------------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------|-----|
| | | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | |
| Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority) | 3_i [central gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of central government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | | | |
| | Combat corruption | 1% | 6% | 4% | 4% | 8% | 6% | 2% | 3% | 3% | |
| | Combat sexual violence | 22% | 35% | 29% | 23% | 55% | 40% | 22% | 25% | 24% | |
| | Create employment | 1% | 0% | 0% | 5% | 2% | 4% | 1% | 0% | 1% | |
| | Ensure security | 4% | 19% | 12% | 3% | 29% | 17% | 7% | 16% | 11% | |
| | Establishing peace in Eastern DRC | 2% | 10% | 6% | 3% | 13% | 8% | 8% | 18% | 13% | |
| | Improve the lives of Congolese | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 6% | 4% | |
| | Reduce poverty | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 2% | |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 6% | 6% | 6% | 15% | 13% | 14% | 19% | 11% | 15% | |
| | 3_i [provincial gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of provincial government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | | | |
| | Ensure security | | | | | | | 7% | 18% | 12% | |
| | Improve the lives of Congolaise | | | | | | | 2% | 6% | 4% | |
| | Prepare democratic elections | | | | | | | 7% | 13% | 10% | |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | | | | | | | 23% | 18% | 21% | |
| | 3_i [territorial gov.] | % of women and men assessing the performance of the territorial government / La Mairie as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | | | |
| | Ensure security | | | | | | | 8% | 21% | 15% | |
| | Improve the lives of Congolaise | | | | | | | 2% | 6% | 4% | |
| | Prepare democratic elections | | | | | | | 7% | 13% | 10% | |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | | | | | | | 25% | 19% | 22% | |
| | 3.1_i | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of Congolese State (état civil) | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 3% | 12% | 8% | 8% | 12% | 10% | 6% | 20% | 13% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to land administration services of the Congolese State | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | 0% | 23% | 11% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to national civil judicial system | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 0% | 3% | 2% | 14% | 7% | 10% | 6% | 19% | 12% |
| | 3.1.1_i [global] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance on state agents: | | | | | | | | | |
| | | State agents have the right skills to provide good services | | | | | | | 57% | 56% | 56% |
| | State agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way | | | | | | | 29% | 43% | 36% | |
| | State agents work on case without payment of incentive | | | | | | | 23% | 15% | 19% | |
| | State agents work on cases quickly/ swiftly | | | | | | | 29% | 36% | 32% | |
| 3.1.1_j [justice] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the actors of the justice (system) are corrupt | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Actors of the justice (system) are corrupt | | | | | | | 63% | 50% | 56% | |
| | Court decisions are well executed | | | | | | | 21% | 6% | 14% | |
| | Decisions of courts are taken in a fair manner | | | | | | | 21% | 6% | 14% | |
| | Justice is fast | | | | | | | 19% | 7% | 13% | |
| | The courts treat people in a fair and equal manner | | | | | | | 21% | 7% | 14% | |
| | Trials are fair | | | | | | | 18% | 8% | 13% | |
| 3.1.1_j [police] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the police | | | | | | | | | | |
| | It is possible to avoid arrest if one pays the police | | | | | | | 60% | 39% | 50% | |
| | Police go unpunished (for crimes they commit) | | | | | | | 29% | 24% | 27% | |
| | Police only work on case after payment of an incentive | | | | | | | 75% | 71% | 73% | |
| | The police treats all ethnic groups in the same way | | | | | | | 43% | 53% | 48% | |
| 3.2_i | % of women and men indicating that national government represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 0% | 4% | 2% | 3% | 2% | 3% | 9% | 3% | 6% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that provincial government represents the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 0% | 2% | 2% | 4% | 8% | 6% | 9% | 3% | 6% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that territorial administration & 'la mairie' represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | 18% | 24% | 21% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that local authorities represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 21% | 41% | 31% | 31% | 55% | 43% | |
| 3.2.2_ii | % of women and men who indicate that they find it 'very' or 'extremely' acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes'). | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 29% | 9% | 18% | 22% | 12% | 17% | 9% | 19% | 14% | |

Table 11: ISSSS Results Data, Kitshanga, Pillars 4 and 5, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January June 2016 | | | July - December 2016 | | | January - June 2017 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|---|---------------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------|--|
| | | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | Kitshanga (Bwito) | Kitshanga (Bashali) | Grand Total | |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience) | 4_i | Average monthly HH Income | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4_ii | % of HH depending on traditional activities as main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, animal husbandry) | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2.1_iv | % of women and men indicating they have "good" or "very good" access to markets | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2.2_ii: | % of women and men declaring they have "good" or "very good" access to land | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2.3_i | % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2.5_i: | % of women and men declaring to have had paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.3_i | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.3.2_i | % of women and men who indicate having a "good" or "very good" relationship with: | | | | | | | | | |
| | | the family | | | | | | | | | |
| | | neighbours | | | | | | | | | |
| | | people of the village | | | | | | | | | |
| | | their own ethnic group | | | | | | | | | |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 5_ii | % women and men reporting to have experienced physical or sexual violence in last 6 months | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5_iii | % of women and men who personally know a woman / man who was survivor ("victim") of sexual violence | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5.1_i | % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage) | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved in family, i.e., without involvement of authorities | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who "agree" that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat wife / spouse | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into community | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into household | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as result. | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5.2_i | % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC / PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5.3.3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to health care services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who consider the access to psychological support services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who consider the access to reintegration services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | | | | |

Table 12: ISSSS Results Data, Kitshanga - by gender, Pillar 1, June 2016 – June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | July - December 2016 | | January - June 2017 | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|----------------------|-----|---------------------|----------|----------|-------------|----------|----------|
| | | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Children | Grand Total | | |
| 1_iii | % women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | 3% | 13% | 12% | 15% | 21% | 7% | | 14% | | |
| 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | 14% | 32% | 21% | 24% | 19% | 8% | | 13% | | |
| 1.1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | 9% | 24% | 28% | 26% | 35% | 0% | | 18% | | |
| CISPE data (Beneficiaries survey) (n(Bwito)=20; n(Bashali)=21) | | | | | | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| Pillar 1 (Democratic dialogue) | 1.2.1_i (a) | Inclusivity: fair representation in the platform's composition | The dialogue platform represents the interests of the women (well, very well) | | | 6 | 46% | 16 | 64% | 22 | 58% |
| | | | The dialogue platform represents the interests of the youth (well, very well) | | | 7 | 54% | 16 | 64% | 23 | 61% |
| | | | The dialogue platform represents the interests of different ethnic groups (well, very well) | | | 5 | 39% | 15 | 60% | 20 | 53% |
| | 1.2.1_i (b) | Neutral space: extent to which participants to the platform feel free to express their views and opinions without fear of repercussions | During the platform's meetings, do you feel comfortable when you speak up to express your point of view (comfortable, very comfortable) | | | 7 | 54% | 13 | 52% | 20 | 53% |
| | | | During the meetings, have you already feared reprisal or threats for expressing your opinion about a problem (often, occasionally) | | | 2 | 15% | 14 | 56% | 16 | 42% |
| | 1.2.1_i (c) | Learning: extent to which participants to the platform exchange their opinions and learn from each other | How often do meetings help you better understand other participants' opinions? (often, very often) | | | 8 | 62% | 12 | 48% | 20 | 53% |
| | | | During the meetings, do you feel participants really express their views? (all participants, most) | | | 5 | 39% | 14 | 56% | 19 | 50% |
| | 1.2.1_i (d) | Good faith: extent to which the participants feel the process is conducted in a correct and transparent way | Is it possible that the platform members take part in the meetings with a sincere intention to find solutions to the community's problems? (possible, likely) | | | 3 | 23% | 14 | 56% | 15 | 45% |
| | | | Is it possible that certain members of the platform try to perturb its work? (possible, likely) | | | 5 | 39% | 15 | 60% | 20 | 53% |
| | 1.2.1_i (e). | Empowerment: extent to which participants feel they have an important role within the stabilisation process | Est-il possible que la plateforme soulève une question avec les autorités que vous aimez particulièrement? (possible, likely) | | | 5 | 39% | 15 | 60% | 20 | 53% |
| | | | Est-il possible que les autorités de l'Etat prennent l'initiative sur la base de la recommandation du groupe? (possible, likely) | | | 5 | 39% | 14 | 56% | 19 | 50% |
| | | | How often do you personally reach out to state authorities to discuss your troubles? (often, very often) | | | 3 | 23% | 11 | 44% | 14 | 37% |
| | | | To what extent does the action plan reflect your priorities? (well, very well) | | | 4 | 31% | 11 | 44% | 15 | 40% |
| | | | In your opinion, how does the implementation of the action plan reflect your priorities? (well, very well) | | | 6 | 46% | 10 | 40% | 16 | 42% |
| | | | During the platform meetings, how often have you raised the issue of GBV? (often, very often) | | | 7 | 54% | 12 | 48% | 19 | 51% |

Table 13: ISSSS Results Data, Kitshanga - by gender, Pillar 2, June 2016 – June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | | January - June 2016 | | July - December 2016 | | January - June 2017 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---------------------|---|----------------------|-----|---------------------|-----|----------|-------------|-----|
| | | | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Children | Grand Total | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_i (a) [JHRO] | # of reported incidents perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | 26 | 106 | 14 | 146 |
| | | | | Others | | | | 2 | 21 | 1 | 24 |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | 22 | 0 | 10 | 32 |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | 21 | 135 | 17 | 173 |
| | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | 24 | 247 | 14 | 285 | |
| | Forced Labour | | | | | | 0 | 18 | 1 | 19 | |
| | 2_i (b) [JHRO] | # of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | 3 | 16 | 1 | 20 |
| | | | | Others | | | | 0 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | 2 | 35 | 1 | 38 |
| | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | 1 | 42 | 1 | 44 | |
| | Forced Labour | | | | | | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | |
| | 2_i (c) [JHRO] | # of reported incidents perpetrated by other state agents against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones**). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | 1 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| | | | | Others | | | | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | 1 | 8 | 0 | 9 | |
| Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | 1 | 9 | 1 | 11 | | |
| Forced Labour | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over past year | | | | | | 1% | 6% | | 4% | |
| 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | | 19% | 24% | 8% | 18% | 3% | 32% | | 17% | |
| 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | | | | | | 50% | 59% | | 55% | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | | 13% | 28% | 17% | 35% | 10% | 4% | | 7% | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'lala salam a' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6mths | | | | | | 3% | 9% | | 6% | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men feeling "very secure" or "secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol | | | | | | 42% | 29% | | 35% | |
| 2.2.2_i | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | | 70% | 65% | 53% | 44% | 37% | 55% | | 46% | |
| 2.2.2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by soldiers are ongoing | | 45% | 41% | 29% | 47% | 24% | 56% | | 40% | |
| 2.2.2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for crimes they commit) | | 34% | 37% | 32% | 31% | 23% | 41% | | 32% | |

Table 14: ISSSS Results Data, Kitshanga - by gender, Pillar 3, June 2016 – June 2017

| ISSSS indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | July - December 2016 | | January - June 2017 | | | |
|---|--|--|-----|----------------------|-----|---------------------|-----|----------|-------------|
| | | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Children | Grand Total |
| Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority) | 3_i [gouv. central] % of women and men assessing performance of central government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) Combat corruption Combat sexual violence Create employment Ensure security Establishing peace in Eastern DRC Improve the lives of Congolese Reduce poverty Unify the different ethnic groups | | | | | 4% | 1% | | 3% |
| | | | | | | 25% | 22% | | 24% |
| | | | | | | 1% | 0% | | 1% |
| | | | | | | 20% | 3% | | 11% |
| | | | | | | 20% | 6% | | 13% |
| | | | | | | 5% | 2% | | 4% |
| | | | | | | 2% | 1% | | 2% |
| | | | | | | 14% | 16% | | 15% |
| | | 3_i [gouv. provincial] % of women and men assessing performance of provincial government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) Ensure security Improve the lives of Congolaise Prepare democratic elections Unify the different ethnic groups | | | | | | 22% | 2% |
| | | | | | | 4% | 3% | | 4% |
| | | | | | | 17% | 2% | | 10% |
| | | | | | | 20% | 22% | | 21% |
| | 3_i [gouv. territorial] % of women and men assessing the performance of the territorial government / La Mairie as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) Ensure security Improve the lives of Congolaise Prepare democratic elections Unify the different ethnic groups | | | | | | 27% | 2% | 15% |
| | | | | | | 7% | 2% | | 4% |
| | | | | | | 18% | 2% | | 10% |
| | | | | | | 22% | 22% | | 22% |
| | 3.1_i % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of Congolese State (état civil) % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to land administration services of the Congolese State % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to national civil | | 3% | 12% | 6% | 15% | 21% | 4% | 13% |
| | | | | | | | 17% | 6% | 11% |
| | | | 0% | 3% | 11% | 9% | 19% | 5% | 12% |
| | 3.1.1_i [global] % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance on state agents: State agents have the right skills to provide good services State agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way State agents work on case without payment of incentive State agents work on cases quickly / swiftly | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 47% | 66% | 56% |
| | | | | | | | 38% | 34% | 36% |
| | | | | | | | 18% | 21% | 19% |
| | | | | | | | 38% | 27% | 32% |
| | 3.1.1_i [justice] % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance of judicial officials: Actors of the justice (system) are corrupt Court decisions are well executed Decisions of courts are taken in a fair manner Justice is fast The courts treat people in a fair and equal manner Trials are fair | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 53% | 60% | 56% |
| | | | | | | | 22% | 5% | 14% |
| | | | | | | | 21% | 6% | 14% |
| | | | | | | | 22% | 4% | 13% |
| | | | | | | | 23% | 6% | 14% |
| | 3.1.1_i [police] % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on police / PNC performance: It is possible to avoid arrest if one pays the police Police go unpunished (for crimes they commit) Police only work on case after payment of an incentive The police treats all ethnic groups in the same way | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 35% | 64% | 50% |
| | | | | | | | 15% | 38% | 27% |
| | | | | | | 80% | 67% | 73% | |
| | | | | | | 43% | 54% | 48% | |
| 3.2_i % of women and men indicating that national government represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' % of women and men indicating that provincial government represents the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' % of women and men indicating that territorial administration & 'la mairie' represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' % of women and men indicating that local authorities represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well' | | 1% | 3% | 5% | 1% | 9% | 3% | 6% | |
| | | 0% | 3% | 6% | 7% | 9% | 3% | 6% | |
| | | | | | | 30% | 11% | 21% | |
| | | | | 31% | 32% | 63% | 22% | 43% | |
| 3.2.2_ii % of women and men who indicate that they find it "very" or "extremely" acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes'). | | 7% | 29% | 22% | 11% | 18% | 10% | 14% | |

Table 15: ISSSS Results Data, Kitshanga - by gender, Pillars 4 and 5, June 2016 – June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | July - December 2016 | | January - June 2017 | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|-----|----------------------|-----|---------------------|-----|----------|-------------|-----|
| | | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Children | Grand Total | |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience) | 4_ii | % of HH depending on traditional activities as main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, animal husbandry) | 0% | 0% | 90% | 80% | 70% | 86% | | 78% |
| | 4.2.1_iv | % of women and men indicating they have "good" or "very good" access to markets | 0% | 0% | 22% | 47% | 30% | 18% | | 24% |
| | 4.2.2_ii: | % of women and men declaring they have "good" or "very good" access to land | 34% | 37% | 35% | 27% | 45% | 10% | | 27% |
| | 4.2.3_i | % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required | 4% | 1% | 4% | 3% | 14% | 19% | | 16% |
| | 4.2.5_i: | % of women and men declaring to have had paid job for at least a week over the past 3 months | 2% | 3% | 7% | 10% | 0% | 7% | | 4% |
| | 4.3_i | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | 0% | 0% | 87% | 91% | 70% | 98% | | 84% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | 0% | 0% | 86% | 98% | 80% | 99% | | 89% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups | 0% | 0% | 75% | 91% | 72% | 96% | | 84% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups | 0% | 0% | 75% | 93% | 73% | 98% | | 85% |
| | 4.3.2_i | % of women and men who indicate having a "good" or "very good" relationship with: | | | | | | | | |
| | | the family | 77% | 93% | 90% | 94% | 88% | 100% | | 94% |
| | | neighbours | 78% | 94% | 91% | 89% | 67% | 81% | | 74% |
| | | people of the village | 76% | 87% | 82% | 83% | 64% | 69% | | 67% |
| | | their own ethnic group | 76% | 89% | 82% | 80% | 69% | 64% | | 66% |
| other ethnic groups | 42% | 71% | 59% | 65% | 43% | 51% | | 47% | | |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 5_ii | % women and men reporting to have experienced physical or sexual violence in last 6 months | 8% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 4% | 0% | | 2% |
| | 5_iii | % of women and men who personally know a woman / man who was survivor ("victim") of sexual violence | | | | | 13% | 14% | | 14% |
| | 5.1_i | % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage) | 80% | 44% | 67% | 84% | | | | |
| | | % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in family', i.e., without involvement of authorities | 0% | 0% | 30% | 44% | 29% | 12% | | 21% |
| | | % of women and men who "agree" that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat wife / spouse | 0% | 0% | 27% | 35% | 16% | 18% | | 17% |
| | 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into community | 96% | 95% | 90% | 97% | 94% | 99% | | 97% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into household | 95% | 92% | 88% | 94% | 94% | 100% | | 97% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence | 94% | 79% | 79% | 80% | 92% | 99% | | 95% |
| | | % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as result. | 94% | 79% | 76% | 68% | | | | |
| | 5.2_i | % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC / PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence | | | | | 55% | 61% | | 58% |
| 5.3.3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to health care services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | 39% | 31% | | 35% | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to psychological support services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | 10% | 22% | | 16% | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to reintegration services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | 9% | 19% | | 14% | |

4 Conclusion - Observations and possible considerations

The analysis, the conclusions, the observations and the recommendations presented in this section of the report were developed by the M&E Cell, based on the available data provided by the various sources.

Observations – Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

As already underlined in the baseline study, the **engagement of the population in the ISSSS/ stabilisation efforts** in Kitshanga needs to be strengthened in the context of currently negative views on peace and stability at the local level. The population's trust in a safer future and in the relevance of peace projects is still weak, in particular amongst men. Moreover, perceptions on security vary greatly between men and women, and between the zone around Bwito and the one around Bashali.

More specifically, people's sense of security in their villages (**Indicator 1_iii**) remains weak, and the total reported number of security incidents and human rights violations in the PZ has increased (**Indicator 2_i**). Overall, expectations regarding a more peaceful future in the PZ (**Indicator 1_iv**) have remained low, and they reach a very low level among men. In Bwito, we note a significant decrease of this indicator's value: less than one person out of now thinks his/her village will be more peaceful in a year's time (against 3 people out of 10 in July-December 2016). It is worth noting that this drop is more significant amongst men, considering that they are more often the victims of reported security incidents and human rights violations. It is also worth noting that in July-December 2016 and in January-June 2016, Bwito was the most optimistic sub-zone regarding the future.

Based on the first project-level data available (International Alert's FCS project) about the level of support among stabilisation actors (state agents, local authorities and representatives of the civil society) towards the ISSSS (**Indicator 1_ii**), most respondents mentioned a variety of participatory activities as key factors that influenced peace and security in their zone during the previous 6 months. Similarly, to the question about "the actors who had the biggest impact on peace and security in your surroundings during the last six/twelve months", answers generally include a broad spectrum of actors, such as the FARDC, the population, local leaders, state agents and national/international organisations.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 1

A more detailed analysis of the links between perceptions about security, peace projects and expectations concerning the future could be carried out to identify **the factors contributing to these results**. The present report is not the most appropriate forum for this type of investigation but, at the request from ISSSS stakeholders, the M&E Cell could take care of this analysis².

² The M&E Cell has the possibility to produce brief reports on targeted issues, based on the available data. ISSSS stakeholders who are interested in a more detailed analysis on such questions are invited to contact the Cell and submit their requests.

Observations – Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

The population of the zone around Kitshanga sends seemingly contradictory messages concerning trust in the FARDC and their performance (these messages are difficult to explain with the available data). Overall, we note a weaker level of trust towards the FARDC in Bwito than in Bashali.

The armed groups (AG) are responsible for many more security incidents/human rights violations (HRV) than the FARDC: the MONUSCO Force reported 4 times more incidents at the hands of AG than of the FARDC, and the Joint Human Rights Office (JHRO) reported 5 times more HRV committed by AG than by the FARDC (**Indicator 2_i**). Based on this information, it would be interesting to analyse the perception data: half of the population in the Kitshanga zone declares it trusts the FARDC to guarantee security in their villages (**Indicator 2_iii**) but, at the same time, less than one person out of 10 stated that the FARDC provide a “large” or “very large” contribution to their safety (**Indicator 2_iii (a)**).

Interestingly, men tend to have a lower level of trust towards the FARDC: JHRO data indicate that adult men were by far (103 for 8 adult women) more often the victims of HRV cases reported during the past 6 months. Also, fewer men declare that the FARDC had made a “large” or “very large” contribution to their security (**Indicator 2_iii (a)**) and that they feel “safe” or “very safe” when meeting a patrol of FARDC soldiers (**Indicator 2.2**). It is also worth noting that the feeling of trust towards the FARDC concerning their contribution to security has substantially decreased (ever since the June and December 2016 data), in particular in Bashali.

As far as the perception of FARDC accountability is concerned, between 4 and 5 people out of 10 think that the victims of crimes committed by the FARDC have the possibility to report it (**Indicator 2.2.2_i**), 4 people out of 10 state that the efforts to increase FARDC accountability are ongoing (**Indicator 2.2.2_ii**), and only 3 people out of 10 think that FARDC members remain unpunished for the crimes they commit. It is interesting to note that, overall, between 3 and 5 people out of 10 (especially men) have positive opinions regarding FARDC accountability.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 2

The present report’s data cannot explain the contradictions described above. In order to evaluate FARDC performance in terms of PoC, other types of information are also needed, such as those on the change in behaviour/knowledge among the FARDC. As recommended in the report on outcome 6 of the UNDAF results framework, the entities that implement interventions in this sector must measure changes of behaviour/knowledge among security actors. Project bilaterally funded are strongly encouraged to undergo the alignment process, whereas aligned projects aligned and funded by the FCS are encouraged to harmonise their logframe with the ISSSS’s, and to include in their M&E systems those indicators that measure this type of change (as foreseen in the ISSSS logframe).

Observations – Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

Opinions regarding a **beneficial presence of the “regular” Congolese State (Specific Objective 3)** around Kitshanga are still generally negative, and more so than in any other PZ. Interestingly, women have a greater trust in the government, throughout its administrative levels (central, provincial and local/territorial) and report a better access to services. In all cases, neither men nor women are satisfied with the service providers’ performance and accountability. **Bwito** turns out to be the **most problematic zone concerning access to services**.

Kitshanga is one of the PZ (with Kalehe) where the level of trust towards the central government (**Indicator 3_i**) is the lowest, and keeps decreasing. This downwards slope is particularly evident in the data concerning the fight against sexual violence: 2 people out of 10 consider the central government’s performance as “good” or “very good” in this area, whereas 4 people out of 10 had this opinion during the previous reporting period.

Important differences are noticeable regarding people’s trust in the government at national, provincial, territorial and local levels (**Indicator 3.2_i**)³, in particular between the national and local levels (4 people out of 10 consider that local authorities represent “well” or “very well” the population’s interests, but this is true for less than one person out of 10 regarding the national government). It must be noted that, compared to the baseline study, the population’s opinions in the PZ around Kitshanga about local representatives have become globally more positive (10% variation).

Reported access to services remains very limited (**Indicator 3.1_i**), but a positive trend appears as far as women are concerned: if we compare June 2016 to June 2017 data, the percentage of women of women reporting they have a “good” or “very good” access to administrative services has increased by 18 points, and the share of those reporting they have a “good” or “very good” access to the judicial services has increased by 19 points. At the same time, it is interesting to note that only a small share of the population is prepared to pay taxes (**Indicator 3.2.2_ii**). In fact, among the perceptions of service providers’ performance (**Indicator 3.1.1_i**), the justice system is perceived as the least equitable (especially in Bashali). State agents, the justice system and the PNC are seen as very corrupted in Bwito and, at the PZ-level, this perception is more prevalent among women. Significant exceptions are constituted by the more positive opinions of women towards the justice system and state agents overall.

Finally, Bwito turns out to be the most problematic zone concerning access to services: considering a stronger prevalence of security incidents and HRV, and a weaker trust towards the FARDC than elsewhere, the data analysed and observations by operators in Bwito similarly describe a more volatile security situation, and more difficult accesses from the point of view of logistics in this PZ (also determined by the security situation).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 3

³ The phrasing of those indicators that measure the level of trust among populations towards the different administrative levels has changed slightly since the baseline study (June-December 2016 data) and the present reporting period (January-June 2017). The original phrasing was: “In your opinion, how do representatives at the national level represent the population’s interests and opinions?” Now, the indicator asks: “In your opinion, how does the central government represent the population’s interests and opinions?” The M&E Cell continues to compare these indicators, but a certain error margin inevitably appears.

One of the key elements of the ISSSS's approach is the strengthening of the social contract between the population and the state. This includes, among other things, the sensitization of the population and of state agents regarding their roles and responsibilities, through different approaches/activities. The projects mapping shows that the results about **changes of the population's knowledge, attitudes and behaviours concerning their rights and duties towards the state** are not entirely covered by the ISSSS programming. Practically speaking, this may mean that projects should focus more on this aspect. At the same time, several projects aim to improve the provision of state services: it will be important to follow any evolution in this field in order to better understand the populations' perceptions.

Observations – Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

According to data relative to Pillar 4, **Bwito again appears to be the least privileged area within the Kitshanga PZ**, if we consider the indicators about access to land and land use services, about perceptions of security, the level of trust towards the FARDC and the number of security incidents/HRV (Pillar 2). **The indicators about social cohesion**, however, do constitute an exception to this trend.

Throughout the PZ, the reported level of access to land (**Indicator 4.2.2_ii**) remains low (the situation improved for women, while it deteriorated for men) ; the population in Bwito has always reported the most limited access to land and, during the last semester, 0% of the people state that they have a "good" or "very good" access to land use services (**Indicator 3.1_i**).

Over the last 6 months, as noted in the section on Pillar 3, more women declare having access to land and to land use services: almost half of the women now consider their access "good" or "very good", against only one man out of 10. A similar situation appears regarding access to markets, where men again seem to be disadvantaged (**Indicator 4.2.1_iv**).

Despite these findings, **Bwito seems to witness a higher level of social cohesion** (although the level remains high in Bashali): more people in Bwito claim there are "often" or "occasionally" interactions between different ethnic groups, including in the context of weddings, of participation in cultural events, of joint work, or of shared places of worship (**Indicators 4.3_i**). Nevertheless, when the question addresses their own interactions with other groups within the community (**Indicator 4.3.2_i**), a difference appears: the population in Bwito reports slightly less friendly relationships to their neighbours, regardless of the ethnic group, and to other individuals in their villages than the population in Bashali.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 4

What are the structural elements that characterize Bwito, or the events that occurred in Bwito, that determine a restricted access to services, a low sense of security and, at the same time, a seemingly high level of social cohesion? Is the reported good level of inter-ethnic relationships genuine and based on mutual acceptance and trust, or is it determined by needs (to protect oneself from insecurity, to face common problems, etc.)?

Through the process of democratic dialogue managed by the projects, we can perhaps better understand the relationships between these elements and, for example, understand whether "behind" the data of the indicators on social cohesion there is a real feeling of confidence (which will contribute

to the long-term transformation of conflicts) or whether the processes carried out in the ISSS framework are rather used for solving problems in the short term. The second possibility would represent a risk for achieving the objectives related to conflict transformation and for the sustainability of ISSS interventions.

Observations – Pillar 5 (Fight against SGBV)⁴

The prevalence of negative social norms and the reported level of sexual violence in the area around Kitshanga are generally very low. On the other hand, we also note a reduced access to support services for survivors of such violence. Unlike the situation for the other pillars, the analysis of data related to Pillar 5 does not show any major differences between Bwito and Bashali.

Comparing with the data presented in the baseline study, more and more people view consent between partners as "always necessary" before sex (**Indicator 5.1_i**), including in the context of marriage . This opinion is stronger in the Kitshanga PZ than in any other PZ, and it would be interesting to understand the cause of this evolution (for example, whether this area has been the focus of many interventions on this topic).

Another positive sign is the increased acceptance of reintegration (within the family and the community) of victims/survivors of SV, including those who have had a child or have contracted illness as a result of the violence (**Indicator 5.1_ii**).

In contrast to the Pillar 3 indicators on reported access to services, women claim to have a reduced access to psychological support and reintegration services (**Indicator 5.3.3_v**) and, within the PZ, this access is even more limited in Bwito.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 5

Why is it that in the fight against sexual violence there are **no significant differences between Bashali and Bwito**? Has the whole area around Kitshanga seen a number of projects targeting negative social norms on gender issues? If so, should the ISSS programming still prioritise this area of intervention in Kitshanga? Or, what are the structural elements that characterize Bwito or the events that took place in Bwito that determine low access to services (Pillar 3), a low sense of security (Pillar 2) and, at the same time, a level apparently strong social cohesion (Pillar 4) and a reduced prevalence of negative social norms around issues of sexual violence (Pillar 5)? Is there a link between the indicators on social cohesion and the attitudes towards SV that can demonstrate a **greater acceptance of others within these communities**, and which could effectively form the basis for conflict transformation and ensure the sustainability of achievements?

⁴ It is not possible to estimate the total number of incidents of sexual violence in the priority zones, as it is unlikely that any of the available data sets offer a comprehensive tally. Assuming however that any flaws in the data affect all data collection across all geographic zones, however, the data sets can offer some insight into relative magnitude of the problem across geographic areas.

Serious consideration of these questions could shed light on the issue raised by the analysis of Pillar 4 data on genuine social cohesion.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 5

Further analysis of the links between the indicators mentioned above could clarify aspects related to social cohesion. This report is not the most appropriate forum for this type of investigation but, at the request of ISSSS stakeholders, the M&E Cell could conduct this more detailed analysis⁵, and thus identify possible implications for future programming.

⁵ The M&E Cell has the possibility to produce brief reports on targeted issues, based on the available data. ISSSS stakeholders who are interested in a more detailed analysis on such questions are invited to contact the Cell and submit their requests.

Annex IV - Ruzizi Priority Zone, South-Kivu Province

List of Acronyms

| | |
|----------|--|
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| ETD | <i>Entités Territoriales Décentralisées</i> (Local Entities) |
| FARDC | <i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i> (DRC Armed Forces) |
| FCS | <i>Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation</i> (Stabilisation Coherence Fund) |
| HR | Human Right(s) |
| HRV | Human Rights Violation(s) |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| I.O. | Intermediate Outcome |
| IOM | International Migration Organisation |
| ISSSS | International Stabilization and Security Support Strategy |
| JHRO | Joint Human Right Office |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| M&E Cell | Monitoring and Evaluation Cell (of the SSU) |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC |
| O.O. | Overall Outcome |
| PNC | <i>Police Nationale Congolaise</i> (Congolese National Police) |
| PoC | Protection of civilians |
| PZ | Priority Zone |
| SFCG | Search For Common Ground |
| SGBV | Sexual and Gender Based Violence |
| S.O. | Specific Objective |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform (<i>Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika</i>) |
| SSU | Stabilisation Support Unit |
| SV | Sexual Violence |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

1 Presentation of Annex IV – Ruzizi Plain (South-Kivu Province)

This annex to the second consolidated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) follows the baseline study that was published in July 2017, as part of the biannual production of consolidated ISSSS progress reports by the M&E Cell of the Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU).

This annex presents a projection of the ISSSS programming in the Ruzizi plain priority zone (PZ) for the period that extends from the second half of 2017 to the first quarter of 2018. This forward looking perspective is meant to ensure that our mapping takes into account those projects that are currently still “in the pipeline” (for example, in their preliminary phase, or in the final stages of their design phase), but are slated for implementation in the foreseeable future. The projects considered in this mapping are those that are funded by the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (*Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation*, or FCS) and those that are funded by bilateral contributions and have undergone the process of alignment to and harmonisation with the ISSSS and its logical framework (logframe).

This annex provides an update to the ISSSS baseline data for the first half of 2017, by presenting a set of preliminary and provisional observations regarding progress in the ISSSS programming in the Ruzizi plain PZ. It is however important to underline that these observations are meant to help and inform stakeholders to pursue the debate about trends and programming options in the PZ. They are therefore by no means intended to be definitive, final or accepted at face value. Questioning, revising and refining this report’s observations in the course of this debate is very much an intended part of the monitoring and learning process within the SSU M&E Cell.

2 Status of ISSSS programming – Ruzizi (South-Kivu Province)

This section of the report provides an overview of the status of ISSSS programming in the Ruzizi PZ. Specifically, this section provides:

- a **brief description of the different programmes and interventions** that are currently being implemented in Ruzizi in association with the ISSSS, i.e. those that are either financed through the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (FCS) or through bi-lateral funding arrangements (*aligned programmes*);
- an overview of how these **interventions cover the result elements of the ISSSS across its five thematic pillars**, and some tentative observations on the degree to which all necessary elements are being addressed;
- a slightly more in-depth view of the **pillar-specific status of ISSSS programming**, based on the status of ISSSS projects in June/July 2017, as well as some additional thoughts on implications for the implementation of the strategy in the months to come.

Overview of ISSSS interventions in Ruzizi

Table 1 below lists the projects that are currently being implemented or are set to start implementation in the coming months under the umbrella of the ISSSS in the Ruzizi PZ. For each one, the table provides information on the respective lead organisations, the expected implementation period and the thematic focus.

Table 1: Overview of interventions associated with the ISSSS (aligned and FCS) in the Ruzizi plain PZ

| Type | Title (Lead Organisation) | Implementation Period | Thematic Focus(es) |
|---------|---|-----------------------|--|
| FCS | Construisons ensemble pour la Paix (International Alert) | July 17 – June 19 | Promoting an inclusive dialogue process to address the roots causes of conflicts, consolidate peace and create the conditions for stables institutions and economic recovery in the project area |
| Aligned | Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika (Security Sector Reform, SSR) (Phase 4 ; Extension) (SFCG) | May 2017 | Increasing knowledge and awareness among Congolese security forces and civilians about their rights, roles and mutual responsibilities to improve relationships and build confidence. |
| | Expanding Community Resilience to Violence in Ruzizi and Fizi (Peace Direct) | July 2017 - June 2019 | Based on the concept of Community Based Reintegration, the goal is to create economic opportunities for the most vulnerable population that contribute to sustainable development and peace |

The overall project landscape in Ruzizi

Taken together, the above-mentioned projects address the results from all five thematic pillars of the ISSSS, with varying degrees of coverage:

- Over the first half of 2017, only the coverage by programming under Pillar 5 (Fight against SGBV) is still “developing” in the Sud-Irumu PZ, i.e. less than half of the results under this pillar are currently covered by at least one project.
- The coverage of all four other pillars, i.e. pillars 1 (Democratic Dialogue), 2 (FARDC performance in Protection of Civilians), 3 (Restoration of State Authority) and 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict) is **relatively advanced**, in as much as more than half of the results are covered by at least one project.

Table 2 below provides an overview of the programming status of the five thematic ISSSS pillars in the Ruzizi plain PZ.

Table 2: Overview of programming status across all ISSSS Pillars, Ruzizi PZ (South-Kivu Province), July 2017

| Pillar | Intended Contribution to implementation of ISSSS | Coverage of ISSSS results framework ¹ |
|----------|--|--|
| Pillar 1 | <i>Create a participatory and inclusive (democratic) dialogue to ensure a political and community-based transformation process of the targeted conflicts.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 2 | <i>Improve the performance of the FARDC in civilian protection, and community – FARDC relations</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 3 | <i>Increase the (beneficial) role and presence of the Congolese state (in particular the local authorities) in the Priority Zones.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 4 | <i>Increase the equitable resource flow to and coherence among at risk populations (women and men, girls and boys), including in particular, IDPs and returnees.</i> | Advanced |
| Pillar 5 | <i>Ensure that security sector reforms (covered by both Pillars 2 and 3) and local state capacity building (Pillar 3) sufficiently emphasize combating sexual and gender based violence as a symptom and driver of conflict in the Priority Zones.</i> | Developing |

The sections below provide a more detailed look at the project coverage for each of the five pillars in the Ruzizi PZ.

¹ **Complete:** All result elements of the ISSSS are addressed by projects; **Advanced:** Most result elements are addressed by projects; **Developing:** A minority of result elements are addressed by projects; **None:** No results elements of the Pillar are addressed by projects.

Programming for Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

With regard to Table 3 below, the programming for Pillar 1 has not changed since the baseline study. It remains focused on the facilitation of the Democratic Dialogue at the community level through the implementation of the International Alert project (FCS). This project also foresees several activities aimed at facilitating the appropriation and support of provincial (South-Kivu) and national authorities for local stabilisation processes. In addition, the SSU is engaged with the provincial government in the development of a sector compact as part of its "good offices" responsibilities.

The gap in this programming lies in maintaining community support for the local stabilisation process and in prioritizing joint action plans in national level sector compacts.

In the current political context in the DRC, factors from the ISSSS risk matrix, such as clashes between the FARDC and armed groups and other obstacles from national and provincial authorities (and others) should be considered as likely detractors of the Democratic Dialogue process in the short and medium term. This can potentially generate scepticism about the process within communities.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 1 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 3: The ISSSS program landscape in Sud-Irumu, Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated projects / programmes |
|---------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| S.O. 1 | Support for the ISSSS at community level | |
| O.O. 1.1 | Local stabilisation processes aligned with community priorities | (FCS) International Alert |
| I.O. 1.1.1 | Joint action plans developed and approved by communities | (FCS) International Alert |
| I.O. 1.1.2 | Joint action plans compiled into Sector Compacts | Not covered |
| I.O. 1.1.3 | National authorities commit to & act upon 'Sector Compacts' | (FCS) International Alert |
| O.O. 1.2 | Local groups support stabilisation process | Not covered |
| I.O. 1.2.1 | Oversight mechanisms of stabilisation process set-up and functioning; | (FCS) International Alert |

Programming for Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

As was the case for Pillar 1, Pillar 2 programming in the Ruzizi PZ has not changed since the baseline study. It remains focussed on the application of the procedures and operational principles in terms of Protection of Civilians (PoC) (SSR project), as well as on the improvement of the relations between security forces (PNC, FARDC) and the communities through the FCS-funded Ruzizi projects and SSR.

However, as for the baseline study, gaps remain regarding the setting up of internal oversight and incentive structures within the FARDC in terms of PoC and regarding the improvement of FARDC behaviour. The same is true for efforts to communicate the experiences and lessons learnt from local project engagement with FARDC members to the national leaders, or to link local work with the national security sector reform (SSR).

The system of rotation/transfer of FARDC elements makes it difficult to consolidate project achievements in terms of performance in PoC. To this must be added the insufficiency of progress made

in the national security sector reform programme, particularly in relation to the care and politicisation of the army corps.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 2 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 4: The ISSSS program landscape in Ruzizi, Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of PoC)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated projects / programmes |
|---------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| S.O. 2 | FARDC Performance in terms of PoC | |
| O.O. 2.1 | Operational FARDC PoC principles & procedures applied and enforced | (A) SSR |
| I.O. 2.1.1 | Increased awareness and skills among FARDC commanders & their units regarding PoC and SGBV prevention principles | (A) SSR |
| I.O. 2.1.2 | FARDC disciplinary, oversight, incentive structures reinforced and aligned with PoC principles | Not covered |
| I.O. 2.1.3 | Strengthened military judicial mechanisms f. HR violations | (A) SSR |
| I.O.2.1.4 | Lessons learnt from PoC experiences and resource requirements communicated to national FARDC leaders | Not covered |
| O.O. 2.2 | Strengthened cohesion and trust between civilians and FARDC | (FCS) International Alert |
| I.O. 2.2.1 | Social & economical integration of soldiers into host communities | (FCS) International Alert (A) SSR |
| I.O. 2.2.2 | Improved redress mechanisms for local authorities and communities | Not covered |
| I.O. 2.2.3 | Improved behaviour by FARDC soldiers (less predatory & profiteering) | Not covered |

Programming for Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

With regard to Table 5 below, ISSSS programming for Pillar 3 in the Ruzizi PZ covers a major part of the results. Its focus includes access to services, the performance of state agents, the establishment of participatory supervision and planning structures, and the awareness of state agents in relation to their duties and responsibilities.

The previously identified gaps remain regarding the increase and availability of financial resources to enable the proper functioning of ETDs, the improvement of state institutions' reactivity and accountability, the improvement of population behaviour on their rights and duties towards local authorities and, finally, the establishment of an enabling and coherent regulatory/legal framework for local governance.

Several factors are still likely to affect the impact of actions under Pillar 3. In particular, the current national political context (centralisation of power, obstructionism and lack of reforms, including financial ones, such as the question of the pay) is likely to hinder or cancel out project work.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 3 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 5: The ISSSS program landscape in Ruzizi, Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated projects / programmes |
|---------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| O.S. 3 | Increased beneficial role and presence of "regular" Congolese State in local governance | |
| O.O. 3.1 | Improved access to relevant state-provided services | (FCS) International Alert |
| I.O. 3.1.1 | Improved performance of state agents in service delivery | (FCS) International Alert (A) SSR |
| I.O. 3.1.2 | Improved availability/access to physical infrastructure and other assets for service delivery | Not covered |
| O.O. 3.1.3 | Improved availability of financial resources for service delivery | Not covered |
| O.O. 3.2 | Improved accountability and responsiveness of state institutions | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.2.1 | Local, participatory oversight and planning structures established; functioning | (FCS) International Alert |
| I.O. 3.2.2 | Local population & civil society acting on responsibilities and rights vis-a-vis local authorities | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.2.3 | Awareness of state agents of their formal duties and responsibilities (including no corruption) | (A) SSR |
| O.O. 3.3 | Enabling, coherent regulatory/legal framework for local governance in place | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.3.1 | Local authorities/ETD prepared for devolution and financial retrocession | Not covered |
| I.O. 3.3.2 | Division of responsibilities between formal and traditional authorities codified | (FCS) International Alert |
| I.O. 3.3.3 | Lessons for increased local state presence acted on by national authorities | Not covered |

Programming for Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

As was noted in the baseline study, programming under this pillar covers most of the outcomes related to short-term income stabilisation, to medium-to-long-term economic recovery, to access to training opportunities as well as to social cohesion between and among communities.

ISSSS programming in Ruzizi remains potentially vulnerable to several risk factors, such as doubts about perceived inequalities in resources distribution, or vulnerabilities generated by security incidents (e.g. impact on access to markets), or macroeconomic shocks.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 4 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 6: The ISSSS program landscape in Ruzizi, Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated projects / programmes |
|---------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| O.S. 4 | Equitable resource flow (income earning & economic opportunities; socio-economic support) | |
| O.O. 4.1 | Increased participation in employment schemes and short-term income stabilisation | (A) Peace Direct |
| I.O. 4.1.1 | Improved availability of livelihood and start-up grants and cash-for-work | (FCS) International Alert |
| I.O. 4.1.2 | Improved access to services | (FCS) International Alert |
| O.O. 4.2 | Improved (enabling) conditions for local economic recovery | Not covered |
| I.O. 4.2.1 | Increased sustained access to markets | Not covered |
| I.O. 4.2.2 | Improved and secure access to land, natural resources | (FCS) International Alert |
| I.O. 4.2.3 | Improved access to credit (all groups) | (A) Peace Direct |

| | | |
|------------------|---|---|
| I.O. 4.2.4 | Improved access to training opportunities | (A) Peace Direct |
| I.O. 4.2.5 | Improved access to wage employment | (FCS) International Alert (A) Peace Direct |
| O.O. 4.3. | Social linkages within and between communities strengthened | (FCS) International Alert (A) Peace Direct |
| I.O. 4.3.1 | Psycho-social needs of vulnerable or marginalized groups in community addressed | Not covered |
| I.O. 4.3.2 | Inter- and intra-community trust increased | (A) Peace Direct |

Programming for Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

Programming for Pillar 5 in the Ruzizi PZ remains focussed on changing harmful gender and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) social norms, using not only dialogue and awareness campaigns, but also (as in the case of the FCS program implemented by International Alert) by developing a gender action plan to guide the planning of specific activities. Beyond this, a program (SSR) works directly with security officers on gender and SGBV awareness in order to reduce cases of SGBV committed by the PNC and the FARDC.

The previously identified gaps in the coverage of results through Pillar 5 programming remain relevant, especially for outcomes that aim to work directly with the justice system and other service providers to ensure appropriate access for victims/survivors of SGBV cases to the justice system, to improve the quality of judicial proceedings, and to make other support services available to victims and their families. These results include to some extent the military justice system and civilian courts.

However, actions aimed at changing harmful gender norms still face a strong culture of impunity among security services around SGBV. Achieving this change can also be complicated by the fact that ISSSS projects do not intend to address the internal motivational structures that may lead FARDC soldiers to maintain links with armed groups and to change their allegiance in opportunistic ways.

The table below provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 5 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 7: The ISSSS program landscape in Ruzizi, Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated projects / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---|
| S.O. 5 | Reduced levels of Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) | |
| O.O. 5.1 | Harmful social / gender norms (SGBV) decreased | (FCS) International Alert (A) Peace Direct |
| I.O. 5.1.2 | Active and meaningful participation in dialogue around SGBV | |
| I.O. 5.1.3 | Increased involvement in changing harmful social/gender norms | |
| O.O. 5.2 | Increased levels of trust in security forces to prosecute SGBV incidents committed by staff | Not covered |
| I.O. 5.2.1 | Reduced involvement of security sector actors (FARDC and PNC) in SGBV | (A) SSR |
| I.O. 5.2.2 | Strengthened military judicial systems for prosecution of SGBV cases | Not covered |
| O.O. 5.3 | Improved access to justice and support services for SGBV survivors | Not covered |
| I.O. 5.3.1 | Increased public awareness of laws & standards; roles and responsibilities to combat SGBV | (FCS) International Alert |
| I.O. 5.3.3 | Improved support services for SGBV survivors | Not covered |
| I.O. 5.3.4 | Improved ease of filing of SGBV cases at local level | Not covered |
| I.O. 5.3.5 | Improved speed, impartiality and confidentiality of SGBV trials improved | Not covered |

3 ISSSS Results Data – Ruzizi plain PZ

This section of the report contains a summary data sheet for those indicators of the ISSSS logframe for which data were available during this second monitoring phase for the Ruzizi PZ.

The population samples for the perception data were established at the PZ level, which means the data are statistically representative of the zone's population (not limited to the beneficiaries or the respondents). In this process, the PZ was divided into 3 sub-zones. The first one, called "around the Ruzizi plain" includes the chefferies of Bavira of the Ruzizi plain, both located in Uvira's territory; the second one is called "Itombwe" and includes the Itombwe sector in Mwenga's territory; the third one is called "Uvira city" only covers the city of Uvira.

The data sheet contains data from the Joint Human Rights Office (JHRO), divided according to the territories where the sub-zones are situated, i.e. that of Uvira (which here includes Uvira city) and that of Mwenga. Please note that the underage victims' gender is not recorded in JHRO data. Minors are therefore only included in the overall, total number of victims.

The following section contains a presentation and global analysis of selected data, which underline the global trends and main changes observed in the data between the two reporting periods. The M&E Cell intends to publish a quarterly report called "Stabilisation Spotlights", which will provide more detailed analyses of certain questions raised in the present report (interested ISSSS stakeholders are invited to contact the M&E Cell and submit their requests).

Table 8 : ISSSS Results Data, Ruzizi PZ, Pillars 1 and 2, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | | | July - December 2016 | | | | January - June 2017 | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|-------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----|
| | | Ruzizi plain | Itombwe | Uvira city | Total | Ruzizi plain | Itombwe | Uvira city | Total | Ruzizi plain | Itombwe | Uvira city | Total | |
| Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) | 1_iii | % women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1.1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_1 (a) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men. | | | | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | |
| | 2_1 (b) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men. | | | | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | |
| | 2_1 (c) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by unknown perpetrators against women, girls, boys and men. | | | | 1 incident(s) | 1 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 2 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | |
| | 2_1 (a) (JHRO) | # Human right violations (HRV) perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men (in the territories containing the ISSSS priority zones) | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | | | 5 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| | | | | Others | | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | 5 | 0 | 5 | 10 |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary arrest and illegal detention) | | | | | | | | 19 | 2 | 19 | 40 |
| | | | Property | | | | | | | | 18 | 2 | 18 | 39 |
| | | | Forced Labour | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| | 2_1 (b) (JHRO) | # Human right violations (HRV) perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men (in the territories containing the ISSSS priority zones) | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| | | | | Others | | | | | | | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary arrest and illegal detention) | | | | | | | | 6 | 1 | 6 | 13 |
| | | | Property | | | | | | | | 3 | 0 | 3 | 6 |
| | | | Forced Labour | | | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2_1 (c) (JHRO) | # Human right violations (HRV) perpetrated by State Agents (PNC, ARN,...) against women, girls, boys and men (in the territories containing the ISSSS priority zones) | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | Others | | | | | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | | | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary arrest and illegal detention) | | | | | | | | 11 | 0 | 11 | 22 |
| | | | Property | | | | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Forced Labour | | | | | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over past year | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'lala salam a' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6 months | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men feeling "very secure" or "secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.2.2_1 | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.2.2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by soldiers are ongoing | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.2.2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' for crimes) | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 9 : : ISSSS Results Data, Ruzizi PZ, Pillar 3, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | | | July - December 2016 | | | | January - June 2017 | | | |
|------------------------|--|---------------------|---------|------------|------------|----------------------|---------|------------|------------|---------------------|---------|------------|-------|
| | | Ruzizi plain | Itombwe | Uvira city | Total | Ruzizi plain | Itombwe | Uvira city | Total | Ruzizi plain | Itombwe | Uvira city | Total |
| 3_1 [central gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of central government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Combat corruption | 1% | 0% | 3% | 2% | 3% | 0% | 4% | 3% | 2% | 0% | 4% | 2% |
| | Combat sexual violence | 27% | 11% | 25% | 22% | 46% | 19% | 41% | 37% | 24% | 17% | 25% | 23% |
| | Create employment | 1% | 0% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 4% | 2% | 1% | 0% | 5% | 2% |
| | Ensure security | 13% | 1% | 18% | 12% | 17% | 1% | 16% | 12% | 11% | 0% | 8% | 7% |
| | Establishing peace in Eastern DRC | 12% | 0% | 25% | 14% | 24% | 10% | 12% | 16% | 11% | 0% | 16% | 10% |
| | Improve the lives of Congolese | 3% | 0% | 4% | 2% | 3% | 0% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 0% | 4% | 2% |
| | Reduce poverty | 1% | 0% | 3% | 2% | 1% | 0% | 2% | 1% | 3% | 0% | 6% | 3% |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 19% | 7% | 20% | 17% | 24% | 12% | 14% | 17% | 13% | 3% | 13% | 10% |
| 3_1 [provincial gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of provincial government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Ensure security | | | | | | | | | 11% | 1% | 11% | 8% |
| | Improve the lives of Congolese | | | | | | | | | 4% | 0% | 7% | 4% |
| | Prepare democratic elections | | | | | | | | | 1% | 0% | 5% | 3% |
| 3_1 [territorial gov.] | % of women and men assessing the performance of the territorial government / La Mairie as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Ensure security | | | | | | | | | 17% | 0% | 9% | 9% |
| | Improve the lives of Congolese | | | | | | | | | 3% | 0% | 9% | 5% |
| | Prepare democratic elections | | | | | | | | | 3% | 0% | 5% | 3% |
| 3.1.1_i | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of Congolese State (état civil) | 5% | 1% | 25% | 12% | 14% | 0% | 29% | 16% | 14% | 4% | 31% | 17% |
| | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to land administration services of the Congolese State | | | | | | | | | 15% | 2% | 29% | 17% |
| | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to national civil judicial system | 10% | 1% | 20% | 11% | 16% | 1% | 27% | 17% | 13% | 0% | 17% | 11% |
| 3.1.1_i [overall] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance on state agents: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | State agents have the right skills to provide good services | | | | | | | | | 31% | 7% | 25% | 22% |
| | State agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way | | | | | | | | | 26% | 57% | 15% | 30% |
| | State agents work on case without payment of incentive | | | | | | | | | 23% | 7% | 20% | 17% |
| 3.1.1_i [justice] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance of judicial officials: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Court decisions are well executed | | | | | | | | | 6% | 0% | 10% | 6% |
| | Decisions of courts are taken in a fair manner | | | | | | | | | 9% | 1% | 12% | 8% |
| | Justice is fast | | | | | | | | | 5% | 0% | 5% | 3% |
| | The courts treat people in a fair and equal manner | | | | | | | | | 11% | 0% | 15% | 9% |
| | Trials are fair | | | | | | | | | 8% | 0% | 12% | 7% |
| 3.1.1_i [police] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on police / PNC performance: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | It is possible to avoid arrest if one pays the police | | | | | | | | | 47% | 57% | 43% | 48% |
| | Police go unpunished (for crimes they commit) | | | | | | | | | 36% | 20% | 25% | 28% |
| | Police only work on case after payment of an incentive | | | | | | | | | 62% | 94% | 59% | 69% |
| 3.2_i | % of women and men indicating that national government represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 3% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 5% | 0% | 4% | 3% | 2% | 0% | 6% | 3% |
| | % of women and men indicating that provincial government represents the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 2% | 1% | 3% | 2% | 4% | 0% | 5% | 3% | 3% | 0% | 5% | 3% |
| | % of women and men indicating that territorial administration & 'la mairie' represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | 27% | 40% | 17% | 26% | 14% | 0% | 6% | 7% |
| | % of women and men indicating that local authorities represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | | 27% | 40% | 17% | 26% | 37% | 6% | 8% | 17% |
| 3.2.2_ii | % of women and men who indicate that they find it 'very' or 'extremely' acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes'). | 22% | 38% | 22% | 26% | 23% | 40% | 27% | 29% | 29% | 21% | 18% | 22% |

Table 10 : ISSSS Results Data, Ruzizi PZ, Pillars 4 and 5, June 2016 to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | | | July - December 2016 | | | | January - June 2017 | | | |
|---|---|--|---------|------------|-------|----------------------|---------|------------|-------|---------------------|---------|------------|-------|
| | | Ruzizi plain | Itombwe | Uvira city | Total | Ruzizi plain | Itombwe | Uvira city | Total | Ruzizi plain | Itombwe | Uvira city | Total |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience) | 4_1 | Average monthly HH Income | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4_ii | % of HH depending on traditional activities as main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, animal husbandry) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2_1_iv | % of women and men indicating they have "good" or "very good" access to markets | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2_2_ii | % of women and men declaring they have "good" or "very good" access to land | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2_3_i | % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.2.5_i: | % of women and men declaring to have had paid job for at least a week over #past 3 months | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.3_i | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 5_ii | % women and men reporting to have experienced physical or sexual violence in last 6 months | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5_iii | % of women and men who personally know a woman / man who was survivor ("victim") of sexual violence | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5.1_i | % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved in family, i.e., without involvement of authorities | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5.1_ii | % of women and men who "agree" that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat wife / spouse | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into community | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into household | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5.2_i | % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as result. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC / PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % of women and men who consider the access to health care services to survivors ("Victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5.3_3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to psychological support services to survivors ("Victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to reintegration services to survivors ("Victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 11: ISSSS Results Data, Ruzizi PZ - by gender, Pillars 1 and 2, June 2016 – June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | July - December 2016 | | January - June 2017 | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|--|---|-----|---------------------|-----|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Children | Total 2017 | | | |
| Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) | 1_iii | % women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | | 10% | 16% | 5% | 20% | 8% | 14% | | 11% | |
| | 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | | 9% | 24% | 13% | 26% | 6% | 6% | | 6% | |
| | 1.1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1% | 1% | | 1% | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_i (a) [JHRO] | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls*, boys* and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | 1 victim (s) | 4 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 5 victim (s) |
| | | | | Others | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | 1 victim (s) | 10 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) | 12 victim (s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | 2 victim (s) | 48 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 50 victim (s) |
| | | Forced Labour | | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 6 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 6 victim (s) | |
| | 2_i (b) [JHRO] | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls*, boys* and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) |
| | | | | Others | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 2 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 2 victim (s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | 1 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 2 victim (s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 7 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) | 8 victim (s) |
| | | Forced Labour | | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | |
| | 2_i (c) [JHRO] | # Human rights violations (HRV) perpetrated by State Agents (PNC, ARN,...) against women, girls, boys and men (in the territories containing the ISSSS priority zones) | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) |
| | | | | Others | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 1 victim (s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 2 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 2 victim (s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 13 victim (s) | 2 victim (s) | 15 victim (s) |
| | | Forced Labour | | | | | | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | 0 victim (s) | |
| | 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over past year | | | | | | 1% | 6% | | 4% | |
| | 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | | | | | | 3% | 11% | | 7% | |
| 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | | | | | | 53% | 41% | | 47% | | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | | | | | | 8% | 10% | | 9% | | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'lala salama' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6mths | | | | | | 2% | 17% | | 9% | | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men feeling "very secure" or "secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol. | | | | | | 26% | 56% | | 41% | | |
| 2.2.2_i | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | | 51% | 59% | 57% | 46% | 48% | 44% | | 46% | | |
| 2.2.2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by soldiers are ongoing | | | | | | 25% | 27% | | 26% | | |
| 2.2.2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for crimes) | | 32% | 49% | 45% | 27% | 32% | 34% | | 33% | | |

Table 12: ISSSS Results Data, Ruzizi PZ - by gender, Pillar 3, June 2016 – June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | July - December 2016 | | January - June 2017 | | | |
|---|--|--|-----|----------------------|-----|---------------------|-----|----------|------------|
| | | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Children | Total 2017 |
| Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority) | 3_i [central gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of central government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | |
| | | Combat corruption | | | | | | | |
| | | Combat sexual violence | | | | | | | |
| | | Create employment | | | | | | | |
| | | Ensure security | | | | | | | |
| | | Establishing peace in Eastern DRC | | | | | | | |
| | | Improve the lives of Congolese | | | | | | | |
| | | Reduce poverty | | | | | | | |
| | | Unify the different ethnic groups | | | | | | | |
| | 3_i [provincial gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of provincial government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | |
| | | Ensure security | | | | | | | |
| | | Improve the lives of Congolaise | | | | | | | |
| | | Prepare democratic elections | | | | | | | |
| | | Unify the different ethnic groups | | | | | | | |
| | 3_i [territorial gov.] | % of women and men assessing the performance of the territorial government / La Mairie as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | | | | | |
| | | Ensure security | | | | | | | |
| | | Improve the lives of Congolaise | | | | | | | |
| | | Prepare democratic elections | | | | | | | |
| | | Unify the different ethnic groups | | | | | | | |
| | 3.1_i | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to land administration services | | | | | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to national civil judicial system | | | | | | | |
| | 3.1.1_i [overall] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance | | | | | | | |
| | | State agents have the right skills to provide good services | | | | | | | |
| | | State agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way | | | | | | | |
| | | State agents work on case without payment of incentive | | | | | | | |
| | | State agents work on cases quickly / swiftly | | | | | | | |
| | 3.1.1_i [justice] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance of | | | | | | | |
| | | Court decisions are well executed | | | | | | | |
| | | Decisions of courts are taken in a fair manner | | | | | | | |
| | | Justice is fast | | | | | | | |
| | | The courts treat people in a fair and equal manner | | | | | | | |
| | | Trials are fair | | | | | | | |
| | Actors of the justice (system) are corrupt | | | | | | | | |
| 3.1.1_i [police] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on police / PNC | | | | | | | | |
| | It is possible to avoid arrest if one pays the police | | | | | | | | |
| | Police go unpunished (for crimes they commit) | | | | | | | | |
| | Police only work on case after payment of an incentive | | | | | | | | |
| | The police treats all ethnic groups in the same way | | | | | | | | |
| 3.2_i | % of women and men indicating that national government represent the interest of population 'well' or | | | | | | | | |
| | % of women and men indicating that provincial government represents the interest of population 'well' or | | | | | | | | |
| | % of women and men indicating that territorial administration & 'la mairie' represent the interest of | | | | | | | | |
| | % of women and men indicating that local authorities represent the interest of the population 'well' or | | | | | | | | |
| 3.2.2_ii | % of women and men who indicate that they find it "very" or "extremely" acceptable to pay 'official taxes' | | | | | | | | |

Table 13: ISSSS Results Data, Ruzizi PZ - by gender, Pillars 4 and 5, June 2016 – June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | January - June 2016 | | July - December 2016 | | January - June 2017 | | | | |
|--|---|--|-----|----------------------|-----|---------------------|-----|----------|------------|-----|
| | | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Children | Total 2017 | |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience) | 4_i | Average monthly HH Income | | | | | | | | |
| | 4_ii | % of HH depending on traditional activities as main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, animal | | | | 62% | 74% | | 68% | |
| | 4.2.1_iv | % of women and men indicating they have "good" or "very good" access to markets | | | | 24% | 13% | | 19% | |
| | 4.2.2_ii: | % of women and men declaring they have "good" or "very good" access to land | | | | 22% | 24% | | 23% | |
| | 4.2.3_i | % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required | | | | 8% | 10% | | 9% | |
| | 4.2.5_j: | % of women and men declaring to have had paid job for at least a week over #past 3 months | | | | | | | | |
| | 4.3_i | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with | | | | 80% | 82% | | 81% | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | | | | 81% | 83% | | 82% | |
| % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with | | | | 77% | 83% | | 80% | | | |
| % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | | | | 86% | 88% | | 87% | | | |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 5_ii | % women and men reporting to have experienced physical or sexual violence in last 6 months | | | | 1% | 1% | | 1% | |
| | 5_iii | % of women and men who personally know a woman / man who was survivor ("victim") of sexual | | | | 1% | 3% | | 2% | |
| | 5.1_i | % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside | | 42% | 56% | 63% | 81% | 76% | 72% | 74% |
| | | % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved 'in family', i.e., without | | | | | | 27% | 27% | 27% |
| | | % of women and men who "agree" that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat wife / spouse | | | | | | 9% | 19% | 14% |
| | 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence | | | | | | 83% | 86% | 85% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into community | | | | | | 90% | 95% | 93% |
| | | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into household | | | | | | 86% | 91% | 89% |
| | | % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as result. | | 83% | 78% | 87% | 71% | 83% | 80% | 82% |
| | 5.2_i | % of women and men who 'agree' that FARDC / PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual | | | | | | 22% | 42% | 32% |
| 5.3.3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to health care services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | 17% | 15% | 16% | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to psychological support services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | 7% | 11% | 9% | |
| | % of women and men who consider the access to reintegration services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | | | | | 5% | 11% | 8% | |

4 Conclusion - Observations and possible considerations

The analysis, the conclusions, the observations and the recommendations presented in this section of the report were developed by the M&E Cell, based on the available data provided by the various sources.

Observations – Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

The population's negative perception of peace has not changed in the Ruzizi PZ since the baseline study: 1 in 10 people report that their village/neighbourhood is “very” or “extremely peaceful” (**Indicator 1_iii**). A peculiarity has been observed around Itombwe where less than one in 10 people think their village is “a little peaceful”, while almost the entire population in the sub-zone thinks that its villages are “not peaceful at all”. This situation coincides with the security context of the Itombwe sector sub-zone, which is characterized by the resurgence of armed groups and local self-defence committees. According to the analyses carried out during the second phase of the STAREC/ISSSS workshop of 15-17 July 2014, the presence of the state in this sector is particularly weak, and its ability to respond to security challenges is insufficient. As a result, the circulation of small arms and light weapons, as well as trafficking of all kinds, have both flourished².

The hope of finding peace in the villages of the PZ has decreased among the population. We note a reduction in the proportion of women and men (less than 1 in 10 versus 1 in 5 in the baseline study) who expect their villages/neighbourhoods to become “very” or “much more peaceful” in a year's time (**Indicator 1_iv**). This perception coincides with the fact that the necessary arrangements for the implementation of the December 31 agreement on the conduct of the transition and on the holding of credible elections in DRC have not been implemented.

The population's confidence in the ability of peacebuilding projects to address the most relevant issues in the area (**Indicator 1.1_iii**) has decreased somewhat. No interviewee (whether woman or man) in the Itombwe sector and in Uvira city currently believes in the capacity of peace projects to address the problems of their area, while a negative variation of 11 points is observed around the Ruzizi Plain (**Indicator 1.1_iii**).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 1

The worsening of opinions regarding peace projects' ability to address the most relevant issues in the zone increases the pressure for projects to rapidly take concrete action to convince a largely sceptical population of their added value. The longer the action on the ground takes to materialise, the more the population will doubt its added value.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 1

The dramatic situation in the Itombwe sub-zone - which remains characterized by the lack of peace and a particularly low level of confidence in the Government's (provincial and national) capacity to respond to security challenges - demands that partners intervening in the field of peace provide a specific

² https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/starec-uas-rapport_court-atelier_sur_lidentification_et_la_priorisation_des_zone_de_stabilisation_final.pdf

response. It may be useful to continue to involve active partners in the sub-zone in the more precise identification of specific conflict factors, and to ensure that they are sufficiently integrated within the framework of the ISSSS interventions' implementation.

Observations – Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

Overall, the perception of the population on the FARDC's performance in terms of Protection of Civilians (PoC) has not changed significantly since the baseline study. Confidence and cohesion between the population and the FARDC still seem to reign in the Ruzizi PZ: almost the entire population says it has never been the victim of violence/crimes/misconduct by FARDC members (**Indicator 2_ii**). About half of the people trust the FARDC to provide security in their villages/neighbourhoods (**Indicator 2_iii**) and say they feel "very safe" or "safe" when meeting a patrol of the FARDC (**Indicator 2.2**). However, women are less confident about their effectiveness: almost 3 in 10 women, against almost 6 in 10 men, feel safe when encountering one of these patrols. The presence of the FARDC and their operational capabilities also appear to be limited in terms of PoC: only 1 in 10 people believes that the FARDC make a "significant" or "very significant" contribution to its security (**Indicator 2_iii a**).

Cases of human rights violations perpetrated by the FARDC predominantly target men: out of the total of 38 cases reported in the PZ, only 1 concerned a woman (**Indicator 2_i b**)³. This may explain a higher level of confidence among women towards the FARDC's ability to ensure the safety of their villages (5 out of 10 women versus 4 out of 10 men).

On the other hand, the perception of the population on the effectiveness of FARDC efforts in terms of accountability for the prevention of crimes perpetrated by its members has decreased. 4 people out of 10 agreed that these efforts were effective in the baseline study, compared to less than a third of the population in the first half of 2017 (**Indicator 2.2.2_ii**).

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 2

In order to correctly interpret the results related to Pillar 2 in the Ruzizi PZ, it will be important to better understand the specific context that defines the relationship between the FARDC and the civilian population, and the relevance of the approach used for the response of programming under this pillar in the PZ. This includes the need to monitor the particular situation in the Itombwe sub-zone, including the actual effectiveness and coverage of the FARDC's deployment on the ground.

However, in order to assess the effective performance of the FARDC in terms of PoC, additional information is needed on the constitution and motivation of the FARDC corps, and on behaviour changes in terms of PoC. Therefore, projects are strongly encouraged to contribute to the ISSSS M&E system in order to fill this current gap in the data and allow for more in-depth analysis in future reports.

³ Source: Joint Office for Human Rights (JHRO)

Observations – Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

The level of government performance at the central, provincial and territorial levels remains very low, as was the case at the time of the baseline study. Fewer than 1 in 10 people think that the actions of the state (at the central and provincial levels) and of the territorial administrations effectively manage key aspects, such as reducing corruption, fighting against sexual violence, creating jobs, improving the lives of the population, and reducing poverty (**Indicator 3.1_i**).

A small percentage of men and women appreciate the actions of the different levels of government in relation to the cohesion between ethnic groups. Another peculiarity of the Itombwe sector is that less than 1 in 10 people appreciate the actions of the Government, in all fields.

Access to state services has not changed. Almost 2 people out of 10 say they have access to state administrative services, and 1 in 10 has access to the justice system. There is a significant difference between the sub-zones: the Itombwe sector stands out, with an average of only 2% of men and women who have access to state services. This raises the question of the state's presence there (**Indicator 3.1_i**).

Less than one-third of the population attests that the state agents are efficient in the provision of quality services. The same portion of the population thinks that these agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way. The quality of services provided by public servants is less popular among women (7 out of 10, compared to 5 out of 10 men) (**Indicator 3.1.1_i**).

Trust in the justice system is weak. Fewer than one in ten people “agree” or “strongly agree” that justice decisions are made on time and fairly, and that they are well executed. On the other hand, almost half of the population thinks that justice actors and the justice system itself are corrupt, and this is particularly true for men: more than 2 thirds of men, for about 1 third of women share this opinion.

The population does not seem to appreciate the performance of the police in the provision of its services: more than 2 thirds of the population think that the PNC only works on a case if it is paid. This is particularly pronounced in the Itombwe area, where almost the entire population has this perception.

Public mistrust of provincial and national representatives has not changed: as in the baseline study, less than one in 10 people think that the provincial and national governments represent their interests well⁴.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 3

The question arises as to the presence of the State in certain areas, particularly that of the Itombwe sector. Even in areas where there is a relative presence of the state, its effectiveness in managing key societal issues is challenged by the population. Given this situation, the current projects (FCS and aligned) do not cover either Intermediate Outcome 3.1.3 or Overall Outcome 3.3, which aim at increasing the availability of financial resources and promoting the development of a coherent regulatory, legal and administrative framework that can foster local governance. This does not facilitate the restoration of the State's regular functions in the PZ.

⁴ The phrasing of those indicators that measure the level of trust among populations towards the different administrative levels has changed slightly since the baseline study (June-December 2016 data) and the present reporting period (January-June 2017). The original phrasing was: “In your opinion, how do representatives at the national level represent the population’s interests and opinions?” Now, the indicator asks: “In your opinion, how does the central government represent the population’s interests and opinions?” The M&E Cell continues to compare these indicators, but a certain error margin inevitably appears.

In any case, the issues related to the deployment and care of state agents remain a major challenge to the restoration of state authority in the Ruzizi PZ.

Observations – Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

From an economic point of view, the majority of the population is poor, and only 5% of households have an average income of between 151 and 300 USD. There is a slight increase in the share of the population that relies on traditional activities. It is therefore important to question the relevance of encouraging the diversification of income sources in programming in this PZ

It is noted that the city of Uvira differs from this trend: only 1/3 of the population depends on traditional activities. Being a city, it is natural that the sources of income are more diversified: apart from agriculture, 1 in 10 people are in the small trade and livestock, while the others carry out intellectual work (NGO, Public Administration, etc.).

Agriculture seems to interest the majority of the population, half of whom make agriculture their main activity. On the other hand, access to land has decreased: only 2 out of 10 people (compared to 3 out of 10 in the baseline study) currently have access to land (**Indicator 4.2.2_ii**).

Market access (**Indicator 4.2.1_iv**) has also declined since the baseline study, and currently fewer than 2 in 10 people have good or very good market access. Women seem to have easier access to markets than men: 2 out of 10 (against 1 in 10 men) think their access to land is good. For its part, access to credit has not changed: less than 1 out of 10 people has access to credit (**Indicator 4.2.3_i**).

Social cohesion seems to be increasing overall: 4 out of 5 people in this reporting period attest that people in their area often work or sometimes with members of other ethnic groups, compared with half of the population in the previous semester. (**Indicator 4.3_i**). This is particularly notable in the Itombwe sub-zone, where 100% of women and men currently report working “often” or “occasionally” with members of other ethnic groups”. This change is all the more surprising given that it has occurred in a relatively short period of time (6 months), and this development will be closely monitored in the next report.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 4

How to explain a reduction of access to land in an agricultural zone? Were these lands expropriated or was part of the population oriented towards diversifying the sources of income? How has access to the market so significantly diminished in the Itombwe and Uvira sub-zones? What are the factors that can explain the strengthening of social cohesion in the Ruzizi Plain PZ?

The explanation of the dramatic changes in the opinions of the population since the baseline study can not be given in this report with the data available today. Indeed, the project data that will be collected during their implementation, as well as the follow-up of trends in the next report, will provide more details to enable us to confirm or explain this change.

Observations – Pillar 5 (SGBV Prevention)⁵

People's perceptions of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) have not changed since the baseline study. SGBV does not appear to be particularly prevalent in this area. More than 2/3 of the population say that consent is always required in a sexual relationship, including in marriage (**Indicator 5.1_i**). The rate of reported SGBV cases has not changed since the baseline study: almost no one reported having experienced physical or sexual violence in the last 6 months, and a small section of the population personally knows a victim/survivor of sexual violence.

Access to psychosocial care services seems to be lacking in this area. Very few people consider that access to psychological support services for victims/survivors of SGBV in their village is “good” or “very good”.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 5

Data on SGBV prevalence and on contributing factors do not allow us to judge whether programmatic coverage under Pillar 5 is adequate, or whether more projects should be put in place to help prevent and respond to SGBV cases in the ZP. It may be necessary to revisit this issue further in future monitoring reports and to engage implementing partners in this discussion.

⁵ It is not possible to estimate the total number of incidents of sexual violence in the priority zones, as it is unlikely that any of the available data sets offer a comprehensive tally. Assuming however that any flaws in the data affect all data collection across all geographic zones, however, the data sets can offer some insight into relative magnitude of the problem across geographic areas.

Annex V– Kalehe Priority Zone, South-Kivu Province

List of Acronyms

| CPLUP | Community-Based Participatory Land Use Planning |
|----------|--|
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| ETD | <i>Entités Territoriales Décentralisées</i> (Local Entities) |
| FARDC | <i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i> (DRC Armed Forces) |
| FCS | <i>Fonds de Cohérence pour la Stabilisation</i> (Stabilisation Coherence Fund) |
| HR | Human Right(s) |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| I.O. | Intermediate Outcome |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| ISSSS | International Stabilization and Security Support Strategy |
| JHRO | Joint Human Right Office |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| M&E Cell | Monitoring and Evaluation Cell (of the SSU) |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC |
| O.O. | Overall Outcome |
| PNC | <i>Police Nationale Congolaise</i> (Congolese National Police) |
| PoC | Protection of civilians |
| PZ | Priority Zone |
| SFCG | Search For Common Ground |
| SGBV | Sexual and Gender Based Violence |
| S.O. | Specific Objective |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform (<i>Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika</i>) |
| SSU | Stabilisation Support Unit |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

1 Introduction to Annex V – Kalehe (South-Kivu Province)

This annex presents a projection of the ISSSS programming in the Kalehe priority zone (PZ) for the first half of 2017. It provides the mapping of harmonised projects that are either currently implemented or still “in the pipeline” (for example, in their preliminary phase, or in the final stages of their design phase), but slated for implementation in the foreseeable future.

Since the first semester of 2017 is the first period for which complete sets of monitoring data were available, this annex effectively constitutes a brief baseline report of the ISSSS in the Kalehe PZ, which means that the data presented here will serve as reference to which data collected in the future will be compared.

This annex provides a set of preliminary and provisional observations regarding progress in the ISSSS programming in the Kalehe PZ. It is however important to underline that these observations are meant to help and inform stakeholders to pursue the debate about trends and programming options in the PZ. They are therefore by no means intended to be definitive, final or accepted at face value. Questioning, revising and refining this report’s observations in the course of this debate is very much an intended part of the monitoring and learning process within the SSU M&E Cell.

2 Status of ISSSS programming – Kalehe PZ (South-Kivu Province)

This section of the report provides an overview of the status of ISSSS programming in the Kalehe PZ. Specifically, this section provides:

- a **brief description of the different programmes and interventions** that are currently being implemented in the Kalehe PZ in association with the ISSSS, i.e. those that are either financed through the Stabilisation Coherence Fund (FCS) or through bi-lateral funding arrangements (*aligned programmes*);
- an overview of how these **interventions cover the result elements of the ISSSS across its five thematic pillars**, and some tentative observations on the degree to which all necessary elements are being addressed;
- a slightly more in-depth view of the **pillar-specific status of ISSSS programming**, based on the status of ISSSS projects from January to June 2017, as well as some additional thoughts on implications for the implementation of the strategy in the months to come.

Overview of ISSSS interventions in Kalehe

Table 1 below lists the projects that are currently being implemented or are set to start implementation in the coming months under the umbrella of the ISSSS in the Kalehe PZ. For each one, the table provides information on the respective lead organisations, the expected implementation period and the thematic focus.

Table 1: Overview of interventions associated with the ISSSS (aligned and FCS) in Kalehe

| Type | Title (Lead Organisation) | Implementation Period | Thematic Focuses |
|---------|---|------------------------------------|--|
| FCS | <i>Projet de consolidation du projet intégré du Nord-Kalehe (UNDP)</i> | Planned for June 2017 to June 2018 | Support to the stabilisation process, improved performance of government agents in the provision of services, and strengthening of social cohesion and resilience of communities through the social reintegration of vulnerable groups and economic recovery. |
| Aligned | <i>Inawezekana (ARC/ZOA)</i> | Ongoing (ending in 2021) | Increased inclusive participation of the population in decision-making and conflict resolution at the community level, increased inclusivity and transparency of governance by traditional authorities, security institutions, and local, provincial and national governments, inclusion of young people and creation of sustainable and attractive economic opportunities for young people, women and vulnerable groups |
| | Community Participatory Land Use planning (CPLUP) in North-Kivu, South-Kivu and Ituri (UNHABITAT) | Ongoing (ending in 2018) | Reduction of land conflicts in selected conflict-affected areas through an integrated approach to land-use planning and management based on ownership and participation of various stakeholders and key actors |

The overall project landscape in Kalehe

Taken together, the projects mentioned in Table 2 below are set to address all five substantive pillars of the ISSSS in the Kalehe PZ, albeit at differing degrees of intensity:

- Presently, project coverage of Pillars 1 (Democratic Dialogue), 3 (Restoration of State Authority), and 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict) **is relatively advanced**, in that more than half of each of these pillars' results components are covered by at least one project.
- Project coverage for Pillars 2 (FARDC performance in Protection of Civilians), and 5 (Fight against SGBV) **is still developing**. Less than half of the results components of each of these pillars are currently targeted by at least one project.

Table 2 below provides an overview of the programming status of the five thematic ISSSS pillars in Kalehe.

Table 2: Overview of programming status across all ISSSS Pillars, Kalehe PZ (South-Kivu Province), July 2017

| Pillar | Intended Contribution to implementation of ISSSS | Coverage of ISSSS results framework ¹ |
|----------|---|--|
| Pillar 1 | Create a participatory and inclusive (democratic) dialogue to ensure a political and community-based transformation process of the targeted conflicts. | Advanced |
| Pillar 2 | Improve the performance of the FARDC in civilian protection, and community – FARDC relations | Developing |
| Pillar 3 | Increase the (beneficial) role and presence of the Congolese state (in particular the local authorities) in the Priority Zones. | Advanced |
| Pillar 4 | Increase the equitable resource flow to and coherence among at risk populations (women and men, girls and boys), including in particular, IDPs and returnees. | Advanced |
| Pillar 5 | Ensure that security sector reforms (covered by both Pillars 2 and 3) and local state capacity building (Pillar 3) sufficiently emphasize combating sexual and gender based violence as a symptom and driver of conflict in the Priority Zones. | Developing |

Programming for Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

With regard to Table 3 below, ISSSS programming under Pillar 1 is fundamentally aimed at developing and implementing participatory and inclusive monitoring mechanisms for the development of joint and gender-sensitive action plans at the community level.

In their original version, none of the projects supported the creation of provincially feasible compacts (as conducted by the SSU as part of its good offices responsibilities); or the continued engagement of national authorities in their implementation. The focus was essentially on community-level activities and consensus-building, rather than on encouraging legislative or policy action by the government. However, thanks to the good offices of the SSU, the implementing partners obtained the government's commitment in the provincial stabilisation processes through the validation of the *Pact for South-Kivu* last June. This compact contains important agreements with provincial authorities on aspects related to:

- Road maintenance, access to territory, illegal taxation, deployment of state agents, coordination of stabilisation activities and support for STAREC

¹ **Complete:** All result elements of the ISSSS are addressed by projects; **Advanced:** Most result elements are addressed by projects; **Developing:** A minority of result elements are addressed by projects; **None:** No results elements of the Pillar are addressed by projects.

- Support for the international community’s stabilisation activities, including donors and the MONUSCO
- Supervision and control (quarterly) of the implementation of the commitments, in particular regarding the ISSSS programmes in the Kalehe and the Ruzizi priority zones.

The table provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 1 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 3: The ISSSS program landscape in the Kalehe PZ, Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---|
| S.O. 1 | Support for the ISSSS at community level | |
| O.O. 1.1 | Local stabilisation processes aligned with community priorities | (FCS) UNDP (A) ARC, (A) CPLUP ² |
| I.O. 1.1.1 | Joint action plans developed and approved by communities | (FCS) UNDP (A) ARC, (A) CPLUP |
| I.O. 1.1.2 | Joint action plans compiled into Sector Compacts | Not covered |
| I.O. 1.1.3 | National authorities commit to & act upon Sector Compacts | Not covered |
| O.O. 1.2 | Local groups support stabilisation process | (FCS) UNDP (A) CPLUP |
| I.O. 1.2.1 | Oversight mechanisms of stabilisation process set-up and functioning; | (FCS) UNDP (A) CPLUP, (A) ARC |

Programming for Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

No programme currently intervenes in the Kalehe PZ under Pillar 2 of the ISSSS.

Programming for Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

As can be noted in Table 4 below, ISSSS programming for Pillar 3 in the Kalehe PZ covers most of the results. It focusses on all the following sectors: access to services, performance of state agents, availability of infrastructure, establishment of local participatory supervision and planning structures, and improvement of state agents’ awareness, in order to increase the beneficial role of the Congolese state in local governance.

However, some Outcomes are not yet covered in the Kalehe PZ, such as: the need for major allocations from the national level to the ETDs to finance the extension of the public services provided (Intermediate Outcome **I.O. 3.1.3**); the presence of a supportive and consistent regulatory/ legal framework for governance in the PZ (Overall Outcome **O.O. 3.3**); and the capitalization of legal experiences and financial requirements to enhance both the presence and the beneficial role of the state in the area.

Several factors in the ISSSS risk matrix may affect work under Pillar 3. In particular, the current national political context (centralization of power, obstructionism and lack of reforms, including in financial areas such as the issue of the pay) is likely to hinder and counteract the work of projects.

² The CLUP programme is aligned to the ISSSS, but does not currently share its data for internal reasons.

The table here below provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 3 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 4: The ISSSS program landscape in Kalehe, Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority)

| Objective / outcome | | Associated project / programmes |
|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| O.S. 3 | Increased beneficial role and presence of "regular" Congolese State in local governance | |
| O.O. 3.1 | Improved access to relevant state-provided services | (FCS) UNDP (A) CPLUP |
| I.O. 3.1.1 | Improved performance of state agents in service delivery | (FCS) UNDP (A) ARC |
| I.O. 3.1.2 | Improved availability/access to physical infrastructure and other assets for service delivery | (FCS) UNDP |
| O.O. 3.1.3 | Improved availability of financial resources for service delivery | Not Covered |
| O.O. 3.2 | Improved accountability and responsiveness of state institutions | (FCS) UNDP (A) ARC, CPLUP |
| I.O. 3.2.1 | Local, participatory oversight and planning structures established; functioning | (FCS) UNDP |
| I.O. 3.2.2 | Local population & civil society acting on responsibilities and rights vis-a-vis local authorities | (FCS) UNDP |
| I.O. 3.2.3 | Awareness of state agents of their formal duties and responsibilities (including no corruption) | (FCS) UNDP Consortium |
| O.O. 3.3 | Enabling, coherent regulatory/legal framework for local governance in place | Not Covered |
| I.O. 3.3.1 | Local authorities/ETD prepared for devolution and financial retrocession | (FCS) UNDP |
| I.O. 3.3.2 | Division of responsibilities between formal and traditional authorities codified | (FCS) UNDP |
| I.O. 3.3.3 | Lessons for increased local State presence acted on by national authorities | Not Covered |

Programming for Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

In Table 5 below, programming under Pillar 4 in Kalehe covers most of the components of the associated results: improved economic conditions for long-term economic development and stabilisation (**O.O. 4.2**); specific assistance to improve access to land (reduced land conflicts, better access to land governance, land-use planning). The ISSSS programme also provides support for strengthening social bonds and social coherence within communities (**O.O. 4.3**).

Among the results that are currently not covered, we can mention the creation of paid jobs, linked to the long-term stabilisation of local economies (**I.O. 4.2.5**) and the psychosocial care of vulnerable groups (**I.O. 4.3.1**).

Political instability and the resurgence of armed groups in this area pose a major risk to the success of Pillar 4 interventions in the Kalehe PZ.

The table below provides an overview of the current coverage and of the expected contributions by projects to the overall and intermediate outcomes (O.O. and I.O.) under Pillar 4 of the ISSSS logframe.

Table 5: The ISSSS program landscape in Kalehe, Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to Conflict)

| Objective / outcome | Associated project / |
|---------------------|----------------------|
|---------------------|----------------------|

| | | programmes |
|------------------|--|------------------------------|
| O.S. 4 | Equitable resource flow (income earning & economic opportunities; socio-economic support) | |
| O.O. 4.1 | Increased participation in employment schemes and short-term income stabilisation | (FCS) UNDP (A) ARC |
| I.O. 4.1.1 | Improved availability of livelihood and start-up grants and cash-for-work | (FCS) UNDP |
| I.O. 4.1.2 | Improved access to services | (FCS) UNDP (A) CPLUP |
| O.O. 4.2 | Improved (enabling) conditions for local economic recovery | (FCS) UNDP |
| I.O. 4.2.1 | Increased sustained access to markets | (FCS) UNDP |
| I.O. 4.2.2 | Improved and secure access to land, natural resources | (FCS) UNDP (A) CPLUP, ARC |
| I.O. 4.2.3 | Improved access to credit (all groups) | (FCS) UNDP (A) ARC |
| I.O. 4.2.4 | Improved access to training opportunities | (A) ARC |
| I.O. 4.2.5 | Improved access to wage employment | Not Covered |
| O.O. 4.3. | Social linkages within and between communities strengthened | (FCS) UNDP (A) ARC |
| I.O. 4.3.1 | Psycho-social needs of vulnerable or marginalized groups in community addressed | Not Covered |
| I.O. 4.3.2 | Inter- and intra-community trust increased | (FCS) UNDP (A) ARC |

Programming for Pillar 5 (Fight Against SGBV)

No programme currently intervenes in the Kalehe PZ under Pillar 5 of the ISSSS.

3 ISSSS Results Data – Kalehe PZ

This section of the report contains a summary data sheet for those indicators of the ISSSS logframe for which data were available during this first monitoring phase for the Kalehe PZ.

The population samples for the perception data were established at the PZ level, which means the data are statistically representative of the zone’s population (not limited to the beneficiaries or the respondents). In this process, the Buhavu chefferie was divided into 2 sub-zones “High Plateau” and “Littoral”.

The data sheet contains data from the Joint Human Rights Office (JHRO), which refer to the territory of Kalehe, where the two sub-zones of the Kalehe PZ are located. Please note that the underage victims’ gender is not recorded in JHRO data. Minors are therefore only included in the overall, total number of victims.

The following section contains a presentation and global analysis of selected data, which underline the global trends and main changes observed in the data between the two reporting periods. The M&E Cell intends to publish a quarterly report called “Stabilisation Spotlights”, which will provide more detailed analyses of certain questions raised in the present report (interested ISSSS stakeholders are invited to contact the M&E Cell and submit their requests).

Table 6: ISSSS Results Data, Kalehe, Pillars 1 and 2, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (short) | January-June 2017 | | | |
|--|---|--|--|---|---------------|
| | | Kalehe High-Plateau | Kalehe Littoral | | |
| Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) | 1_iii | % women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | 6% | 29% | |
| | 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | 36% | 42% | |
| | 1.1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | 1% | 7% | |
| | 2_i (a) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men. | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | |
| | 2_i (b) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men. | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | |
| | 2_i (c) (ITEM) | # of reported incidents in Priority Zone locations perpetrated by unknown perpetrators against women, girls, boys and | 0 incident(s) | 0 incident(s) | |
| | 2_i (a) (JHRO)* | # of reported incidents perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones)*. | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 1 incident(s) |
| | | | | Others | 0 incident(s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity (incl. rape) | Sexual violence | 1 incident(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 2 incident(s) |
| Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | | | 4 incident(s) | |
| Property | | | | 6 incident(s) | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_i (b) (JHRO)* | # of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones)*. | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 0 incident(s) |
| | | | | Others | 0 incident(s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 1 incident(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 0 incident(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | 1 incident(s) |
| | | | Property | | 1 incident(s) |
| | 2_i (c) (JHRO) | # Human right violations (HRV) perpetrated by State Agents (PNC, ARM,...) against women, girls, boys and men (in the territories containing the ISSSS priority zones)*. | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 0 incident(s) |
| | | | | Others | 0 incident(s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 0 incident(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 0 incident(s) |
| | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | | 2 incident(s) | | |
| | Property | | 1 incident(s) | | |
| | Forced Labour | | 0 incident(s) | | |
| 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over past year | 1% | 1% | | |
| 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | 2% | 3% | | |
| 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | 21% | 63% | | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | 0% | 9% | | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'lala salama' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6mths | 0% | 2% | | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men who feel "secure" or "very secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol | 46% | 47% | | |
| 2.2.2_i | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | 36% | 49% | | |
| 2.2.2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by soldiers are ongoing | 38% | 29% | | |
| 2.2.2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for crimes) | 86% | 71% | | |

Table 7: ISSSS Results Data, Kalehe, Pillar 3, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (short) | January-June 2017 | | |
|---|--|--|-----------------|-----|
| | | Kalehe High-Plateau | Kalehe Littoral | |
| Pillar 3 : (Restoration of State authority) | 3_i [central gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of central government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | |
| | | Combat corruption | 0% | 1% |
| | | Combat sexual violence | 12% | 24% |
| | | Create employment | 0% | 1% |
| | | Ensure security | 1% | 3% |
| | | Establishing peace in Eastern DRC | 1% | 5% |
| | | Improve the lives of Congolese | 0% | 1% |
| | | Reduce poverty | 0% | 3% |
| | | Unify the different ethnic groups | 16% | 7% |
| | 3_i [provincial gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of provincial government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | |
| | | Ensure security | 0% | 3% |
| | | Improve the lives of Congolaise | 0% | 1% |
| | | Prepare democratic elections | 2% | 0% |
| | | Unify the different ethnic groups | 22% | 10% |
| | 3_i [territorial gov.] | % of women and men assessing the performance of the territorial government / La Mairie as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | |
| | | Ensure security | 1% | 17% |
| | | Improve the lives of Congolaise | 1% | 13% |
| | | Prepare democratic elections | 2% | 9% |
| | | Unify the different ethnic groups | 35% | 35% |
| | 3.1_i | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of Congolese State (état civil) | 2% | 23% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to land administration services of the Congolese State | 1% | 18% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to national civil judicial system | 0% | 12% |
| | 3.1.1_i [overall] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance on state agents: | | |
| | | State agents have the right skills to provide good services | 46% | 68% |
| | | State agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way | 58% | 29% |
| | | State agents work on case without payment of incentive | 32% | 17% |
| | | State agents work on cases quickly / swiftly | 37% | 23% |
| | 3.1.1_i [justice] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance of judicial officials: | | |
| | | Court decisions are well executed | 14% | 6% |
| | | Decisions of courts are taken in a fair manner | 29% | 6% |
| | | Justice is fast | 4% | 6% |
| | | The courts treat people in a fair and equal manner | 32% | 6% |
| | | Trials are fair | 32% | 6% |
| | Actors of the justice (system) are corrupt | 93% | 85% | |
| 3.1.1_i [police] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on police / PNC performance: | | | |
| | It is possible to avoid arrest if one pays the police | 93% | 83% | |
| | Police go unpunished (for crimes they commit) | 77% | 65% | |
| | Police only work on case after payment of an incentive | 96% | 79% | |
| | The police treats all ethnic groups in the same way | 78% | 52% | |
| 3.2_i | % of women and men indicating that national government represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 0% | 2% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that provincial government represents the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 0% | 3% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that territorial administration & 'la mairie' represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | 4% | 37% | |
| | % of women and men indicating that local authorities represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well' | 24% | 46% | |
| 3.2.2_ii | % of women and men who indicate that they find it 'very' or 'extremely' acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes'). | 12% | 36% | |

Table 8: ISSSS Results Data, Kalehe, Pillars 4 and 5, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (short) | January-June 2017 | |
|--|---|--|-----------------|
| | | Kalehe High-Plateau | Kalehe Littoral |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to conflict) | 4_i | Average monthly HH Income | |
| | 4_ii | % of HH depending on traditional activities as main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, animal husbandry) | |
| | 4.2.1_iv | 87% | 84% |
| | 4.2.2_iv | 2% | 27% |
| | 4.2.2_ii: | % of women and men declaring they have "good" or "very good" access to markets | |
| | 4.2.3_i | 17% | 53% |
| | 4.2.3_i | % of women and men who indicate to have access to credit, if required | |
| | 4.2.5_i: | 5% | 11% |
| | 4.2.5_i: | % of women and men declaring to have had paid job for at least a week over #past 3 months | |
| | 4.3_i | 5% | 13% |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 4.3_i | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other | |
| | | 74% | 91% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | |
| | | 87% | 94% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other | |
| | | 88% | 94% |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | |
| | | 92% | 97% |
| | 5_ii | % women and men reporting to have experienced physical or sexual violence in last 6 months | |
| | 5_iii | 0% | 0% |
| 5.1_i | % of women and men who personally know a woman / man who was survivor ("victim") of sexual violence | | |
| 5.1_i | 1% | 6% | |
| 5.1_i | % of women and men believing that consent for sexual activity is always necessary (including inside marriage) | | |
| 5.1_i | 67% | 90% | |
| 5.1_i | % of women and men believing that crimes of sexual violence should be resolved in family, i.e., without involvement of authorities | | |
| 5.1_i | 18% | 29% | |
| 5.1_i | % of women and men who "agree" that it is sometimes acceptable for a man to beat wife / spouse | | |
| 5.1_i | 26% | 21% | |
| 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept back in to their household a survivor of sexual violence who has a child as a result of the violence | | |
| 5.1_ii | 68% | 83% | |
| 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into community | | |
| 5.1_ii | 99% | 100% | |
| 5.1_ii | % of women and men reporting they would accept survivor of sexual violence back into household | | |
| 5.1_ii | 98% | 100% | |
| 5.1_ii | % of women and men who would accept back into their household a survivor of sexual violence who had contracted a disease or suffered an injury as result. | | |
| 5.1_ii | 64% | 83% | |
| 5.2_i | % of women and men who "agree" that FARDC / PNC are punished appropriately if they commit sexual violence | | |
| 5.2_i | 43% | 36% | |
| 5.3.3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to health care services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | |
| 5.3.3_v | 8% | 27% | |
| 5.3.3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to psychological support services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | |
| 5.3.3_v | 3% | 22% | |
| 5.3.3_v | % of women and men who consider the access to reintegration services to survivors ("victims") of sexual violence in their village to be "good" or "very good" | | |
| 5.3.3_v | 3% | 20% | |

Table 9: ISSSS Results Data, Kalehe - by gender, Pillars 1 and 2, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | Gender | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|--|---|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | Women | Men | Children | Grand Total | | | |
| Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue) | 1_iii | % women and men stating their villages / neighborhoods are "very" or "extremely" peaceful | | 9% | 25% | | | |
| | 1_iv | % of women and men expecting their village / neighborhood to be more peaceful in one year | | 65% | 13% | | | |
| | 1.1_iii | % of men & women stating that peace projects are "very good" or "extremely good" at addressing most important issues in their area | | 3% | 5% | | | |
| Pillar 2 (Security) | 2_i (a) (JHRO)* | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by Armed Groups against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 0 victim(s) | 2 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 2 victim(s) |
| | | | | Others | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity (incl. rape) | Sexual violence | 1 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 0 victim(s) | 2 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 2 victim(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | 1 victim(s) | 10 victim(s) | 2 victim(s) | 13 victim(s) | |
| | Forced Labour | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | | | |
| | 2_i (b) (JHRO)* | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by FARDC against women, girls, boys and men (in territories containing the ISSSS priority zones). | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) |
| | | | | Others | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 1 victim(s) | 1 victim(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | 0 victim(s) | 1 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 1 victim(s) | |
| | Forced Labour | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | | | |
| | 2_i (c) (JHRO) | # of victims of reported incidents perpetrated by State Agents (PNC, ARN,...) against women, girls, boys and men (in the territories containing the ISSSS priority zones) | Right to Life | Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) |
| | | | | Others | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) |
| | | | Bodily Integrity | Sexual violence | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) |
| | | | | Torture & cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) |
| | | | Liberty and Security (incl. arbitrary detention) | 0 victim(s) | 11 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 11 victim(s) | |
| | Forced Labour | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | 0 victim(s) | | | |
| | 2_ii | % women and men reporting to have been victim of misconduct by FARDC over past year | | 1% | 1% | | | |
| | 2_ii (a) | % of women and men who have been helped by FARDC over the past year. | | 2% | 3% | | | |
| | 2_iii | % women and men who have confidence in FARDC to ensure safety in their neighborhood or village | | 38% | 46% | | | |
| 2_iii (a) | % of women and men who think the FARDC makes a "big" or "very big" contribution to their security | | 3% | 6% | | | | |
| 2.1_iii | % women and men who paid 'lala salama' / security contributions to FARDC in the past 6mths | | 2% | 0% | | | | |
| 2.2 | % of women and men feeling "very secure" or "secure" when encountering an FARDC patrol. | | 44% | 49% | | | | |
| 2.2.2_i | % of women and men who agree that victims of crimes by FARDC have opportunity to complain. | | 65% | 20% | | | | |
| 2.2.2_ii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC accountability efforts for crimes by soldiers are ongoing | | 46% | 22% | | | | |
| 2.2.2_iii | % of women and men who agree that FARDC are 'unpunished' (for crimes) | | 76% | 81% | | | | |

Table 10: ISSSS Results Data, Kalehe - by gender, Pillar 3, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | Gender | | | |
|---|--|--|-----|----------|-------------|
| | | Women | Men | Children | Grand Total |
| Pillar 3 (Restoration of State Authority) | 3_i [central gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of central government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | |
| | Combat corruption | 0% | 0% | | |
| | Combat sexual violence | 17% | 19% | | |
| | Create employment | 1% | 0% | | |
| | Ensure security | 2% | 2% | | |
| | Establishing peace in Eastern DRC | 4% | 1% | | |
| | Improve the lives of Congolese | 1% | 0% | | |
| | Reduce poverty | 3% | 0% | | |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 20% | 4% | | |
| | 3_i [provincial gov.] | % of women and men assessing performance of provincial government as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | |
| | Ensure security | 3% | 0% | | |
| | Improve the lives of Congolaise | 1% | 0% | | |
| | Prepare democratic elections | 2% | 0% | | |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 22% | 10% | | |
| | 3_i [territorial gov.] | % of women and men assessing the performance of the territorial government / La Mairie as 'very good' or 'good' across all of the following thematic areas (overall index) | | | |
| | Ensure security | 6% | 11% | | |
| | Improve the lives of Congolaise | 4% | 10% | | |
| | Prepare democratic elections | 2% | 9% | | |
| | Unify the different ethnic groups | 40% | 29% | | |
| | 3.1_i | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to administrative services of Congolese State (état civil) | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to land administration services of the Congolese State | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate they have 'good' or 'very good' access to national civil judicial system | | | |
| | 3.1.1_j [overall] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance on state agents: | | | |
| | | State agents have the right skills to provide good services | 71% | 43% | |
| | | State agents treat all ethnic groups in the same way | 49% | 39% | |
| | | State agents work on case without payment of incentive | 36% | 12% | |
| | State agents work on cases quickly / swiftly | 44% | 16% | | |
| 3.1.1_i [justice] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on the performance of judicial officials: | | | | |
| | Actors of the justice (system) are corrupt | 89% | 90% | | |
| | Court decisions are well executed | 20% | 0% | | |
| | Decisions of courts are taken in a fair manner | 34% | 2% | | |
| | Justice is fast | 9% | 1% | | |
| | The courts treat people in a fair and equal manner | 35% | 3% | | |
| | Trials are fair | 35% | 3% | | |
| 3.1.1_j [police] | % of women and men 'agreeing', 'strongly agreeing' with the following statements on police / PNC performance: | | | | |
| | It is possible to avoid arrest if one pays the police | 87% | 89% | | |
| | Police go unpunished (for crimes they commit) | 70% | 73% | | |
| | Police only work on case after payment of an incentive | 84% | 92% | | |
| | The police treats all ethnic groups in the same way | 67% | 64% | | |
| 3.2_i | % of women and men indicating that national government represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | |
| | % of women and men indicating that provincial government represents the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | |
| | % of women and men indicating that territorial administration & 'la mairie' represent the interest of population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | |
| | % of women and men indicating that local authorities represent the interest of the population 'well' or 'very well' | | | | |
| 3.2.2_ii | % of women and men who indicate that they find it 'very' or 'extremely' acceptable to pay 'official taxes' (i.e., 'real taxes', not 'invented taxes'). | | | | |
| | | 23% | 24% | | |

Table 11: ISSSS Results Data, Kalehe - by gender, Pillars 4 and 5, January to June 2017

| ISSSS Indicator # | ISSSS Indicator (EN-short) | Gender | | | |
|--|--|--|-----|----------|-------------|
| | | Women | Men | Children | Grand Total |
| Pillar 4 (Socio-Economic Resilience to conflict) | 4_i | Average monthly HH Income | | | |
| | 4_ii | % of HH depending on traditional activities as main economic activity (agriculture, fishery, animal husbandry) | | | |
| | 4.2.1_iv | 79% | 92% | | |
| | 4.2.2_ii: | 15% | 14% | | |
| | 4.2.3_i | 32% | 38% | | |
| | 4.2.5_i: | 8% | 7% | | |
| | 4.3_i | 5% | 12% | | |
| | | % of women and men declaring to have had paid job for at least a week over #past 3 months | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" participate in cultural activities / ceremonies with members of other ethnic groups | | | |
| | | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" attend places of worship together with members of other ethnic groups | | | |
| | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together with members of other ethnic groups | | | | |
| | % of women and men who indicate that people in their area "often" or "sometimes" intermarry with members from other ethnic groups | | | | |
| Pillar 5 (Preventing SGBV) | 5_ii | 97% | 84% | | |
| | 5_iii | 100% | 89% | | |
| | 5.1_i | 97% | 84% | | |
| | | 97% | 68% | | |
| | 5.1_ii | 0% | 0% | | |
| | | 6% | 1% | | |
| | | 86% | 70% | | |
| | | 33% | 14% | | |
| | | 18% | 29% | | |
| | | 100% | 99% | | |
| | 100% | 98% | | | |
| | 97% | 54% | | | |
| | 96% | 51% | | | |
| 5.2_i | 58% | 22% | | | |
| 5.3.3_v | 13% | 23% | | | |
| | 9% | 16% | | | |
| | 10% | 13% | | | |

4 Conclusion - Observations and possible considerations

The analysis, the conclusions, the observations and the recommendations presented in this section of the report were developed by the M&E Cell, based on the available data provided by the various sources.

Observations – Pillar 1 (Democratic Dialogue)

Survey data suggests that the High Plateau sub-zone is less peaceful than Littoral. Furthermore, peace projects are seemingly less effective in the High Plateau sub-zone compared to the Littoral sub-zone, as exemplified by significant differences between respondent ratings across the two areas outlined below.

Perceptions of peacefulness amongst men and women in the High Plateau and Littoral sub-zones were low, with less than 2 out of 10 people of the combined responding populations rating their neighbourhoods as “very” or “extremely” peaceful (**Indicator 1_iii**). This places Kalehe close to Ruzizi (1 person out of 10) and Kitshanga (less than 2 people out of 10), ahead of Sud-Irumu (less than 1 person out of 10) and much lower than Mambasa (approximately one third of the population). Ratings in the High Plateau region were particularly low regarding perceptions of peace in villages and neighbourhoods (less than 1 person out of ten). This coincides with a higher number of active armed groups in the area compared to the Littoral sub-zone; however, we cannot assess whether there is a causal relationship between the two. Although between 2 and 3 men out of 10 found their neighbourhoods to be “very” or “extremely” peaceful, for only about 1 woman out of 10, a similar gap is observed between the 1 every 2 men and the 1 out of 3 women who found their neighbourhoods to be “a little” or “not at all” peaceful.

Even though only a minority of the population expected villages and neighbourhoods to be more peaceful in a year (just under half the population), women were more likely to be optimistic than men (2 out of 3 providing “more peaceful” ratings for just over 1 out of 10 men) (**Indicator 1_iv**).

Only one tenth of the population in the Kalehe PZ believed that peace projects were addressing the most important issues in their area. Opinions of the projects in the High Plateau sub-zone were particularly low, with 8 out of 10 people reporting that projects were only “a little” or “not at all” capable of addressing these issues, compared to 6 out of 10 in the Littoral (**Indicator 1.1_iii**).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 1

All three projects operating in Kalehe (FCS – UNDP, CPLUP, INAWEZEKANA) seek to contribute to **Overall Outcome 1.1**, the result being measured by indicator 1_iii, and thus should take note of the above dynamics. Considering the negative views regarding peace projects addressing important issues in Kalehe, continued use of the participatory approach and dialogue mechanism of the ISSS may be worthwhile. Intervention may be prioritized in the High Plateau sub-zone given its significantly lower ratings with regard to levels of peacefulness.

Observations – Pillar 2 (FARDC performance in terms of Protection of Civilians)

Perceptions of the FARDC were generally more positive in the Littoral sub-zone compared to the High Plateau. This may be linked to a higher presence of law enforcement in the Littoral area compared to the High Plateau, however we cannot assert whether there is a causal connection. Although data suggests that respondents were not directly threatened by the FARDC, just under half

of the population reported feeling secure around FARDC patrols in both sub-zones, with women, overall, feeling less safe than men.

While the vast majority of respondents did not report having been a victim of misconduct by FARDC members over the past year, a very low share (just over one person out of 10 in both sub-zones) reported having been helped by the army (**Indicators 2_ii et 2_ii(a)**). There were no significant reporting differences between women and men. Although the FARDC did not appear to be perceived by communities as a direct threat, Kalehe was not reported to be peaceful, as noted above. This may suggest that the main perpetrators of violence in this PZ are other actors such as armed groups or the PNC. Despite perceptions that the PZ is not peaceful, far fewer reported security incidents and human rights violations (HRV) were captured by ITEM or JHRO in Kalehe than in other priority zones, which constitutes a puzzle in the data. For instance, in Mambasa, where perceptions of peacefulness are more widespread than in Kalehe (one third of the population in Mambasa versus less than a fifth in Kalehe), JHRO recorded 28 HRV perpetrated by the FARDC in Mambasa compared with only 3 in Kalehe.

Confidence in the FARDC to ensure safety in neighbourhoods was far greater in the Littoral sub-zone, with two thirds of respondents providing high ratings, compared to one fifth of the population in the High Plateau sub-zone. Furthermore, no respondents in the High Plateau reported that the FARDC contributed significantly to their security, compared to 1 out of 10 people in the Littoral. Less than half of the population in both sub-zones noted feeling secure when encountering a FARDC patrol. While a similar percentage of women and men provided a “moderate” score to this item, a larger share of women (1 out of 5) than men (1 out of 10) reported feeling insecure. In both sub-zones, but particularly in the High Plateau, there was a strong sense that FARDC crimes go unpunished (**Indicators 2_iii, 2_iii(a), 2.2, et 2.2.2_iii**).

About two-thirds of women agree that victims of crimes by the FARDC had the opportunity to complain, compared to only one-fifth of men (**Indicator 2.2.2_i**). This appears to be consistent with **Indicator 3.1.1_i (justice)**, whereby the percentage of women who agreed that the performance of judicial officials and courts was satisfactory was higher than that of men. Women feeling more able to complain about the FARDC may be related to their perceptions of state agents in the judicial system, but we are unable to assert a causal connection.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 2

Indicators in the Kalehe High Plateau sub-zone generally suggest a more volatile security situation as demonstrated in the majority of survey domains compared to the Kalehe Littoral sub-zone, indicating a higher need for intervention in the former area with regard to improved Protection of Civilians by the FARDC.

Opportunities for further monitoring and learning – Pillar 2

Examination into the low levels of peace and low levels of misconduct by the FARDC may warrant further investigation to determine whether other actors are the main perpetrators of violence in Kalehe. Furthermore, inquiry into the misalignment between the lack of reported incidents of violence in the area compared to the other priority zones, but with far lower levels of peace, may be necessary to determine whether violent incidents are unreported/under-reported in Kalehe.

Overall, perceptions regarding the performance of the government at central, provincial and territorial levels were low across both sub-zones, although it should be noted that ratings were lower in the High Plateau compared to the Littoral. In addition, ratings for performance in ensuring security at all levels of government were the lowest in Kalehe compared to the other four currently active priority zones (Kalehe – less than 1 out of 10 people, Ruzizi – less than 1 out of 10, Kitshanga – 1 out of 10, Sud-Irumu – 2 out of 10 and Mambasa – almost 5 out of 10). The one exception was the central and provincial government’s role in unifying different ethnic groups, which scored higher in the High Plateau sub-zone, indicating slightly more effective involvement in that area. Data in both sub-zones indicated a more positive perception of the territorial government’s function in facilitating inter-ethnic unification, as suggested below.

Central Government

The shares of women and men rating the central government in both sub-priority zones were generally low. In the High Plateau, indicators related to combatting corruption, creating employment, ensuring security, establishing peace in the Eastern DRC, improving the lives of the Congolese, and reducing poverty received “bad” to “very bad” ratings by 9 out of 10 of the surveyed population. While the Littoral sub-zone recorded marginally better ratings for the same indicators, the percentage of “bad” to “very bad” was still substantially high (from 8 to 9 people out of 10). Perceptions regarding the central government’s ability to combat sexual violence was relatively similar in both sub-zones, with just over two thirds of the population considering it “bad” to “very bad”. However, 2 out of 10 respondents in the Littoral provided “good” ratings compared to 1 out of 10 in the High Plateau. Interestingly, when comparing between genders, a larger share of men (about three quarters) than women (just over half of them) rated the government’s performance in this sector “bad” or “very bad”. It should be noted here that a much higher percentage of women than men provided “neutral” ratings. The only item in which ratings scored higher in the High Plateau sub-zone was regarding the government’s ability to unify different ethnic groups: it was rated “good” by one out of 6 people in the High Plateau for only 1 out of 13 in the Littoral, and it was rated “bad” or “very bad” by 2 out of 3 people in the High Plateau, for 3 out of 4 in the Littoral **(Indicator 3_i (central gov.))**.

Provincial Government

Similar to perceptions of the central government, the role of the provincial government was generally perceived to be weak across several areas. In the High Plateau sub-zone, improving the lives of the Congolese was seen to be particularly inadequate, with almost all respondents giving “bad” or “very bad” ratings. Ensuring security and preparing democratic elections were also reported to be feeble, with over 9 out of 10 people providing “bad” or “very bad” ratings. Ratings in the Littoral sub-zone were approximately one tenth higher compared to High Plateau regarding the provincial government’s ability to ensure security, though still relatively poor with just over 8 out of 10 people providing “bad” or “very bad” scores. Perceptions around improving the lives of Congolese and holding democratic elections were also very low with over 9 out of 10 people providing “bad” or “very bad” scores for both items. A similar pattern emerged when comparing ratings from the central government; perceptions of the provincial government’s ability to unify different ethnic groups was better in the High Plateau sub-zone with just over 2 out of 10 respondents providing “good” scores compared to less than 1 out of 10 in the Littoral, where on the other hand 7 out of 10 respondents rated it “bad” or “very bad” in the Littoral, against under half of the population in the High Plateau **(Indicator 3_i (provincial gov.))**.

Territorial Government

The territorial government was generally perceived as weak in the High Plateau sub-zone, with approximately 9 out of 10 respondents rating its performance in ensuring security, improving lives, and preparing democratic elections as “bad” or “very bad”. Perceptions in the Littoral sub-zone were somewhat better, particularly surrounding security: nearly 4 out of 10 people evaluate the government’s performance in this field as “good” or “average”, against less than 1 out of 10 in the High Plateau, and from 7 to 8 out of 10 people rated it “bad” or “very bad”, compared to 9 out of 10 in the High Plateau. Similarly, the performance of the territorial government concerning the improvement of living conditions is considered “good” or “average” in the Littoral by nearly 3 out of 10 people (against less than 1 in 10 in the High Plateau) and “bad” or “very bad” by three quarters (against more than 9 out of 10 people in the High Plateau). Moreover, in the first sub-zone, about 2 out of 10 people rate the government's contributions to the preparation of democratic elections as “good” or “average”, compared with just 1 in 10 in the High Plateau, and 8 out of 10 respondents in the Littoral against 9 out of 10 in the High Plateau rated it “bad” or “very bad”.

Again, a notable exception in both sub-zones was the significantly more positive perception related to the territorial government’s performance in unifying different ethnic groups, which received similar ratings throughout the PZ: approximately one third of the population in both sub-zones rated it “good”. One third of the populations in both sub-zones also provided “bad” or “very bad” ratings; however, this still represents an improvement compared to other survey items in the domain **(Indicator 3_i (territorial gov.))**.

Land Administration

In general, survey data indicated access to land administration was significantly better in the Littoral sub-zone compared to the High Plateau.

Approximately 1 out of 10 respondents from the High Plateau sub-zone provided “good” or “average” ratings regarding access to land administration and to administrative services, respectively. This compares to just over half of the population in the Littoral that provided “very good”, “good” and “average” scores for access to land administration, and 7 out of 10 people providing similar ratings for administrative services. Findings may coincide with the fact that there are greater access opportunities to judicial services in the Littoral sub-zone, and compared with more limited ones in the High Plateau **(Indicator 3.1_i)**.

State Agents

Unlike the majority of results from other survey domains, the High Plateau sub-zone outperformed the Littoral on several survey items, such as perceptions around state agents treating ethnic groups the same way (6 out of 10 against 3 out of 10), their working without incentive payments (3 out of 10 against less than 2 out of 10), and their working on cases swiftly (nearly 4 out of 10 against 2 out of 10). However, there was some inconsistency in the data as 7 respondents out of 10 in the Littoral “agreed” that regarding state agents have the right skills to provide good services, against less than half of the population of the High Plateau **(Indicator 3.1.1_i (overall))**.

Judicial System

The judicial system was generally perceived to be more effective in the High Plateau sub-zone compared to Littoral, with the exception of the perception of corruption, though it is very high in both sub-zones. Confidence in the territorial administration and local authorities was much higher throughout the PZ compared to trust in the national and provincial governments. In line with other

survey data, however, the Littoral sub-zone outperformed the High Plateau as highlighted below, suggesting better systems in territorial and local systems in the former.

Confidence in the judicial system was relatively low in both sub-zones. In particular, corruption amongst justice system actors and police was perceived to be high, especially in the High Plateau. Respondent views on the role of national and provincial governments was negative in both sub-zones, though worse in the High Plateau.

Perceptions around the role of the territorial administration representing interests of the population were notably higher in the Littoral region, with 7 out of 10 people providing “very good”, “good” and “average” scores, compared to 3 out of 10 in the High Plateau. Trust in the local authorities was seemingly higher than towards representatives at that provincial and national levels, with three quarters of respondents in the High Plateau and 8 out of 10 in the Littoral providing positive or average ratings.

Perceptions around the judicial system were particularly low in the Littoral sub-zone, where less than 1 out of 10 people consider that court decisions are executed well, taken in a fair manner, and treat people equally and fairly. The High Plateau recorded similarly low scores, except for views around court decisions being taken in a fair manner, which received a comparatively higher score with 3 out of 10 respondents providing “agreement” ratings. Corruption amongst justice system actors was perceived to be high across both sub-zones though slightly higher in the High Plateau with 9 out of 10 people against 8 out of 10 in the Littoral providing “agreement” ratings. The outlook on policing was similarly low, with high percentages of respondents reporting corruption through pay-offs in both sub-zones, though more so in the High Plateau (9 out of 10, for 8 out of 10 in the Littoral). Despite slightly better perceptions regarding police impunity for crimes they commit, approximately 8 out of 10 respondents agreed that police go unpunished in the High Plateau, for two-thirds in the Littoral (**Indicators 3.1.1_i (justice) et 3.1.1_i (police)**).

While perceptions that the national and provincial governments represented interests of the population “well” or “very well” were very low in both sub-zones (less than 1 out of 10 people), the territorial administration performed remarkably better in the Littoral sub-zone (approximately one third of the population) compared to the High Plateau (less than 1 out of 10 people). Respondents feedback on the local authorities representing community interest well was relatively higher in both sub-zones, with approximately half of the population in the Littoral sub-zone and a quarter in the High Plateau providing “very good” or “good” ratings (**Indicator 3.2_i**)³.

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 3

The disparity of ratings between the High Plateau and Littoral sub-zones regarding government performance suggest an imbalance which may need to be addressed. In particular, programming around improving land administration in the High Plateau may be an area to target in the shorter term. The higher levels of trust in local authorities compared to national and provincial actors may suggest that efforts to restore state authority are more likely to gain acceptance by communities in Kalehe if targeted at the territorial level.

³ The phrasing of those indicators that measure the level of trust among populations towards the different administrative levels has changed slightly since the baseline study (June-December 2016 data) and the present reporting period (January-June 2017). The original phrasing was: “In your opinion, how do representatives at the national level represent the population’s interests and opinions?” Now, the indicator asks: “In your opinion, how does the central government represent the population’s interests and opinions?” The M&E Cell continues to compare these indicators, but a certain error margin inevitably appears.

Observations – Pillar 4 (Socio-economic resilience to conflict)

Overall, women and men in the High Plateau sub-zone had far less access to credit, land, and markets than in the Littoral, which significantly limited their ability to participate in income earning activities or wage employment. This does not, however, seem to have coincided with ethnic tensions or disharmony at the community level.

The vast majority of respondents in both sub-zones depend on traditional activities (e.g. agriculture, fishery and husbandry) as main economic activities (**Indicator 4_ii**). While both populations reported poor access to markets, the High Plateau region recorded particularly low scores, with only 1 out of 10 people evaluating their access as “good”, and three quarters “poor” and “very poor”. Comparatively, one quarter of respondents from the Littoral sub-zone asserted “poor” or “very poor” access (**Indicator 4.2.1_iv**). On trend, a proportionally lower number of respondents from the High Plateau sub-zone (less than 2 out of 10 against more than 5 out of 10 in the Littoral) reported good access to land (**Indicator 4.2.2_ii**). Across both sub-zones, the percentage of respondents reporting paid work in the past three months was low and, as expected, lower in the High Plateau sub-zone than in the Littoral (less than 1 out of 10 and 1 out of 10 people respectively) (**Indicator 4.2.5_i**).

Respondents reported high levels of engagement with other ethnic groups across both sub-zones in multiple domains such as inter-ethnic cooperation through intermarriage, cultural activities, and attending the same places of worship (from 7 to 9 out of 10 people). Women reported higher levels of cooperation than men across these dimensions (**Indicator 4.3_i**).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 4

Significant differences in socio-economic resilience between the High Plateau and Littoral sub-zones suggests a higher need for intervention in the former regarding access to credit, land and markets. Targeted programming, which enhances High Plateau residents’ opportunities for generating income, should be considered.

Observations – Pillar 5 (SGBV Prevention)⁴

Overall levels of sexual violence did not present as a major issue in the Kalehe PZ. However, survey data shows less progressive attitudes towards women, particularly in the High Plateau sub-zone when compared to the Littoral sub-zone. Unsurprisingly, men’s outlooks were generally more patriarchal than women’s regarding sexual consent, violence towards women and reintegrating survivors of sexual violence back into households, as outlined below. Access to health services were far worse in the High Plateau than in the Littoral, particularly regarding psychological support and reintegration services, indicating a need for greater intervention in the former.

Levels of sexual violence in both the High Plateau and Littoral sub-zones were seemingly low with no reports of attacks in the past six months and relatively low numbers (less than 1 out of 10) of respondents asserting personally knowing a victim (**Indicators 5_ii** and **5_iii**). Despite this, cultural perceptions around consent indicated less progressive attitudes within the communities, particularly

⁴ It is not possible to estimate the total number of incidents of sexual violence in the priority zones, as it is unlikely that any of the available data sets offer a comprehensive tally. Assuming however that any flaws in the data affect all data collection across all geographic zones, however, the data sets can offer some insight into relative magnitude of the problem across geographic areas.

in the High Plateau and among men. Consent for sexual activity differed between the sub-zones, with approximately one third of respondents in the High Plateau suggesting that consent was *not* always required, compared to 1 out of 10 in the Littoral. Unsurprisingly, when disaggregated by gender, 9 women out of 10 asserted that consent was always necessary, compared to only 7 men out of 10. Interestingly, while some survey items suggest a slightly more progressive attitude toward SGBV in the Littoral sub-zone, 3 out of 10 respondents there felt that sexual violence should be resolved within the family, without the involvement of authorities, for 2 out of 10 in the High Plateau (**Indicator 5.1_i**).

A relatively high percentage of respondents (a quarter of the population in the High Plateau, one fifth in the Littoral) agreed that it is sometimes acceptable for men to beat their wife, indicating less progressive attitudes towards violence against women. When disaggregated by gender, approximately one third of men asserted acceptability, compared to just under one fifth of women. Though the difference in attitudes of men and women is notable, one fifth of women agreeing with this statement suggests male dominance within the communities (**Indicator 5.1_i**).

An overwhelming majority of respondents in both sub-zones (almost 10 out of 10 people) asserted that they would accept victims/survivors of sexual violence back into households and communities, though this figure drops within households if the victim/survivor contracted a disease or suffered an injury as a result. On trend, respondents from the High Plateau sub-zone show a less progressive outlook with one third of the population suggesting they would *not* let a survivor back into the household, compared to 1 out of 10 in the Littoral area. The data shows stark differences in attitudes between women and men, with almost 10 out of 10 female respondents across both sub-zones reporting that they would allow a survivor back into the household, compared to only half of the male respondents. Similarly, almost all of the women indicated they would allow a survivor who had a child as a result of sexual violence back into the home, compared to only 5 men out of 10 (**Indicator 5.1_ii**).

While perceptions were relatively low in both sub-zones, access to health care services, psychological support and reintegration services for survivors of sexual violence were outwardly worse in High Plateau with only less than 1 out of 10 respondents reporting “very good” or “good” access to services, compared to approximately a quarter of the Littoral population. Interestingly, almost one third more men than women reported access to health care services for survivors as “bad” or “very bad” (**Indicator 5.3.3_v**).

Possible considerations for programming – Pillar 5

As in other priority zones, an emphasis on programming which addresses patriarchal conceptions of gender roles may need to be considered, particularly regarding attitudes towards sexual consent. The grave disparities highlighted by the data suggests a strong need for intervention in health services, psychological support and reintegration services of sexual violence in the High Plateau sub-zone.